The Political Creed of Thomas Cromwell

1956 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 69-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. R. Elton

TWO views are current concerning the political views of Thomas Cromwell. One—the more common—holds that he believed in absolute monarchy and desired to establish it in England. The Abbé Constant, summarizing (as was his wont) other people's views in language free from other people's reservations, stated it most starkly: he thought that Cromwell aimed at making Henry ‘tout-puissant’ and that his ministry was the golden age of Tudor despotism. Quite recently, an ingenious theory, buttressed with a misunderstood document, based itself on this general conviction. This view has suffered curiously little from the growing realization that the Henrician Reformation rested on conscious co-operation with Parliament and that the propagandists of the time never produced a theory of absolute monarchy. Pollard, the defender of Henry VIII's constitutionalism, seems to have held that, though the king had no ambitions for a genuine despotism, Cromwell certainly harboured such ideas. The other view, recently given support by Dr. Parker, holds that Cromwell did not bother at all about theoretical issues, that his ‘resolutely Philistine type of mind’ despised political theory, and that he never thought beyond the establishment of a sovereign monarchy. Thus, too, Mr. Baumer thought that Cromwell saw in Parliament ‘only a means of executing the royal will’, but also that he ‘had no theoretical views whatever about the relation of the king to the law’—passages hard to reconcile but suggestive of Dr. Parker's views rather than M. Constant's.

2020 ◽  
Vol 145 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-505
Author(s):  
EIRINI DIAMANTOULI

Ideologically motivated attempts to elucidate Shostakovich’s political views and to determine whether and how they may be coded into his compositions have come to characterize the Western reception of the composer’s works since his death in 1975. Fuelled by the political oppositions of the cold war, Shostakovich’s posthumous reputation in the West has been largely shaped by two conflicting perspectives. These have positioned him on the one hand as a secret dissident, bent and broken under the unbearable strain of totalitarianism, made heroic through his veiled musical resistance to Communism; and on the other hand as a composer compromised by his capitulation to the regime – represented in an anachronistic musical style. Both perspectives surrender Shostakovich and his music to a crude oversimplification driven by vested political interests. Western listeners thus conditioned are primed to hear either the coded dissidence of a tragic victim of Communist brutality or the sinister submission of a ‘loyal son of the Communist Party’.1 For those prepared to accept Shostakovich as a ‘tragic victim’, the publication of his purported memoirs in 1979, ‘as related to and edited by’ the author Solomon Volkov, presents a tantalizing conclusion: bitterly yet discreetly scornful of the Stalinist regime, Shostakovich was indeed a secret dissident and this dissidence was made tangible in his music.


Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman

Justices have considerable latitude to pursue either their personal preferences or their personal visions of the law. The danger is that the Court gets so far out of line from the rest of the political system that we see fundamental institutional showdowns that threaten the independence of the judiciary, such as the Court-packing controversy in the 1930s. If the elected branches influence justices, however, they can keep the Court in check, thereby attenuating such risks. This chapter tests whether the Court systematically yields to the elected branches. In particular, it examines whether individual justices vote differently when the constraints imposed by the executive and legislative branches are likely to be at their strongest. It focuses on the two versions in the literature: one in which the Court is constrained only on statutory cases and the other in which the constraint extends to all cases, including constitutional cases.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-121
Author(s):  
Joan Wallach Scott

This chapter considers the contradictions of women's emancipation in light of the American (1776) and the French (1789) revolutions. It shows how the resistance to women's citizenship had less to do with the necessarily slow but inevitable progress of liberal democratic ideas than it did with a contradiction at the very heart of the political thinking that articulated them—a political thinking integral to the discourse of secularism. Liberal political theory postulated the sameness of all individuals as the key to their formal equality—abstracted from their circumstances there was no discernable difference among them, they stood as equals before the law. At the same time there were differences that were thought to refuse abstraction. These were people in a state of dependency, such as propertyless peasants, wage laborers, women, children, slaves. Therefore, they could not be counted as autonomous individuals—autonomy, after all, was at the heart of the very definition of individuality.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
MELVIN L. ROGERS

In recent decades, the concept of “the people” has received sustained theoretical attention. Unfortunately, political theorists have said very little about its explicit or implicit use in thinking about the expansion of the American polity along racial lines. The purpose of this article in taking up this issue is twofold: first, to provide a substantive account of the meaning of “the people”—what I call its descriptive and aspirational dimensions—and second, to use that description as a framework for understanding the rhetorical character of W.E.B. Du Bois's classic work,The Souls of Black Folk, and its relationship to what one might call the cognitive–affective dimension of judgment. In doing so, I argue that as a work of political theory,Soulsdraws a connection between rhetoric, on the one hand, and emotional states such as sympathy and shame, on the other, to enlarge America's political and ethical imagination regarding the status of African-Americans.


