scholarly journals Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 112 (5) ◽  
pp. 1257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Kapczynski
Author(s):  
Susan Gluck Mezey

Opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States is frequently based on the religious belief that marriage should be reserved for a man and a woman. With most of the attention focused on wedding vendors, the clash between religious liberty and marriage equality has largely manifested itself in efforts by business owners, such as photographers, florists, caterers, and bakers, to deny their services to same-sex couples celebrating their marriages. Citing state antidiscrimination laws, the couples demand the owners treat them as they do their other customers. Owners of public accommodations (privately owned business open to the public) who object to facilitating the weddings of same-sex couples do so typically by asserting their personal religious beliefs as defenses when charged with violating such laws; they argue that they would view their participation (albeit indirect) in wedding ceremonies as endorsing same-sex marriage. As the lawsuits against them began to proliferate, the business owners asked the courts to shield them from liability for violating the laws prohibiting discrimination because of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. They cited their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion and their right not to be compelled to speak, that is, to express a positive message about same-sex marriage. With conflicts between same-sex couples and owners of business establishments arising in a number of states, the focus of the nation’s attention was on a New Mexico photographer, a Washington State florist, and a Colorado baker, each of whom sought an exemption from their state’s antidiscrimination law to enable them to exercise their religious tenets against marriage equality. In these cases, the state human rights commissions and the state appellate courts ruled that the antidiscrimination laws outweighed the rights of the business owners to exercise their religious beliefs against marriage equality by refusing to play a role, no matter how limited, in a same-sex marriage ceremony. In June 2018, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state’s antidiscrimination law that guaranteed equal treatment for same-sex couples in places of public accommodations but reversed the Commission’s ruling against the Colorado baker. In a narrow decision, the Court held that the Commission infringed on the baker’s First Amendment right to free exercise by uttering comments that, in the Court’s view, demonstrated hostility to his sincerely held religious beliefs. The ruling affirmed that society has a strong interest in protecting gay men and lesbians from harm as they engage in the marketplace as well as in respecting sincerely held religious beliefs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

For several years now, a group of prominent religious liberty scholars in the United States have been defending what they call a “live-and-let-live” approach to accommodating religious dissent in the era of marriage equality. The proposed approach calls on the state to avoid taking sides on contested moral issues when individuals of faith claim that their religious beliefs require them to refrain from facilitating marriages by same-sex couples. The objective, it is argued, is to adopt policies that allow both sides to live according to their values. This article critiques the “live-and-let-live” solution to religious exemptions from LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) equality measures by focusing on questions of harms. It argues that the proposed approach calls for a weighing of harms that is largely unprecedented in the history of American antidiscrimination law and problematic in its own right. The article also explains that the approach is premised on questionable assumptions and predictions about the absence of any meaningful harm to LGBT individuals when business owners provide goods and services to the general public, but refuse to do so for same-sex couples on religious grounds.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-246
Author(s):  
Yofi Tirosh

Abstract This Article addresses a common characteristic of antidiscrimination law: To what extent should one antidiscrimination campaign be held accountable for other, related, discriminatory structures that it does not and cannot purport to correct? Plaintiffs in antidiscrimination cases are sometimes expected to account for the larger social context in which their claim is made. Defendants invoke this larger context as a way of rebutting the discrimination claim, by arguing that the plaintiff’s claim has “discriminatory residue” that would exacerbate related discriminatory structures. For example, in a case in which same-sex couples seek the right to contract with surrogate mothers, the defendant can argue that accepting the plaintiffs’ claim that they are discriminated against on the basis of sexuality might exacerbate the exploitation of surrogate mothers. This Article dubs such rebuttal claims RADARs: reciprocal antidiscrimination arguments. It offers a framework for weighing RADARs’ feasibility, by mapping both their potential and their limitations. It concludes that RADARs can be useful analytical tools for legislators and policymakers when assessing the overall impact of specific antidiscrimination measures. RADARs are also helpful for cause lawyers in considering the long term impacts of antidiscrimination litigation. In contrast, courts should be cautious in accepting RADARs made by defendants in antidiscrimination cases due to the inherent institutional and procedural limitations of adjudication.


Author(s):  
Andrew Koppelman

Should religious people who conscientiously object to facilitating same-sex weddings, and who therefore decline to provide cakes, photography, or other services, be exempted from antidiscrimination laws? This issue has taken on an importance far beyond the tiny number who have made such claims. Gay rights advocates fear that exempting even a few religious dissenters would unleash a devastating wave of discrimination. Conservative Christians fear that the law will treat them like racists and drive them to the margins of American society. Both sides are mistaken. This is not a matter of abstract principle, and none of the constitutional claims work. This is an appropriate occasion for legislative negotiation. This book is the only systematic accounting of the interests that must be balanced in any decent compromise, in terms that both sides can recognize and appreciate. This book explains the basis of antidiscrimination law, including the complex idea of dignitary harm. It shows why even those who do not regard religion as important or valid nonetheless have good reasons to support religious liberty, and why those who regard religion as a value of overriding importance should nonetheless reject the extravagant power over nonbelievers that the Supreme Court has recently embraced. The book also proposes a specific solution to the problem: that religious exemptions be granted only to the few businesses that are willing to announce their compunctions and bear the costs of doing so—an approach makes room for America’s enormous variety of deeply held beliefs and ways of life.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (03) ◽  
pp. 830-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin M. Adam ◽  
Betsy L. Cooper

This study argues that rights discourse influences heterosexual public opinion in Washington State. We tested this through a survey experiment conducted in the 2011 Washington Poll. We broke interviewees into three groups, with each group exposed to a different frame: a pro–lesbian and gay equal rights frame, an anti–lesbian and gay special rights frame, and a control or no frame. Immediately following the treatment, we asked interviewees if they agreed with a pro–lesbian and gay policy: changing state antidiscrimination law to encompass those who identify as lesbian and gay. Overall, this study concludes that a special rights frame dampens support among some while an equal rights frame has no effect. Respondents who indicated that they were against same-sex marriage even more strongly opposed altering antidiscrimination policy to include sexual orientation when confronted with an equal rights frame than when confronted with the special rights frame or no frame at all.


1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin A. Seider ◽  
Keith L. Gladstien ◽  
Kenneth K. Kidd

Time of language onset and frequencies of speech and language problems were examined in stutterers and their nonstuttering siblings. These families were grouped according to six characteristics of the index stutterer: sex, recovery or persistence of stuttering, and positive or negative family history of stuttering. Stutterers and their nonstuttering same-sex siblings were found to be distributed identically in early, average, and late categories of language onset. Comparisons of six subgroups of stutterers and their respective nonstuttering siblings showed no significant differences in the number of their reported articulation problems. Stutterers who were reported to be late talkers did not differ from their nonstuttering siblings in the frequency of their articulation problems, but these two groups had significantly higher frequencies of articulation problems than did stutterers who were early or average talkers and their siblings.


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