Marriage Equality, Public Accommodations Laws, and Religious Exercise

Author(s):  
Susan Gluck Mezey

Opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States is frequently based on the religious belief that marriage should be reserved for a man and a woman. With most of the attention focused on wedding vendors, the clash between religious liberty and marriage equality has largely manifested itself in efforts by business owners, such as photographers, florists, caterers, and bakers, to deny their services to same-sex couples celebrating their marriages. Citing state antidiscrimination laws, the couples demand the owners treat them as they do their other customers. Owners of public accommodations (privately owned business open to the public) who object to facilitating the weddings of same-sex couples do so typically by asserting their personal religious beliefs as defenses when charged with violating such laws; they argue that they would view their participation (albeit indirect) in wedding ceremonies as endorsing same-sex marriage. As the lawsuits against them began to proliferate, the business owners asked the courts to shield them from liability for violating the laws prohibiting discrimination because of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. They cited their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion and their right not to be compelled to speak, that is, to express a positive message about same-sex marriage. With conflicts between same-sex couples and owners of business establishments arising in a number of states, the focus of the nation’s attention was on a New Mexico photographer, a Washington State florist, and a Colorado baker, each of whom sought an exemption from their state’s antidiscrimination law to enable them to exercise their religious tenets against marriage equality. In these cases, the state human rights commissions and the state appellate courts ruled that the antidiscrimination laws outweighed the rights of the business owners to exercise their religious beliefs against marriage equality by refusing to play a role, no matter how limited, in a same-sex marriage ceremony. In June 2018, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state’s antidiscrimination law that guaranteed equal treatment for same-sex couples in places of public accommodations but reversed the Commission’s ruling against the Colorado baker. In a narrow decision, the Court held that the Commission infringed on the baker’s First Amendment right to free exercise by uttering comments that, in the Court’s view, demonstrated hostility to his sincerely held religious beliefs. The ruling affirmed that society has a strong interest in protecting gay men and lesbians from harm as they engage in the marketplace as well as in respecting sincerely held religious beliefs.

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-377
Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

AbstractThis article compares the difficulty in achieving a public stance of neutrality toward sexual orientation with the difficulty in achieving neutrality toward religious belief. Strict separation treats religion as a private commitment, with firm limits on government cooperation with religion and strong protection for free exercise. Formal neutrality discounts religion as a basis either for conferring special benefits or for withholding generally available benefits. Positive neutrality attends to the practical effects of public policy, sometimes requiring an abandonment of nonestablishment in favor of policies that allow for greater protection for free exercise of religion. I argue that none of these forms of neutrality establishes impartiality regarding either religious belief or same-sex marriage. First, Michael McConnell's “disestablishment” approach to sexual orientation and same-sex marriage instantiates are neither neutrality nor civic equality. Second, while formal neutrality may render an establishment more inclusive, it may exclude those whose beliefs and practices are not deemed in accordance with public purposes. Third, although positive neutrality may remove burdens from same-sex couples whose conscientious convictions may impel them to marry, it may still favor some kinds of practices over others.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

For several years now, a group of prominent religious liberty scholars in the United States have been defending what they call a “live-and-let-live” approach to accommodating religious dissent in the era of marriage equality. The proposed approach calls on the state to avoid taking sides on contested moral issues when individuals of faith claim that their religious beliefs require them to refrain from facilitating marriages by same-sex couples. The objective, it is argued, is to adopt policies that allow both sides to live according to their values. This article critiques the “live-and-let-live” solution to religious exemptions from LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) equality measures by focusing on questions of harms. It argues that the proposed approach calls for a weighing of harms that is largely unprecedented in the history of American antidiscrimination law and problematic in its own right. The article also explains that the approach is premised on questionable assumptions and predictions about the absence of any meaningful harm to LGBT individuals when business owners provide goods and services to the general public, but refuse to do so for same-sex couples on religious grounds.


Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

The institution of marriage stands at a critical juncture. As gay marriage equality gains acceptance in law and public opinion, questions abound regarding marriage's future. Will same-sex marriage lead to more radical marriage reform? Should it? Antonin Scalia and many others on the right warn of a slippery slope from same-sex marriage toward polygamy, adult incest, and the dissolution of marriage as we know it. Equally, many academics, activists, and intellectuals on the left contend that there is no place for monogamous marriage as a special status defined by law. This book demonstrates that both sides are wrong: the same principles of democratic justice that demand marriage equality for same-sex couples also lend support to monogamous marriage. The book displays the groundlessness of arguments against same-sex marriage and defends marriage as a public institution against those who would eliminate its special status or supplant it with private arrangements. Arguing that monogamy reflects and cultivates our most basic democratic values, the book opposes the legal recognition of polygamy, but agrees with progressives that public policies should do more to support nontraditional caring and caregiving relationships. Throughout, the book explores the meaning of contemporary marriage and the reasons for its fragility and its enduring significance. Casting new light on today's debates over the future of marriage, the book lays the groundwork for a stronger institution.


