scholarly journals On the Revolution of the four Hundred at Athens

1913 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
M. O. B. Caspari

The copious discussion which has been raised in recent years on the subject of the Four Hundred at Athens has brought out at any rate one certain conclusion. Of our two main authorities for the revolution of 411 B.C. neither Thucydides nor Aristotle can be pronounced entirely right or wrong, and it is no longer admissible to settle the differences between them by canonising the one and ruling the other out of order. Both our authorities can be convicted of some palpable mistakes, but again both can be proved right by collateral evidence on many points of detail. In reconstructing the history of the movement our choice between these two sources must therefore not be made on the ground of any a priori preference accorded to the one or the other. The only safe procedure is to adjudicate each question outstanding between them on the special merits of the case. It is not to be expected that even by this method finality can be attained. But a review of recent controversy will show that only by a pragmatic method of treatment is there much chance of collecting a nucleus of agreed truth.

2014 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-398
Author(s):  
James Carleton Paget

Albert Schweitzer's engagement with Judaism, and with the Jewish community more generally, has never been the subject of substantive discussion. On the one hand this is not surprising—Schweitzer wrote little about Judaism or the Jews during his long life, or at least very little that was devoted principally to those subjects. On the other hand, the lack of a study might be thought odd—Schweitzer's work as a New Testament scholar in particular is taken up to a significant degree with presenting a picture of Jesus, of the earliest Christian communities, and of Paul, and his scholarship emphasizes the need to see these topics against the background of a specific set of Jewish assumptions. It is also noteworthy because Schweitzer married a baptized Jew, whose father's academic career had been disadvantaged because he was a Jew. Moreover, Schweitzer lived at a catastrophic time in the history of the Jews, a time that directly affected his wife's family and others known to him. The extent to which this personal contact with Jews and with Judaism influenced Schweitzer either in his writings on Judaism or in his life will in part be the subject of this article.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Leila Chamankhah

Muḥy al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī’s theoretical mysticism has been the subject of lively discussion among Iranian Sufis since they first encountered it in the seventh century. ‘Abdul Razzāq Kāshānī was the pioneer and forerunner of the debate, followed by reading and interpreting al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s key texts, particularly Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Bezels of Wisdom) by future generations of Shī‘ī scholars. Along with commentaries and glosses on his works, every element of ibn ‘Arabī’s mysticism, from his theory of the oneness of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) to his doctrines of nubuwwa, wilāya, and khatm al-wilāya, was accepted by his Shī‘ī peers, incorporated into their context and adjusted to Shī‘a doctrinal platform. This process of internalization and amalgamation was so complete that after seven centuries, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of waḥdat al-wujūd, or his doctrines of wilāya and khatm al-wilāya and those of his Shī‘ī readers. To have a clearer picture of the philosophical and mystical activities and interests of Shī‘ī scholars in Iran under Ilkhanids (1256-1353), I examined the intellectual and historical contexts of seventh century Iran. The findings of my research are indicative of the contribution of mystics such as ‘Abdul Razzāq Kāshānī to both the school of Ibn ‘Arabī in general and of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī in particular on the one hand, and to the correlation between Sufism and Shī‘īsm on the other. What I call the ‘Shī‘ītization of Akbarīan Mysticism’ started with Kāshānī and can be regarded as a new chapter in the history of Iranian Sufism.


Author(s):  
Laura Laiseca

The purpose of this article is to articulate Nietzsche's criticism of morality which is centered in his experience of the death of God and the end of the subject of Modernity. Nietzsche considers nihilism as a nihilism of morality, not of metaphysics: it is morality and its history that has given rise to nihilism in the Occident. That is why Nietzsche separates himself from metaphysics as well as from morality and science, which differs from Heidegger's reasons. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche places himself in a primal position in the history of metaphysics, by which he means the consummation (Vollendung) of metaphysics' nihilism, which Heidegger tries to transcend. On the one hand, Heidegger shows us how Nietzsche consummates the Platonic philosophy by inverting its principles. On the other, Nietzsche consummates the metaphysics of subjectivity. Consequently he conceives the thought of the will of power and of the eternal recurrence as the two last forms of the metaphysical categories of essence and existence respectively. On this ground it is possible to understand Nietzsche's and Heidegger's thought as the necessary first stage in the transition to Vattimo's postmodern philosophy and his notion of secularization.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1961 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1019-1019
Author(s):  
Carl C. Fischer

