Political Succession

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ◽  
Alastair Smith

In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES D. MORROW ◽  
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ◽  
RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON ◽  
ALASTAIR SMITH

Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory inThe Logic of Political Survival(Bueno de Mesquita et al.2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bausch

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (56) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristiane Nunes Francisco ◽  
Raquel Conceição Carvalho ◽  
Carla Maciel Salgado

Movimentos de massa são processos de evolução da paisagem condicionados por fatores geológicos, geomorfológicos, hidrológicos, climáticos e da cobertura vegetal. A região Sudeste do Brasil destaca-se pela ocorrência de eventos catastróficos, pois combina a ocupação das encostas com as características fisiográficas que a deixam altamente suscetível a diferentes tipos de movimentos de massa, destacando-se os escorregamentos translacionais. Embora tenham um importante papel na evolução da paisagem, a ocorrência de movimentos de massa em áreas ocupadas por atividades antrópicas tem gerado inúmeras perdas humanas e prejuízos econômicos. Foi o que ocorreu em janeiro de 2011 na região serrana do Rio de Janeiro, atingida por fortes chuvas que desencadearam eventos de extrema magnitude, e provocaram, além de destruição e morte, marcas profundas (cicatrizes) na paisagem que podem auxiliar no estudo dos processos de movimentos de massa. Este trabalho, assim, tem como objetivo analisar as relações espaciais entre a morfologia das encostas e a cobertura da terra com a ocorrência dos movimentos de massa em janeiro de 2011 na região serrana fluminense. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo na bacia do rio Roncador, Nova Friburgo (Estado do Rio de Janeiro), com a sobreposição entre o mapeamento das cicatrizes, das variáveis morfológicas das encostas e das classes de cobertura da terra. Os resultados mostram que as cicatrizes predominaram em encostas de forma côncava e íngremes, além de cobertas por vegetação densa, corroborando com a literatura que aponta a declividade e a forma da encosta como fatores condicionantes significativos à ocorrência de movimentos de massa, em especial, dos escorregamentos translacionais.Palavras–chave: escorregamentos translacionais, corridas de lama, sistema de informação geográfica, desastre natural.Abstract Mass movements are landscape evolution processes conditioned by geological, geomorphological, hydrological, climatological and land cover factors. Southeastern Brazil is distinguished by the occurrence of catastrophic landslides events, due to the association of land use and physiographic factors which cause high susceptibility to the occurrence of different types of mass movements, mainly translational slides. Although mass movements have an important role in landscape evolution, their occurrence in areas occupied by human activities has generated numerous life human and economic losses. The mountainous region of Rio de Janeiro, in January 2011, was affected by rainstorms that caused the occurrence of extreme magnitude landslide events, which caused destruction and death as well as deep scars in the landscape, which can contribute to the study of mass movements processes. This paper aims to analyse the spatial relationships between the morphology of the slopes, the land cover and the occurrence of mass movements in January 2011 in the mountainous region of Rio de Janeiro. The study was performed in the Roncador river basin, Nova Friburgo municipality, by overlaying the spatial distribution of landslide scars with morphological variables of the slopes and land cover classes. The results show that the scars predominated on steep and concave slopes covered by dense vegetation, which corroborates the literature that indicates the slope and the curvature as a significant conditioning factor to the occurrence of mass movements, in particular, the translational slides.Keywords: translational slides, mudflows, geographic information system, natural disaster.


Author(s):  
Pierre-Richard Agénor

This chapter extends the Allais–Samuelson Overlapping Generations models presented in chapters 1 and 2 to study interactions between infrastructure and human capital with R&D activities and growth. It begins by providing some background evidence on these interactions. The model is then presented and solved, and the impact of public policy, including potential trade-offs associated with the provision of infrastructure and other services by the government, is discussed. Again, this is a critical issue; if governments have access to limited resources to cover their expenditure, different types of government interventions may entail (temporary or permanent) trade-offs at the macroeconomic level—even though at the microeconomic or sectoral level these interventions are largely complementary. In addition, different types of government intervention may generate spillover effects on other sectors, which may have an indirect impact on innovation capacity.


Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Ackermann ◽  
Ryan Murphy

There is a large body of evidence showing that a substantial proportion of people cooperate in public goods games, even if the situation is one-shot and completely anonymous. In the present study, we bring together two major endogenous factors that are known to affect cooperation levels, and in so doing replicate and extend previous empirical research on public goods problems in several important ways. We measure social preferences and concurrently elicit beliefs on the individual level using multiple methods, and at multiple times during the experiment. With this rich set of predictor variables at the individual level, we test how well individual contribution decisions can be accounted for in both a one-shot and a repeated interaction. We show that when heterogeneity in people’s preferences and beliefs is taken into consideration, more than 50% of the variance in individual choice behavior can be explained. Furthermore, we show that people do not only update their beliefs in a repeated public goods game, but also that their social preferences change, to some extent, in response to the choices of other decision makers.


1993 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Andrew ◽  
T. Haider

The relative risk of adverse drug reactions of ionic versus non-ionic contrast media injected i.v. were compared for different types of trials using odds-ratio. The absolute and relative risk found in large post-marketing trials were compared with that found in the iohexol pre-registration trials. The absolute risks were 2 to 10 times higher in the pre-registration trials compared to the post-marketing surveillances. The relative risk for all adverse drug reactions was 3 to 6 times higher for ionic vs. non-ionic media and independent of pre- or post-registration studies. The odds-ratio seems to be a feasible method of comparing the relative risk of adverse reactions in various trials.


Author(s):  
Brian Gerber

Governance is a complex, highly elastic term used in a wide range of settings which sometimes leads to ambiguity. As a result, defining natural hazards governance as a unique and specific construct is needed for conceptual clarity and analytic precision. At core, natural hazards governance pertains to two fundamental considerations: reducing risk and promoting resilience. While not always recognized as such in the hazards and disasters literature, risk reduction and resilience promotion are two pure public goods. But they are also highly complex public goods—amalgams of a series of distinct but interrelated public policy choices and the administrative systems that put those choices into effect. To understand better a logic for defining and assessing natural hazards governance it is essential to consider it as a set of explicitly collective choices over the production of a complex of public goods aimed at addressing hazards risk reduction and promoting resilience within or across defined political jurisdictions. Those choices create frameworks permitting a set of authoritative actions (lawful and legitimate) to be stated and executed by governmental entities, by non-governmental agents on their behalf (in some form), or for goods and services to be jointly co-produced by governmental and non-governmental actors. Those collective choices in a given setting are influenced by the institutional structure of formal public policy decision-making, which itself reflects variations in the political efficacy of community members, competing interests and incentives over policy preferences, and level of extant knowledge and understanding of critical challenges associated with given hazards. Those formal collective choices are also reflective of a broader cultural context shaping norms of behavior and conception of the relationship between communities and hazards.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document