scholarly journals General Franco as Military Leader

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Preston
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Alexander The Great ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Military Leader ◽  
The World ◽  
El Cid ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Success

BOTH during his lifetime, and after his death, General Franco was reviled by his enemies on the left and subjected to the most absurd adulation by his admirers on the right. As the victor in a bloody civil war which inflamed passions throughout the world, that is hardly surprising. Leaving aside his personal political success in remaining in power for nearly four decades, his victory in the Spanish Civil War was his greatest and most glorious achievement, something reflected in the judgements of detractors and hagiographers alike. For the left, Franco the general was a slow-witted mediocrity whose battlefield triumphs were owed entirely to the unstinting military assistance of Hitler and Mussolini. For the right, Franco the general was the twentieth-century incarnation of Alexander the Great, of Napoleon and of the great warrior hero of Spanish legend, El Cid.

Political Autobiography and the Art of the Plausible: R. A. Butler at the Foreign Office, 1938–1939

1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 901-922 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Stafford
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Educational System ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
British Politics ◽  
Suez Crisis ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Times ◽  
The Right ◽  
Enoch Powell

R. A. Butler has been one of the outstanding figures in twentieth-century British politics. After his death The Times described him as ‘the creator of the modern educational system, the key-figure in the revival of post-war Conservatism, arguably the most successful chancellor since the war and un-questionably a Home Secretary of reforming zeal’. His record of achievement was unequalled by his rivals in the contests for the party leadership in 1957 and in 1963, but on both occasions the leadership eluded him. How and why this happened was understandably of the greatest interest to those who reviewed Rab's memoirs, The art of the possible, which were published in 1971. These memoirs won unanimous praise for their literary excellence, but otherwise met with a rather mixed reception. Enoch Powell, one of Rab's supporters in 1963, described them as ‘a work of astonishing self-revelation [belonging] with the classic Confessions. Augustine and Rousseau were not more unsparing of themselves than Rab…’ The ‘large episodes’ of Rab's career, Powell went on, ‘are treated with a generous vision (including, it need not be added, a generosity to Rab) which leaves the reader with improved understanding and perspective’. Powell's comments were echoed by others on the Right, but the Left was more critical. Anthony Howard noted that ‘what tend…to get wholly left out are the mistakes and blunders’ – the now infamous Villacoublay meeting during the Suez crisis; and Rab's astonishing admission to the journalist George Gale during the 1964 campaign that the election was slipping Labour's way. Harold Wilson, who had offered Rab the mastership of Trinity, was perhaps the least charitable of all. He found The art of the possible disappointing because, he claimed, Rab underwrote the great occasions. Rab's reticence about Suez, however, upset Wilson less than the description of his tribulations at the hands of Labour MPs as government spokesman for the policy of non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War. Here was an issue which could excite the older soldiers of the British Left, and if Wilson was alone among Rab's reviewers in making more than passing reference to Rab's association with appeasement this was why.

scholarly journals Deans of humanitarianism and perfidy. The collaboration of the Diplomatic Missions of Argentina and Chile with the Francoist cause during the Spanish Civil War (and after), 1936-1969

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. e010
Author(s):  
Carlos Píriz
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Franco Regime ◽  
The Right ◽  
Good Number

During the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, some thirty Diplomatic Missions opened their doors and create new sites for the reception of persecution victims under the protection of the right of asylum. However, beyond the humanitarian role, a tendentious collaboration of some of their delegates with the rebels could be seen from the beginning. Argentina and Chile, which held the Diplomatic Deanship in those years, were two prime examples of this. A good number of their representatives used various strategies to help the coup plotters of 1936, such as the refuge, care and irregular extraction of people or espionage. At the same time, they played a role that alternated between searching for consensus with other Diplomatic Missions (mainly the Latin American ones), which really meant demanding that those other legations follow their lead, and denouncing the excesses of the consolidated republican rearguard, especially on the international scene. A situation which tarnishes the image of the legitimate Spanish governments. Once the contest ended, many of those collaborators were praised and rewarded by the Franco regime, and other fascists regimes. This research focuses on demonstrating, based on original documentation and providing new and compelling data, that close (and proven) relationship.

3 Direct Military Assistance on Request During Civil Wars

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
De Wet Erika
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Organizational Practice ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Current State ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The Right

This chapter examines whether the right to self-determination in international law prevents military intervention on the side of the recognized government during a civil war. Post-Cold War state and organizational practice does not convincingly support the claim that direct military assistance at the request of a recognized government is prohibited during a civil war, otherwise known as a ‘non-international armed conflict’ (NIAC). Attempts to explain current state practice by means of counter-terrorism and counter-intervention exceptions to a general prohibition of such assistance also is not grounded in state or organizational practice, nor are such exceptions viable in practice. Instead, state and organizational practice seems to confirm the right of recognized governments to request military assistance from third states, also during civil wars/NIACs, as long as they retain their recognized, de jure status. The potential lack of ‘representativeness’ in such a situation does not seem to limit the extent to which the de jure government can act on behalf of the state (and its people) in matters pertaining to the use of force.

Flamenco and Modernism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bridget Cauthery
Keyword(s):  
Popular Culture ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Golden Age ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Hollywood Films ◽  
The World ◽  
Late Nineteenth

Though practitioners perceive Andalusia as the form’s spiritual and artistic home, flamenco is taught and performed in cities around the world. Modern flamenco evolved from the "Café Cantante" period or "Golden Age" of flamenco in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with its widespread introduction outside of Spain occurring as a result of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Flamenco was absorbed into, and transmitted by, popular culture through its inclusion as an exotic divertissement in Hollywood films of the 1930s and 1940s, and the films of director Carlos Saura in the 1980s. These films and their associated imagery created an impression of flamenco as exotic, virtuosic, and gendered—with overt connections to bull-fighting, toreadors, and Romani culture.

