Purpose
Firms’ real activities management (RAM) can have a more detrimental effect on firms’ future performance than accrual earnings management. This paper aims to examine whether analysts, who play an important role as information intermediaries, understand the negative effect of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond to it accordingly.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors investigate whether analysts lower their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of the firms with RAM. The authors measure RAM by examining firms’ abnormal decreases in discretionary expenses, abnormal increases in production and abnormal decreases in cash flow from operations following prior literature.
Findings
The authors find that after controlling for earnings surprises and other important firm characteristics, analysts lower their forecasts of future annual earnings and stock recommendations of the firms that show signs of RAM.
Research limitations/implications
First, as in other RAM studies, the results in this study are subject to measurement errors inherent in the estimation of RAM (i.e. abnormal production costs, abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenditures). Second, we include only firm-year observations that barely make positive income in our samples following the previous study. This sample selection criterion helps increase the power of the test by examining the “suspect firms group,” which are more likely to engage in earnings management. However, one can challenge that our findings on the association between RAM and analysts’ reactions could be only case-specific and cannot be generalized.
Practical implications
This study contributes to the literature on earnings management and especially on RAM. Specifically, none of the previous studies clearly examines whether analysts understand the negative impact of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond accordingly, although there are studies showing the negative association between RAM and firms’ future operating performance and studies showing the negative association between analysts following and RAM. Thus, filling the gap, this study provides a specific reason for the negative association between the analyst following and real earnings management presented in previous studies.
Social implications
The findings will be of interest to regulators, who are concerned about the potential negative consequences in which tighter accounting standards can result. For example, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically demonstrate that tighter accounting standards can prompt more RAM instead of accounting earnings management. The study provides important evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market. If the market is able to detect RAM and allocate fewer resources to the firms that engage in it, then the concerns associated with the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and RAM can be diminished.
Originality/value
Prior research suggests that tighter accounting regulations (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) prompt more RAM than accounting earnings management. The study provides evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market.
Analysis on the Present Situation and Countermeasures of Earnings Management
