From targeted private benefits to public goods: Land, distributive politics and changing political conditions in Colombia

2021 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 105571
Author(s):  
Allison L. Benson
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Political Conditions

Distribution or Diversion? Distribution of Local Public Goods in the Presence of Clientelist Brokers

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292090380
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Unexpected Result ◽  
Electoral Outcomes

In this article, I argue that, in clientelist regimes, money officially allocated to local public goods will sometimes be diverted to private handouts, and that the extent of diversion will be systematically correlated with electoral outcomes. I show that allocated funds are more likely to translate into local public goods in opposition areas and the incumbent’s ethnic core. Diversion of funds is greatest in areas outside the ethnic core that are nevertheless won by the regime. This is consistent with a model in which brokers tasked with delivering non-coethnic voters to the regime divert funds for this purpose. As a result of extensive diversion in loyal non-coethnic districts, these voters are significantly less likely to see completed local public goods projects than either core voters or those who oppose the regime. This unexpected result suggests that the behavior of local brokers may be responsible for a number of puzzling findings in the distributive politics literature.

The discerning voter: Party–voter linkages and local distribution under multilevel governance

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-202
Author(s):  
Mark Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
State Government ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Multilevel Systems ◽  
Local Leader ◽  
Vignette Experiment

What shapes voters’ expectations of receiving private benefits and local public goods in developing world democracies? Models of instrumental voting suggest that voters’ expectations are shaped by co-partisanship; however, this work does not consider the calculations that voters make in multilevel systems where different types of goods are allocated by different tiers of government. In this article, I argue that voters condition their expectations of private benefits on co-partisan ties with the local leader, but only do so with respect to local public goods when the local leader is aligned with the state government that controls the allocation of pork barrel spending. I test my argument with a vignette experiment conducted in rural India that randomly assigns the partisan affiliation of real village politicians and find empirical support for the argument. I also find suggestive evidence of strategic voting in local elections towards leaders aligned with the ruling party.

Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects ofWfrom Other Elements of Democracy

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES D. MORROW ◽  
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ◽  
RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON ◽  
ALASTAIR SMITH
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Political Survival ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Control Variables ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Coalition Size

Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory inThe Logic of Political Survival(Bueno de Mesquita et al.2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits.

scholarly journals Who Benefits? How Local Ethnic Demography Shapes Political Favoritism in Africa

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Janina Beiser-McGrath ◽  
Carl Müller-Crepon ◽  
Yannick I. Pengl
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Identity ◽  
Infant Mortality ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Excludable Public Goods ◽  
Geographic Data

Abstract Empirical studies show that many governments gear the provision of goods and services towards their ethnic peers. This article investigates governments’ strategies to provide ethnic favors in Africa. Recent studies of ethnic favoritism find that presidents' ethnic peers and home regions enjoy advantages, yet cannot disentangle whether goods are provided to entire regions or co-ethnic individuals. This article argues that local ethnic demography determines whether governments provide non-excludable public goods or more narrowly targeted handouts. Where government co-ethnics are in the majority, public goods benefit all locals regardless of their ethnic identity. Outside of these strongholds, incumbents pursue discriminatory strategies and only their co-ethnics gain from favoritism. Using fine-grained geographic data on ethnic demographics, the study finds support for the argument's implications in the local incidence of infant mortality. These findings have important implications for theories of distributive politics and conflict in multi-ethnic societies.

Political Succession

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ◽  
Alastair Smith
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Relative Risk ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Mass Movements ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Endogenous Factors ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Face Threats ◽  
Political Succession

In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.

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