The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Jian Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Test Sample ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) on audit fees and audit quality. AS5 supersedes Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), and became effective for audits for accelerated filers for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007. Using a large sample of accelerated filers subject to AS5, we find evidence that audit fees decrease upon the adoption of AS5. More importantly, even though AS5 adoption reduces audit fees for our test sample, we find no evidence of a decrease in audit quality. In summary, we document evidence that AS5 improves the efficiency of internal control audits. JEL Classifications: M41.

scholarly journals Evidence on the Impact of Internal Control over Financial Reporting on Audit Fees

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Mohamed Gaber ◽  
Samy Garas ◽  
Edward J. Lusk
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Stock Trading ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Effective Group ◽  
The Impact

Introduction: Circa 1992, the dot.com sector created an irrational stock-trading market where the usual “financial” profiles of: Liquidity, Cash Flow from Operations, and Revenue generation were replaced by Ponzi-esque mayhem. To stabilize the markets, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] required a second audit opinion: the COSO Opinion on the adequacy of management’s system of Internal Control over Financial Reporting: [ICoFR].Study Focus: Three COSO-[ICoFR] designations are now required as public information: (i) A “clean” opinion [Is Effective], (ii) Deficiencies are noted, and (iii) Weaknesses reported. Our research interest is to determine, for a panel of randomly selected firms traded on the S&P500 for a eleven-year period: 2005 to 2015, the nature of the effect that the COSO deficiency reporting protocol has on (i) Audit Fees and (ii) the Market Cap of traded firms.Method: To this end we collected, using the Audit Analytics Ô[WRDSÔ] database, various categories of reported Audit Fees and also Market Cap information. This random sample was classified into two sets: the first group: Is Effective SEC 302 Designation and No COSO issues & the second group: Is Not 100% Effective for which there were SEC 302 Deficiencies or Weaknesses noted.Results: Inferential testing indicates that failure to attend to the PCAOB-COSO imperatives results in a relational where there are higher Audit Fees and a slippage of the firm’s Market Cap compared to the Is Effective Group. The PCAOB’s protocol to require the Audit of the firm’s ICoFR system and make that evaluation public information seems to be an excellent corrective “Carrot and Stick”.

The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, the PCAOB Inspection Regime, and the Great Recession on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2098220
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Johnson ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt ◽  
Jared S. Soileau
Keyword(s):  
Great Recession ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Approach ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the coinciding effects of the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), the change in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection regime, and the Great Recession on the audit fees and audit quality of accelerated filers. AS5 took effect in November 2007 and promulgated a top-down, risk-based audit approach to SOX 404(b) audits of accelerated filers. Concurrently, the PCAOB adopted a stricter approach to its inspections of audit firms, which encouraged them to improve audit quality and reduce audit fees. Moreover, the Great Recession pressured audit firms to reduce fees. We find that, following the three events, audit fees decreased and quality increased for accelerated filers. We also find that audit fees and audit quality increased for non-accelerated filers, although these filers were not directly affected by AS5.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

PCAOB International Inspections and Audit Quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 143-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Relevance Measure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

A Decade after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Need for Ongoing Vigilance, Monitoring, and Research

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanette M. Franzel
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Warning Signs ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Government Accountability ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Independence

SYNOPSIS After more than a decade since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), it is appropriate and necessary to ask questions about the present state of audit quality and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of PCAOB's oversight programs. Written from the viewpoint of a current PCAOB Board member and former Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), this paper discusses the warning signs of serious auditing problems in the years preceding the Act, and the role that the GAO played in analyzing those risks and calling for greater oversight of the accounting profession's auditing public companies. We must be vigilant and continually examine the activities of the auditing profession and the regulatory regime to ensure that audit independence and audit quality remain front and center to ensure investor protection and safeguard the public interest. Academic researchers play a key role in this system of vigilance. This paper provides views on many areas within the auditing profession that would benefit from further research and analysis, as well as opportunities for research that could be useful to the PCAOB as it considers current and future regulatory priorities.