2019 ◽  
pp. 92-94
Author(s):  
Jane Sendall ◽  
Roiya Hodgson

This chapter discusses the scope of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004) which came into force on 5 December 2005 and the formation of civil partnerships. It outlines civil partnership and same-sex marriage under The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. It also explains the differences between civil partnership and marriage. The CPA 2004 enables same-sex couples to form legally recognized civil partnerships. Once a partnership has been formed, civil partners assume many legal rights and responsibilities for each other, third parties, and the State. It does explain that adultery, however, is not a fact to establish the ground for dissolution of a civil partnership as it is in marriage.


Family Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 92-94
Author(s):  
Roiya Hodgson

This chapter discusses the scope of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004) which came into force on 5 December 2005 and the formation of civil partnerships. It outlines civil partnership and same-sex marriage under The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. It also explains the differences between civil partnership and marriage. Once a partnership has been formed, civil partners assume many legal rights and responsibilities for each other, third parties, and the State. It does explain that adultery, however, is not a fact to establish the ground for dissolution of a civil partnership as it is in marriage. The Civil Partnership (Opposite-sex Couples) Regulations 2019 are also outlined.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Jowett

The United Kingdom’s Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act (2013) was framed by the Government as an equality measure and, as such, those who opposed the legislation were likely to be sensitive to possible accusations of prejudice. This article examines opposition to marriage equality within the British press and explores how denials of homophobia were made. Opponents to same-sex marriage attended to commonsense notions of ‘homophobes’, either by aligning their views with categories of persons not typically considered homophobic or by distancing their views from a homophobic other. Opponents also offered a counter-accusation that it was liberal supporters of same-sex marriage who were intolerant. Parallels are drawn with discursive literature on racist discourse and it appears that despite social scientists’ attempts to expand the concept of antigay prejudice, homophobia is commonly referred to in terms of irrational bigoted individuals.


This chapter will focus on the biggest moral issue in recent history-the debate over same-sex marriage. This unprecedented case began in 1990 when three same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses from the State of Hawaii. They were refused and challenged the state's decision. In May 1993, the Hawaiian Supreme Court ruled the state needed to show compelling reasons why the same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry. Although the battle in Hawaii began in the court, it ended up in the state legislature where it spread rapidly across the nation. Legislators have responded to the promotion of same-sex marriage by sponsoring and passing bills claiming that it contravenes their faith based principles.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 549-572
Author(s):  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Uladzislau Belavusau

This paper provides a detailed critical analysis of the case of Coman, where the Court of Justice clarified that the meaning of the term ‘spouse’ in Directive 2004/38 was gender-neutral, opening up the door for same-sex marriage recognition for immigration purposes all around the EU, thus destroying the heteronormative misinterpretations of the clear language of the Directive practised in a handful of Member States. The state of EU law after Coman is still far from perfect, however: we underline a line of important questions which remain open and which the Court will need to turn to in the near future to ensure that marriage equality moves beyond mere proclamations in the whole territory of the Union.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rex Ahdar

Same-sex marriage is legal or likely to be legalised in many Western nations. One important safeguard invariably incorporated in the legislation providing for same-sex marriage has been an exemption for religious ministers who object to solemnising such marriages. Another category of potential objectors consists of marriage registrars, commissioners or celebrants employed or appointed by the state. By contrast, an accommodation grounded in the right of religious freedom and conscience for these governmental celebrants has not been granted. This article examines the introduction of same-sex marriage in three jurisdictions – England and Wales, New Zealand and Canada. It analyses the precise ambit of the exemption for religious celebrants, considers the vulnerability of such exemptions to future legal challenge and questions the validity of denying free exercise accommodation to state-appointed celebrants.


2022 ◽  
pp. 179-201

The political terrain surrounding the legalization of same-sex marriage and the need to accommodate individuals' faith-based objections have been part of public discourse since the passage of initial marriage equality statutes. These exemptions played an essential element in the bills' passages and have mainly gone unquestioned from proponents of marriage equality. But for many of the supporters of these religious exemptions, they did not go far enough to protect business owners or government officials who objected on religious grounds. This chapter discusses the resulting tension between religious freedom and marriage equality.


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