Private Benefits, Public Goods

The discerning voter: Party–voter linkages and local distribution under multilevel governance

Party Politics ◽

10.1177/1354068818761195 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 26 (2) ◽

pp. 191-202

Author(s):

Mark Schneider

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

State Government ◽

Empirical Support ◽

Local Public Goods ◽

Local Elections ◽

Private Benefits ◽

Pork Barrel ◽

Multilevel Systems ◽

Local Leader ◽

Vignette Experiment

What shapes voters’ expectations of receiving private benefits and local public goods in developing world democracies? Models of instrumental voting suggest that voters’ expectations are shaped by co-partisanship; however, this work does not consider the calculations that voters make in multilevel systems where different types of goods are allocated by different tiers of government. In this article, I argue that voters condition their expectations of private benefits on co-partisan ties with the local leader, but only do so with respect to local public goods when the local leader is aligned with the state government that controls the allocation of pork barrel spending. I test my argument with a vignette experiment conducted in rural India that randomly assigns the partisan affiliation of real village politicians and find empirical support for the argument. I also find suggestive evidence of strategic voting in local elections towards leaders aligned with the ruling party.

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Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects ofWfrom Other Elements of Democracy

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055408080295 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 102 (3) ◽

pp. 393-400 ◽

Cited By ~ 40

Author(s):

JAMES D. MORROW ◽

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ◽

RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON ◽

ALASTAIR SMITH

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Winning Coalition ◽

Political Survival ◽

Private Benefits ◽

Control Variables ◽

Selectorate Theory ◽

Coalition Size

Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory inThe Logic of Political Survival(Bueno de Mesquita et al.2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits.

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Preference Variation in Volunteering Decisions: Public Goods and Private Benefits

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1414191 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Bart Weemaes ◽

Erik Schokkaert

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Private Benefits

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From targeted private benefits to public goods: Land, distributive politics and changing political conditions in Colombia

World Development ◽

10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105571 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 146 ◽

pp. 105571

Author(s):

Allison L. Benson

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Distributive Politics ◽

Private Benefits ◽

Political Conditions

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Political Succession

Journal of Conflict Resolution ◽

10.1177/0022002715603100 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 61 (4) ◽

pp. 707-743 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ◽

Alastair Smith

Keyword(s):

Public Policy ◽

Relative Risk ◽

Public Goods ◽

Mass Movements ◽

Private Benefits ◽

Endogenous Factors ◽

Different Types ◽

Selectorate Theory ◽

Face Threats ◽

Political Succession

In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.

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