Income Redistribution without “Leveling”

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-88
2011 ◽  
pp. 118-138
Author(s):  
N. Ryzhova

The article deals with the incentives for increasing international trade centralization and restricting trade border regions openness in reformed economy. Two groups of incentives are determined in terms of new political economy approaches: fear of separatism and reluctance of income redistribution. The situation with the radical international trade reform in Russia, followed by correction of trade openness, illustrates key moments in the concepts.


Author(s):  
James F. Adams

This chapter broadly surveys spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions, where, in Western democracies, the first dimension is typically the left-right dimension pertaining to policy debates over income redistribution and government intervention in the economy. The second dimension may encompass policy debates over issues that cross-cut the left-right economic dimension, or it may encompass universally valued “valence” dimensions of party evaluation such as parties’ images for competence, integrity, and leadership ability. The chapter reviews models with office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. It also surveys both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on these topics.


Author(s):  
Isabel Cepeda ◽  
Pedro Fraile Balbín

ABSTRACT This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110155
Author(s):  
Markus Tepe ◽  
Fabian Paetzel ◽  
Jan Lorenz ◽  
Maximilian Lutz

Income redistribution with an efficiency loss is expected to have a twofold negative effect on support for redistribution, as it lowers egoistic support for redistribution and activates efficiency preferences. This study tests whether such a negative relationship exists, increases with the size of efficiency loss and interacts with group communication and the income position. We present a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive a randomly allocated income and must coordinate on a majority tax rate using a deliberative communication tool. The rate of money lost as a part of the redistribution process is manipulated as a treatment variable (0%, 5%, 20%, or 60%). Experimental evidence shows that efficiency loss exerts a robust negative effect on support for redistribution. The effect shows a tipping point pattern, is stronger at the lower end of the income distribution and is not fully explained by egoistic preferences. Inefficiency matters mostly for the chosen tax rate after group communication. At an efficiency loss of 60%, however, group communication does not affect support for redistribution, which implies that inefficiencies tend to play a minor role in the context of redistribution as long as they are within a moderate range. JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63, D72


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Chavanne ◽  
Kimberly Goodyear

AbstractMotivated by the historical components of the ongoing U.S. opioid epidemic, this study examines how public support for redistributive drug treatment changes with awareness that someone’s opioid addiction started with a legally acquired prescription. Using different versions of a vignette, we vary in a randomized design whether someone’s addiction to painkillers started with a legally acquired prescription or with the decision to take pills from a friend. After reading the vignette, participants expressed their level of support for a policy that uses income redistribution to fund a program that provides the person in the vignette with drug treatment. We find that participants are less likely to support redistributive drug treatment when a prescription precipitates the addiction. The results imply that emphasizing the medical establishment’s role in the opioid epidemic may actually make people less likely to favor using redistributive drug treatment to provide support.


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