Murder & the Modern British Historian

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Wiener

Over a century ago, the pioneer English historian of law F. W. Maitland observed that “If some fairy gave me the power of seeing a scene of one and the same kind in every age of history of every race, the kind of scene that I would choose would be a trial for murder, because I think that it would give me so many hints as to a multitude of matters of the first importance.” For many decades Maitland's remark was ignored, as historical scholarship passed over murder trials as far too “atypical” and “sensationalistic” to merit serious study, leaving them to amateur devotees of courtroom drama and detection mysteries. One notable exception was Brian Simpson, the distinguished legal historian, whose Cannibalism and the Common Law, published in 1984, for the first time placed in its social context the leading case of R. v. Dudley & Stephens, which in 1884 produced the still-authoritative rule governing the “necessity” justification for homicide. In Simpson's hands the case, a “sensational” one indeed, involving the eating of a cabin boy by shipwrecked sailors, opened up the little-known world of late Victorian maritime life. However, Simpson's lead was not followed up, and his book remained a fascinating “one-off,” regarded as an “amusement piece” by an otherwise “serious” scholar of arcane legal reasoning.Only more recently, with developments such as the rise of the genre of “micro-history” and the legitimation of interest in the “sensational,” have historians come to accept homicide and its legal treatment as a worthy subject.

Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

This book discusses the revolutionary broadening of concepts of freedoms of press and speech in Great Britain and in America during the quarter century before the First Amendment and Fox’s Libel Act. The conventional view of the history of freedoms of press and speech is that the common law since antiquity defined those freedoms narrowly. In that view, Sir William Blackstone in 1769, and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in 1770, faithfully summarized that common law in giving very narrow definitions of those freedoms as mere liberty from prior restraint and not as liberty from punishment after printing or speaking (the political crimes of seditious libel and seditious speech). Today, that view continues to be held by neo-Blackstonians, and remains dominant or at least very influential among historians. Neo-Blackstonians claim that the Framers used freedom of press “in a Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints” with no protection against “subsequent restraints” (punishment) of seditious expression. Neo-Blackstonians further claim that “[n]o other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798” existed. This book, by contrast, concludes that a broad definition and understanding of freedoms of press and speech was the dominant context of the First Amendment and of Fox’s Libel Act. Its basis is hundreds of examples of a broad understanding of freedoms of press and speech, in both Britain and America, in the late eighteenth century. For example, a book published in London in 1760 by a Scottish lawyer, George Wallace, stated that it is tyranny “to restrain the freedom of speculative disquisitions,” and because “men have a right to think for themselves, and to publish their thoughts,” it is “monstrous … under the pretext of the authority of laws, which ought never to have been enacted … attempting to restrain the liberty of the press” (seditious libel law). This book also challenges the conventional view of Blackstone and the neo-Blackstonians. Blackstone and Mansfield did not find any definition in the common law, but instead selected the narrowest definition in popular essays from the prior seventy years. Blackstone misdescribed it as an accepted common law definition, which in fact did not exist, and a year later Mansfield inserted a similar definition into the common law for the first time. Both misdescribed that narrow definition and the unique rules for prosecuting sedition as ancient. They were leading a counter-revolution, cloaked as a summary of a narrow and ancient common law doctrine that was neither.


Author(s):  
Joshua Getzler

This chapter investigates the idea of doctrine as a focus of historical scholarship, asking how the doctrinal mentality arose, and how historical approaches to doctrine emerged strongly in both common-law and civilian or Romanistic legal cultures. It first defines the meaning of ‘doctrine’, and sets out a guiding thesis. It argues that an important dimension of doctrine is communication; and jurists become fascinated by the history of doctrine when social and political conditions necessitate an expansion or transfer of the legal system, with concomitant transfers of doctrinal thought. The chapter then traces the development of doctrinal history from Gaius to the common law tradition.


Author(s):  
Filippo Ranieri

Summary The numerous translations through which the Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone – a milestone in the history of the common law – became known in France, and thus contributed for the first time to acquaint French jurists with English law, have been largely neglected by legal historians. The first section of the present contribution introduces the French anglophile visitors to England who, during the second half of the eighteenth century, disseminated the work of William Blackstone and its first translations in France. The biography and work of these first translators require a detailed examination. A second section assesses the influence of these translations, particularly in the legal and political debates on the English trial by jury in the context of revolutionary legislation. A third section considers the later translations of Blackstone’s work during the Napoleonic period and the following years. Finally, a call for further research outlines the impact of that translation literature.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Qamar ◽  
Dachran Busthami ◽  
Aan Aswari ◽  
Farah Syah Reza

