Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-374
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Schultz ◽  
Henk E. Goemans

AbstractAlthough in principle states can bargain over the entire extent of their combined territory, we observe historically that states bargain within far more limited confines defined by well-bounded claims. We argue that this observation stems from the fact that states generally have limited territorial aims due either to limited benefits of obtaining additional territory and/or the costs of absorbing and controlling new territories and their inhabitants. Using a formal model, we show that introducing states with limited aims over territory has strategic implications for bargaining that have not been appreciated in canonical models that do not consider heterogeneity in state preferences. Whereas traditional models generally imply that small demands undermine the credibility of a challenger's threat, the existence of states with limited territorial aims makes limited demands credible, effective, and stable in the face of shocks to relative power. We then employ geospatial data on the geographic extent of territorial disputes in the period 1947–2000 to establish two results: the size of claims is weakly related to the relative power of disputants and unaffected by dramatic changes in power, and smaller claims are associated with a higher probability that the challenger will receive any concession.

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Gallop

For the bargaining model of war, in the absence of incomplete information and commitment problems, war is irrational. But this finding rests on a simple and rarely discussed assumption, that bargaining is between exactly two participants. When we relax this assumption, in a three-player bargaining game, war is an equilibrium. Thus, a key finding of the bargaining model, that there is always an agreement that all states prefer war, is an artifact of dyadic analysis. By removing this limitation, we can find new factors that affect the risk of war: the number of actors, divergence in state preferences, alliance dynamics, and the issue being bargained over.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (04) ◽  
pp. 626-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Haynes

ABSTRACTThis article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international conflict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model’s core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modified to focus on different aspects of the model’s logic.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter John Loewen

Abstract.Some citizens differ in their levels of concern for the supporters of various parties. I demonstrate how such concerns can motivate citizens to vote. I first present a simple formal model that incorporates concern for others and election benefits to explain the decision to vote. By predicting substantial turnout, this model overcomes the “paradox of participation.” I then verify the model empirically. I utilize a series dictator games in an online survey of more than 2000 Canadians to measure the concern of individuals for other partisans. I show how the preferences revealed in these games can predict the decision to vote in the face of several conventional controls. Taken together, the formal model and empirical results generate a more fulsome and satisfactory account of the decision to vote than an explanation which relies solely on duty.Résumé.Les citoyens ne se préoccupent pas tous des partisans des divers partis politiques. Je démontre comment de telles préoccupations peuvent motiver les citoyens à participer aux élections. Je présente d'abord un modèle formel qui explique la décision de voter en intégrant les préoccupations à l'égard des autres électeurs et les bénéfices associés à une élection. En prédisant une part substantielle de la participation, ce modèle surmonte le paradoxe de la participation électorale. Ensuite, le modèle est vérifié empiriquement. J'emploie à cette fin une série de jeux du dictateur insérés dans une enquête menée en ligne auprès de 2000 Canadiens afin de mesurer leur degré de préoccupation à l'égard des autres partisans. Je montre comment les préférences révélées dans ces jeux peuvent prédire la décision de voter. Ensemble, le modèle formel et les résultats empiriques produisent une explication plus éloquente et plus satisfaisante de la décision de voter lors d'une élection que les explications qui s'appuient seulement sur le sens du devoir.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68
Author(s):  
Joan C. Timoneda

Formal institutions in dictatorship are known to improve authoritarian governance and promote power-sharing. Yet institutions also act as tools of information propagation and can be used by autocrats for signaling purposes. In this article, I argue that in times of weakness, dictators follow an expand-and-signal strategy, expanding the ruling coalition to decrease the relative power of coup plotters and then create visible formal institutions to signal strong support. Doing so decreases (1) the probability that a coup is launched and (2) that one succeeds if staged. I propose a formal model to unpack the mechanisms of my argument and use the case of the Dominican Republic during Rafael Trujillo's rule to illustrate my theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Muhammad Owais

The Palestine issue is attributed to be the most complicated problem in the region of the Middle East. However, few researchers analyze the problem through the lens of ethnic conflict. This research paper investigates that the use of Zionism as a metaphor for colonialism and its role in fostering an ethnic conflict between Israeli and Palestinians. Qualitative content analysis is used to analyze secondary data on ethnic conflict in present Israel. In addition to that bargaining model of war is used to identify the underlying issues of the ethnic conflict. The findings reveal that Zionism and identity contribute to accelerating the ethnic conflict between Israeli and Palestinians. Despite international interventions and signing many peace agreements, the problem remains unresolved due to a trust deficit between both ethnicities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 591-607
Author(s):  
Kimberly R Frugé

Leaders are incentivized to repress in the face of mobilized dissent. However, leaders are unable to repress alone and rely on repressive agents, who can shirk the order and weaken the leader’s control. I use a formal model to analyze when the leader can use repression strategically to avoid defection, based on leader type. Each type has incentives to repress to distort the leader’s risk of removal and thus deter defection. Power, cost, and uncertainty are important in both the leader’s and the agent’s decision to repress. Testable hypotheses reveal how executive power and punishment influence the level of repression.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua A Strayhorn

Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigants can credibly signal information about noncompliance, and how litigants’ signals interact with the cues of ideology and dissent. The model shows that litigant signals can be highly informative about doctrinal compliance, sometimes even crowding out the need for other signals. By contrast, litigants face difficulty communicating information about case importance; dissent, however, can be highly informative on this dimension. Accordingly, some informational cues may only influence limited aspects of the high court’s case selection process.


2005 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 612-627
Author(s):  
Makoto Ohtsu ◽  
Anil Verma

This paper attempts to determine the extent to which the concept of «intra-organizational bargaining», suggested by Walton and McKersie, among others, is useful in analyzing wage differentials between sub-groups within a local union. Based on historical data for public schoolteachers in Saskatchewan, the results show that the relative power of sub-groups within the union has a much stronger bearing on internal wage differentials than do the economic variables. This lends strong support to the intraorganizational bargaining model of internal wage differentials.


Author(s):  
John Garnett ◽  
John Baylis

This chapter examines theories that explain the causes of war. It considers ideas advanced by political scientists, sociologists, biologists and philosophers, showing that different explanations of war give rise to different requirements or conditions for peace. After highlighting the difficulties in studying war, the chapter discusses human nature explanations of war, citing such factors as frustration, misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and errors of judgement as well as the role of human collectives including factions, tribes, nations and states. It then describes the bargaining model of war before turning to inter-state wars, intra-state conflicts, and ethnic conflicts. It also explores the debate over whether ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ are the main causes of civil wars. The chapter concludes that identifying a single cause appropriate to all wars is an exercise in futility and that a worldwide ‘just’ peace is unattainable.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document