Argentine Neutrality, Mediation, and Asylum During the Spanish Civil War

1963 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-403
Author(s):  
Joe Robert Juárez
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Popular Front ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Francisco Franco ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
Vested Interests ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Church

Civil War broke out in Spain in 1936. Following eight years of dictatorship by General Primo de Rivera, who had acted with the approval of King Alfonso XIII, elections were held in June, 1931, for a constituent assembly. The election returns brought in a republican-socialist majority, which forbade the king’s return, confiscated his property, and proclaimed Spain a republic. The republic had enemies on both the right and the left. The large landholders, the army, and the Church had vested interests which the republic proceeded to attack. On the left, the anarchists and socialists became more /radical, competing for the loyalty of the Spanish workers. The republic’s problems were compounded by the traditional separatist movements of Catalans, Basques, and Gallegans. Power shifted from the left in 1931 to the right in 1933, and, finally, in February, 1936, to a “popular front “government. The Popular Front, however, proved to be a coalition for election purposes only. Largo Caballero, the leader of the left wing of the socialists, declined to serve in the moderate Azaña cabinet. In July, 1936, army, monarchist, clerical, and Carlist groups joined with the Falange to bring about a counter-revolutionary coup under the leadership of General Francisco Franco. The Civil War had started. It was to last for three brutality-filled years.

Memory and Politics in Democratic Spain

2020 ◽  
pp. 46-61
Author(s):  
Omar G. Encarnación
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
The Political ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Franco Regime ◽  
Political Class ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Right

This chapter explains the persistence of Spain’s ‘politics of forgetting’, a phenomenon revealed by the wilful intent to disremember the political memory of the violence of the Spanish Civil War and the human rights abuses of General Franco’s authoritarian regime. Looking beyond the traumas of the Civil War, the limits on transitional justice and truth-telling on the Franco regime imposed by a transition to democracy anchored on intra-elite pacts, and the conciliatory and forward-looking political culture that consolidated in the new democracy, this analysis emphasizes a decidedly less obvious explanation: the political uses of forgetting. Special attention is paid to how the absence of a reckoning with the past, protected politicians from both the right and the left from embarrassing and inconvenient political histories; facilitated the reinvention of the major political parties as democratic institutions; and lessened societal fears about repeating past historical mistakes. The conclusion of the chapter explains how the success of the current democratic regime, shifting public opinion about the past occasioned by greater awareness about the dark policies and legacies of the Franco regime, and generational change among Spain’s political class have in recent years diminished the political uses of forgetting. This, in turn, has allowed for a more honest treatment of the past in Spain’s public policies.

Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish War

1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon A. O'Rourke
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
Illegal Acts ◽  
Legal Sense ◽  
High Seas

Few problems raised by the Spanish civil war are more interesting than those growing out of the fact that a state of war, in the legal sense, does not exist; belligerent rights have been accorded to neither of the contestants by third Powers. Consequently, on January 8 of this year, Germany turned over to the rebel authorities two Spanish loyalist vessels captured in retaliation to an “act of piracy”—an indictment earned by the loyalist government for its seizure of the German freighter, Palos. One may feel justifiably surprised that a government almost universally recognized as legitimate can be charged with piratical activities. Further reflection reveals that the Spanish situation presents many more questions concerning the rights and duties of the contestants as against third parties. In the absence of the recognition of belligerency, what are the rights of loyalist and rebel ships on the high seas? In the territorial waters of Spain? May the fascist or socialistic factions establish blockades? What are the powers and validity of their prize courts? Who is answerable for the illegal acts of the rebels should they lose—or be victorious? What claims will the Spanish Government have as against third Powers should one or the other prove successful? May the loyalist authorities by simple decree close to neutral trade the ports held by the insurgents? Moreover, how would all of these matters be affected if the maritime Powers of the world were to recognize the existence of a state of war, i.e., belligerency, in Spain? And, finally, in view of the magnitude and duration of the struggle, is there any justification for withholding such recognition?

scholarly journals TIKKUN OLAM AND TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY: JEWISH VOLUNTEERS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-230
Author(s):  
Raanan Rein
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
General Population ◽  
Jewish Identity ◽  
North American ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Active Part ◽  
Tikkun Olam ◽  
The World ◽  
Transnational Solidarity ◽  
Very High

The number of Jewish volunteers who joined the International Brigades (IB) in order to defend the Spanish Republic against the Nationalist rebels was very high. Their presence among volunteers from each nation was in most cases greatly disproportionate to their representation in the general population of those countries. Many of these volunteers held internationalist views, and the idea of emphasizing their Jewish identity was alien to them. But in fact—as is reflected, for example, in the letters they sent from the Spanish trenches to their friends and relatives or in their memoirs—they also followed the Jewish mandate of tikkun olam, a Hebrew phrase meaning “repairing the world,” or showing responsibility for healing and transforming it. Many volunteers attempted to block, with their own bodies if need be, the Nazi and Fascist wave sweeping across Europe, thus defending both universal and Jewish causes. While there is a voluminous bibliography on the IB, less attention has been given to Jewish participation in the Spanish Civil War; and most studies of Jewish participation in the war focus on Jewish-European or on Jewish-North American volunteers. There is a conspicuous absence of historiography about Jewish-Argentines, and very little written on Jewish-Palestinians, in the Iberian conflict. This article looks at volunteers from these two countries and their motivation for taking an active part in the Spanish Civil War.

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