The Impact of CEO and CFO Equity Incentives on Audit Scope and Perceived Risks as Revealed Through Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yezen H. Kannan ◽  
Terrance R. Skantz ◽  
Julia L. Higgs
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Share Price ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Planning ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY: In 2013, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) proposed an amendment to Auditing Standard No. 12 (PCAOB 2010) that would require auditors to consider executive compensation in audit planning because of potential fraud risk associated with equity incentives. We use the association between audit fees and CEO and CFO equity incentives to infer whether auditors increase audit scope and perceive greater risk as equity incentives increase. Equity incentives are defined as the sensitivity of the value of executives' equity portfolios to changes in share price (delta incentive) and to changes in return volatility (vega incentive). We find a positive association between audit fees and vega, but not delta. However, when we interact vega with proxies for residual auditor business risk, we find that the fee premiums for risk decrease as vega increases. Our results suggest that auditors do consider executive compensation in audit planning.

Audit Partner Identification: Unintended Consequences on Audit Judgment

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Cianci ◽  
Richard W. Houston ◽  
Norma R. Montague ◽  
Ryan Vogel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Judgment ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Stated Purpose ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY We examine the impact of partner identification, a regulation proposed by the PCAOB and contested by the audit profession, on audit partners' judgments. Based on accountability theory (e.g., Lerner and Tetlock 1999) and professionalism literature (e.g., Hall 1968; Adler and Kwon 2013), we conduct an experiment in which we manipulate partner identification at three levels (i.e., no identification, disclosure identification, signature identification) and ask 83 partners to make inventory writedown assessments and other judgments underlying their decision making. We find that, contrary to the PCAOB's stated purpose of enhancing audit quality, and consistent with the professionalism literature, partner identification—in the form of either disclosure or signature—yields more aggressive writedown judgments through its negative impact on partners' self-reported measures of commitment to the profession and, in turn, commitment to the public. This result suggests that regulators should consider possible unintended consequences of accountability-inducing regulations. JEL Classifications: C91; M42; M48.

The Effect of Auditing Standard No. 5 on Audit Report Lags

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santanu Mitra ◽  
Hakjoon Song ◽  
Joon Sun Yang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Extended Period ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Audit Process ◽  
Top Down ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Efficiency ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact

SYNOPSIS Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) introduced by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in June 2007 requires a top-down risk-based approach in auditing and is expected to improve audit efficiency and make the overall auditing process timelier by reducing audit report lags. We investigate the impact of AS5 on audit report lags over an extended period from 2006 to 2011 and find that audit report lags are lower in the AS5 years (2007–2011) relative to the AS2 years (2006–2007). But this reduction is evident mostly for the firms with clean SOX 404 opinions. The presence of material internal control weaknesses (ICW) significantly increases audit report lags, but AS5 does not have any incremental moderating effect on report lags and the ICW relationship. Tests for the firms with company-level and account-specific ICWs demonstrate identical results. Additional analyses show that the learning curve effect takes place rapidly in the early part of the AS5 period and audits continue to remain efficient in terms of reduced report lags in the latter part of the AS5 period relative to the AS2 period. The year-to-year change analyses for the AS5 period further corroborate this result. Overall, our study demonstrates that the top-down, risk-based approach under AS5 makes the audit process more efficient and timelier by decreasing audit report lags. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals Impact of External Auditing Quality and Audit Committees on Accounting Conservatism and the Performance of Industrial Firms Listed at the Amman Stock Exchange

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 556
Author(s):  
Mahmod AL-Rawashdeh Abdalwahab ◽  
Riham Fathi ALkabbji
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
Amman Stock Exchange ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Quality Features

This study aims to investigate the impact of external auditing quality and audit committees on accounting conservatism and the performance of industrial firms listed at the Amman Stock Exchange. The study has relied on the industrial sector which comprised of 70 industrial firms, while the sample size comprised 54 firms. Audit quality has been addressed in terms of audit quality features (communication with world audit offices, keep client period, audit fees, accounting specialist in the customer industry), while audit committees quality has been analyzed (audit committees independence, audit committees expertise, audit committees meetings). The accruals model has been used to measure accounting conservatism. The firm`s performance has been measured through its market value. The study concluded that audit committees have no impact on accounting conservatism and firm`s performance, while audit quality features have a positive impact on accounting conservatism and firm`s performance. The study has recommended the need to activate the role of audit committees in public shareholding industrial firms since they positively have an impact on raising audit efficiency and control the regulate the firm`s internal control system.

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