1979 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Forsyth

Hobbes' conception of relations between states has attracted attention from two directions. Students of political theory who have focused on Hobbes have from time to time looked beyond their central preoccupations and noted briefly the relevance of his doctrine for the international arena. The external relations of Leviathan are for them on the fringe of Hobbes' theory. Students of international relations on the other hand invoke Hobbes' name frequently as a kind of shorthand for a particular approach to the international world, one that is also associated with Machiavelli, and usually called the ‘realist’ approach. By contrast with the political theorists, they tend to look from the outside into Hobbes’ theory and to ask whether and how far the ‘domestic’ situation of individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature bears an analogy with the ‘external’ situation of states in relationship to one another.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-436
Author(s):  
Roderick A. Macdonald

Given the inclination of legal scholars to progressively displace the meaning of a judicial decision from its context toward abstract propositions, it is no surprise that at its fiftieth anniversary, Roncarelli v. Duplessis has come to be interpreted in Manichean terms. The complex currents of postwar society and politics in Quebec are reduced to a simple story of good and evil in which evil is incarnated in Duplessis’s “persecution” of Roncarelli. In this paper the author argues for a more nuanced interpretation of the case. He suggests that the thirteen opinions delivered at trial and on appeal reflect several debates about society, the state and law that are as important now as half a century ago. The personal socio-demography of the judges authoring these opinions may have predisposed them to decide one way or the other; however, the majority and dissenting opinions also diverged (even if unconsciously) in their philosophical leanings in relation to social theory (internormative pluralism), political theory (communitarianism), and legal theory (pragmatic instrumentalism). Today, these dimensions can be seen to provide support for each of the positions argued by Duplessis’s counsel in Roncarelli given the state of the law in 1946.


Asian Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Téa SERNELJ

The article investigates the political views of one of the most prominent representatives of the so-called second generation of Modern Confucianism, Xu Fuguan. It reveals his unique position within this intellectual movement. Even though all other adherents of Modern Confucianism were focused upon metaphysics and ontology rather than political theory, Xu believed that these lines of thought could not contribute enough to solving the various urgent social and political problems of modern China. In this regard, the present article focuses upon a critical analysis of Xu’s critique of the Chinese Communist Party. The author presents and evaluates his critique mainly with regard to his search for a resolution of the problematic and chaotic political and social situation of China during the first half of the 20th century. In conclusion, the author provides a critical evaluation of Xu’s social democratic thought and particularly of his attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party.


1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Reshaur

AbstractThis article has two objectives: one is to distinguish and explicate four concepts of solidarity which are found in the writings of Hannah Arendt; the other is to show how Arendt's respect for facts and suspicion of sentiment publicly displayed are justified. The first concept of solidarity is exclusive solidarity. It is limited to those who are suffering from exploitation or oppression. The second conception of solidarity is inclusive: it includes those who suffer but can also accommodate those who make common cause with them. This is the only kind of solidarity that Arendt specifically analyzes. A third concept of solidarity is universal: its proximate constituent parts are the different “peoples” who collectively make up humankind. Finally, there is natural solidarity. This variety of solidarity, the author argues, is conceptually inadequate and confused. In the development and articulation of each of these four concepts, some attention is given to the relative contributions of emotion and cognition in determining one's understanding of solidarity.


Journalism ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 146488492091338
Author(s):  
Chris W Anderson

What should journalism do, and for what reasons should it do it? The starting point of this article is that two distinct but converging factors have made this question increasingly hard to answer. On one hand, the seemingly perpetual crisis in newsroom capacity has made it hard to sustain a maximalist normative conception of what journalism should accomplish. On the other hand, the globalization of journalism studies research has problematized the assumed link between journalism and democracy. In response, this article outlines a new normative journalistic ideal, grounded in the political theory of the late Judith Shklar – a ‘journalism of fear’. Under this model, the link between journalism and liberalism is asserted over and above the link between journalism and democracy. Drawing on Shklar, the journalism of fear contends that the worst of all evils is cruelty, and the purpose of journalism is to minimize that cruelty. The article elaborates Shklar’s thinking by comparing her perspective on a number of issues to those of a far more familiar political philosopher, John Dewey. It concludes by looking at what a journalism of fear would look like in practice by briefly discussing newsroom responses to the Windrush scandal in the United Kingdom.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. 2103-2109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Goldoni ◽  
Christopher McCorkindale

The revival of the political constitution has come about in parallel with two developments, one in constitutional practice and the other in political theory. With regard to the former, the political constitution has been seen as something of a bulwark against the rise of legal (or judicial, or common law) constitutionalism. The seeming hegemony of this latter model of constitutionalism among contemporary lawyers and political scientists has produced from (so-called) political constitutionalists a reaction against the delegation of important decisions to non-political institutions and an obsessively court-centered scholarship. Perceiving this shift in focus from political to legal institutions to be the very antithesis of the traditional Commonwealth (more particularly, of the United Kingdom's parliamentary) model of constitutionalism, and, more broadly, to be an affront to democratic sensibilities, the notion of the political constitution was retrieved and defended in a seminal article in the 1979 edition of the Modern Law Review, written (though first delivered in his Chorley Lecture the previous year) by the late John Griffith. More recently, in the work of Adam Tomkins, Richard Bellamy, and Grégoire Webber and Graham Gee, a normative interpretation has been lent to Griffith's thesis so as to provide a full-fledged constitutionaltheorycapable of standing as an alternative to the liberal-legal paradigm—a turn, one might say, from the political constitution to political constitutionalism.


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