Status: POSTPRINTDiterbitkan oleh: http://penerbitsign.com/Edisi RevisiISBN 978-602-61833-5-4Logika disamping sebagai seni (art's) berpikir juga merupakan ilmu (science) berpikir. Demikian pula halnya dengan Logika Hukum, disamping tunduk pada seni dan ilmu berpikir pada umumnya juga memiliki karakternya sendiri. Karena bagi yang belajar ilmu hukum sangat perlu mengetahui bagaimana berlogika hukum yang benar. Diulas dalam buku ini secara padat bagai meretas pikir dan nalar untuk menarik suatu kesimpulan-kesimpulan yang benar melalui logika dan logika hukum.BIBLIOGRAPHYAhmad Warson Munawir, 1984, Kamus Arab- Indonesia, Yogyakarta.Angel Richard B, 1964, Reasoning and Logic, Appleton Century Craft, New York.Basiq Djalil, H.A, 2012, Logika (Ilmu Mantiq), Prenada, Jakarta.Copi Irving M Carl Cohen, 1990, Introduction to Logic, Coller MacMillan Publisher, London.Golding, Irving M, 1984, Legal Reasoning, Alfreda A. Knoff Inc, New York.George F. Kneller, 1966, Logic and Language of Education, New York.Hanafi, A, 1976, Pengantar Filsafat Islam, Bulang Bintang, Jakarta.Herman Soewardi, 1996, Nalar Kontemplasi dan Realita, UNPAD, Bandung. Ihromi, T.O, 1993, Antropologi dan Hukum, Obor, Jakarta.Jujun S. Suriasumantri, 2007, Filsafat Ilmu, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.Karl Llewellyn, 1961, The Cheyenne Way, Norman University, Oklahoma Press. Louis Ma'lul,1973, Munjid, Beirut.Mark Constanzo, 2006, Aplikasi Psikologi Dalam Sistem Hukum, Pustaka Pelajar, Jakarta.Muzakkir, 2013, Putusan Hakim Yang Diskriminatif, Rangkang, Yogyakarta.Munir Fuady, 2007, Dinamika Teori Hukum, Ghalia, Indonesia.Munduri. H, 2012, Logika, Rajawali Pers, Jakarta. Nurul Qamar, 2009, Aspek Hukum Sewa Beli (Suatu Studi Kasus), Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2009, Pengantar Hukum Ekonomi, Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2010, Hukum Itu Ada Tapi HarusDitemukan, Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2010, Perbandingan Sistem Hukum dan Peradilan, Refleksi, Makassar. Nurul Qamar, 2011, Negara Hukum atau Negara Undang- Undang, Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2011, Karakteristik Hukum Acara PERATUN, Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2012, Percikan Pemikiran tentang Hukum, Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2012, Pengantar Politik Hukum Ketatanegaraan, Pustaka Refleksi, Makassar.Nurul Qamar, 2013, HAM dalam Negara Hukum Demokrasi, Sinar Grafika, Jakarta.Olever Wendel Holmes, 1981, The Common Law, Boston, Little, Brown.Philipus M. Hadjon, 2007, Argumentasi Hukum, UGM, Yogyakarta.Peter Mahmud marzuki, 2007, Penelitian Hukum, Kencana, JakartaPeter Mahmud marzuki, 2008, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum, Kencana, Jakarta.Purwahadiwardoyo, 1985, Nilai Kemanusiaan, IKIP, Yogyakarta.Paul J. Bohannan, 1964, Social Anthropology, New York.Paton. GW. 1972, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, Oxford, University Press, London.Russell, Bertrand 1974, Wisdom of the West, Doubleday, New York.Russell, 1974, History of Western Philosophy, George A & Unwin, London.Said Sampara & Prof. H. Laode Husen, 2013, Metode Penelitian Hukum, Kretakupa, Makassar.Satjipto Rahardjo, 1979, Ilmu Hukum, Citra Aditya, Bandung.Satjipto Rahardjo, 1986, Hukum dan Perubahan Sosial, Alumni, Bandung.Satjipto Rahardjo, 2007, Biarkan Hukum Mengalir, Kompas, Jakarta.Satjipto Rahardjo, 2007, Membedah Hukum Progressif, Kompas, Jakarta.Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, 1995, Perkembangan Hukum Nasional, Eresco, Bandung.Soerjono Soekanto, 1984, Evektivikasi Hukum, Bina Cipta, Jakarta.Soerjono Soekanto, 1984, Antropologi Hukum, Rajawali, Jakarta. Thalib Thahir A.M,1966, Ilmu Mantiq, Widjaya,Jakarta.


1977 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 373
Author(s):  
J. L. Barton ◽  
A. W. B. Simpson ◽  
S. J. Stoljar
Keyword(s):  

1971 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker

Slade's Case is of such significance in the history of the common law that it has, quite properly, been the subject of more scrutiny and discussion in recent years than any other case of the same age. The foundation of all this discussion has been Coke's report, which is the only full report in print. The accuracy and completeness of Coke's version have hardly been challenged, and the discussions have assumed that it contains almost all there is to know about the case. This assumption must be discarded if we are to understand the contemporary significance of the case.


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