FROM TIME to time Presidents of the American Academy of Pediatrics have used this means of sharing with the fellowship, thoughts which seem to them to be of mutual interest. Last year, President George Wheatley had such a message in every issue, covering a wide variety of interesting and stimulating topics. I will not plan to necessarily continue this policy of having a message for each issue, but will do so whenever the subject matter seems to warrant one. At this, the beginning of a new year for the Academy, it seems appropriate to present to the membership at large a few of the thoughts which I presented in Chicago upon my inauguration as your President. It has recently been my pleasure to reread the two little volumes sent to all Academy Fellows a few years ago, the one containing the Presidential addresses of the first 20 presidents, and the other, Dr. Marshall Pease's stimulating "History of the Academy." I heartily recommend these to any of you who might be interested in the conception, delivery and growth and development of our organization. Of first importance at this time, it seems to me, is the review of the primary objectives of our Academy as originally drawn up by Dr. Grulee and his associates more than 30 years ago. These are: "The object of the Academy shall be to foster and stimulate interest in Pediatrics and correlate all aspects of the word for the welfare of children which properly come within the scope of pediatrics."


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Patat

In the last ten years, Noi credevamo (We Believed) (Martone 2010) has been the subject of a very careful criticism interested not only in its historical-ideological implications but also in its semiotic specificities. The purpose of this article is to summarize the cardinal points of these two positions and to add to them some critical observations that have not been noted so far. On the one hand, it is a matter of highlighting how, as a historical film, the work is connected with the history of emotions, a recent historiographical trend that aims to detect the narrative devices of ideological propaganda and the diffusion of feelings since the late eighteenth century. On the other hand, the article proposes a new interpretation of Mario Martone’s film, starting with the analysis of phenomena that are not only historical but also technical and structural.


Archaeologia ◽  
1832 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 361-393
Author(s):  
John Bruce

The letter which I some time since did myself the honour to address to you, upon the subject of the Court of Star Chamber, contains a sketch of the history of the judicial authority of the Consilium Regis down to the reign of Henry VI., during whose minority there occurred something like a parliamentary acquiescence in the interference of the Council in all causes, in which there appeared to be too great might on the one side and “unmight” on the other, or in which there existed other reasonable cause for the withdrawal of the dispute from the ordinary tribunals. I shall now trace the subsequent history of this celebrated Court, commenting, as I proceed, upon some of the cases which came under its notice.


1898 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 129-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Perdrizet

The Imperial Ottoman Museum has recently acquired a very valuable and interesting gold ring (Fig. 1) which was found in 1894 or 1895 in a tomb at Lampsacus. The Museum authorities subsequently undertook further excavations in the necropolis of which this tomb formed part, and it is a matter for great regret that no detailed report of the results was drawn up; we are therefore forced to content ourselves with the somewhat meagre information given by the late Baltazzi-Bey to M. Salomon Reinach, according to which the necropolis yielded fragments of red-figured pottery and specimens of silver autonomous coins of Lampsacus. Both these details are of importance in fixing the date of the ring; for on the one hand silver coins of this class belong almost exclusively to the fourth century, and on the other, the manufacture of painted vases was not continued after that date. When we add that the evidence of coins and inscriptions proves that this was the most flourishing period in the history of Lampsacus, we have strong a priori reason for assigning the ring to this century, while a consideration of the style of the intaglio may help us to fix the date within narrower limits.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalia Nassar

In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.


1976 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perez Zagorin

There are at least two reasons which might be cited for undertaking the historical and comparative investigation of revolution. The first is the desire to make a revolution, the second is the desire to prevent it. Perhaps nearly everybody is susceptible to the one reason or the other, but there is yet a third reason that gives the study of revolution an outstanding interest and significance, even though its appeal is doubtless much more limited than the first two. This is that the understanding of revolution is an indispensable condition for the fuller knowledge and understanding of society. Depending on how we define it, revolution may be common or uncommon, frequent or rare. But in the case of societies, nations, and communities that have experienced revolution, we cannot claim to understand them adequately without understanding their revolutions. In a deep and therefore a non-tautological sense, it is true that every people gets the revolution it deserves and equally true that it gets only the revolutions of which it is capable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Sławomir Bralewski

In this article, I try to answer the following question: was Constantine himself aware of the revolution that he was carrying out? Did he realise that his actions were going to change the course of the history of the Empire? An analysis of sources seems to indicate that emperor Constantine the Great saw in his reign a fundamental change not only in the history of the Imperium Romanum, but also of the entire world. He believed that this change had an eschatological dimension. Constantine’s reign, at least in its propagandist framing, was to be the turning point in the fight against evil. It appears that the ruler was fully aware that by putting an end to the persecutions of Christians he was restoring universal peace. Thus, the shift with which he is associated amounted, on the one hand, to restoring the pax Christiana and the beginning of the Kingdom of God on earth, and on the other to eliminating evil from the world. Therefore, Constantine, in believing that he had become God’s tool for fighting evil, must have also been convinced that he played an incredibly important role in God’s plan of salvation; especially since the Kingdom of God, apparently realised on earth through Constantine’s military victories, was to only finally prevail when evil and death had been defeated forever.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document