Local and Regional Audit Firms and the Market for SEC Audits

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 241-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Read ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama ◽  
K. Raghunandan
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Congressional Hearings ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Insurance Costs ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Rules Changes

The period after the demise of Enron and Andersen has been tumultuous for the accounting profession. In congressional hearings and in responses to the SEC and GAO, auditors have stated that provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) and related SEC rules changes would cause many local and regional audit firms to terminate audit work for SEC registrants. In this study, we provide empirical evidence about small audit firms and recent changes in the market for SEC audits. After examining all auditor resignations during 2000–2003, we find that 47 local and regional audit firms disclosed in Form 8-Ks filed in 2002–2003 that they were ceasing all SEC audits; only eight such firms that made this disclosure in 2000–2001. From interviews with audit partners of such firms, we find that the primary reasons for ceasing SEC audits is the perception of a more stringent oversight by the recently created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), increased professional liability insurance costs, and increased scrutiny of SEC registrants. We also find that many local and regional audit firms that had no SEC audit clients in 2002 voluntarily registered with the PCAOB. Interviews with partners of such audit firms indicate that the primary reason for voluntarily registering with the PCAOB is to signal their audit quality to non-SEC registrants (private companies, nonprofits, etc.) and their stakeholders.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

Audit quality following the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 927-946
Author(s):  
She-Chih Chiu ◽  
Chin-Chen Chien ◽  
Hsuan-Chu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Univariate Analysis ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Big Four

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors. Design/methodology/approach This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals. Findings This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards. Originality/value The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.

Conventions of Audit Quality: The Perspective of Public and Private Company Audit Partners

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Brivot ◽  
Mélanie Roussy ◽  
Maryse Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Professional Judgment ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Depth Analysis

SUMMARY This research is based on an in-depth analysis of 34 interviews with partners in Big 4, medium-sized, and small audit firms that specialize in private and/or public company audits, to explore how they understand the concept of audit quality. Two contrasting conventions—i.e., shared judgment norms—of audit quality emerge from the analysis. Public company audit partners in Big 4 firms espouse what we call the “model” audit quality convention, which considers that audit quality results from a technically flawless audit, where professional judgment is highly formalized, and quality is attested by a perfectly documented audit file that passes Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) and PCAOB inspections. In contrast, partners working primarily on private company audits, regardless of their firm's size, endorse what we call the “value-added” audit quality convention, which considers that audit quality results from tailoring the audit to meet the client's unique needs, where professional judgment is unconstrained, and where quality is attested by the client's perception that the audit has given a better understanding of their financial situation and the associated risks and opportunities. Our analysis also reveals significant tensions within each of these two conventions, and a fear that the current regulatory framework for quality control might end up severely hurting audit quality.

Investors’ Expectations of the Improvement in the Credibility of Audit Opinions following PCAOB Inspection Reports with Identified Deficiencies

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse C. Robertson ◽  
Richard W. Houston
Keyword(s):  
Public Confidence ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
Outreach Programs ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Perceived Credibility ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Accounting Scandals ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Opinions

ABSTRACT: Following high-profile accounting scandals (e.g., Enron), Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts regular inspections of audit firms and issues inspection reports that describe audit deficiencies identified during the inspections. One purpose of these reports is to improve public confidence in auditor credibility. We conduct a between-subjects experiment to provide initial evidence concerning investors’ perceptions of audit opinion credibility following PCAOB inspections. While we find an overall increase in perceptions of the credibility of future audit opinions, the degree to which perceptions increase is a function of three salient characteristics of PCAOB reports. Specifically, we find that investors anticipate more (less) improvement in the credibility of future opinions when: (1) inspections contain high (low) severity deficiencies; (2) firms respond to the reports with concessions (denials); and (3) for small (large) firms. Further, investors’ assessment of the credibility of the firm’s response to the PCAOB report is higher for concessions than denials; response credibility fully mediates the effect of response type (concession or denial) on the perceived improvement in the credibility of future opinions. Therefore, the inspections may be a useful tool for improving the perceived credibility of audit opinions under certain conditions. Implications include the possibility that firms should consider carefully the nature of their responses and the PCAOB should consider establishing outreach programs to investors to educate them about its regulatory role.

Does Increased Audit Partner Tenure Reduce Audit Quality?

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Manry ◽  
Theodore J. Mock ◽  
Jerry L. Turner
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Risk Level ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Using Data ◽  
International Audit

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner to rotate off the audit every five years so the engagement can be viewed “with fresh and skeptical eyes.” Using data obtained from actual audits by multiple U.S. offices of three large international audit firms, we examine whether there is a relationship between evidence of reduced audit quality, measured by estimated discretionary accruals, and audit partner tenure with a specific client. We find that estimated discretionary accruals are significantly and negatively associated with the lead audit partner's tenure with a specific client. Thus, audit quality appears to increase with increased partner tenure. After controlling for client size and engagement risk, we find audit partner tenure significantly and negatively associated with estimated discretionary accruals only for small clients with partner tenure of greater than seven years, regardless of risk level. We also find that tenure is not significantly associated with estimated discretionary accruals for large clients. This suggests that as partner tenure increases, auditors of small client firms become less willing to accept more aggressive financial statement assertions by managers, and that partner tenure does not affect audit quality for large clients or for shorter-tenure smaller clients. Our results relating to audit partner tenure are consistent with the conclusions about audit firm tenure by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002); Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002);Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003); and Nagy (2005) and extend their findings by focusing on individual audit partners rather than on audit firms.

A Decade after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Need for Ongoing Vigilance, Monitoring, and Research

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanette M. Franzel
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Warning Signs ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Government Accountability ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Independence

SYNOPSIS After more than a decade since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), it is appropriate and necessary to ask questions about the present state of audit quality and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of PCAOB's oversight programs. Written from the viewpoint of a current PCAOB Board member and former Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), this paper discusses the warning signs of serious auditing problems in the years preceding the Act, and the role that the GAO played in analyzing those risks and calling for greater oversight of the accounting profession's auditing public companies. We must be vigilant and continually examine the activities of the auditing profession and the regulatory regime to ensure that audit independence and audit quality remain front and center to ensure investor protection and safeguard the public interest. Academic researchers play a key role in this system of vigilance. This paper provides views on many areas within the auditing profession that would benefit from further research and analysis, as well as opportunities for research that could be useful to the PCAOB as it considers current and future regulatory priorities.

scholarly journals The Influence of Institutional Regulatory Pressure on Nonprofit Hospital Audit Quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Michele M. McGowan ◽  
Siew H. Chan ◽  
Yuliya V. Yurova ◽  
Chunhui Liu ◽  
Raymond M. K. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Nonprofit Hospitals ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Nonprofit Hospital

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether the influence of institutional regulatory pressures emanating from the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and subsequent nonprofit legislation and disclosure requirements improves nonprofit hospital audit quality. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that increased regulatory attention can shift the audit firm's judgment regarding the choice and inference of previously acceptable audit procedures and heighten the importance of reputational capital as an incentive for audit firms to improve audit quality. We examine two measures of audit quality: internal control deficiencies and discretionary accruals. The results reveal that the audit quality of nonprofit hospitals improves, suggesting that audit firms have responded to regulatory pressures and enhanced their audit and engagement practices for the benefit of nonprofit hospitals and stakeholders. The findings provide regulators and public interest groups with evidence that desired nonprofit oversight and accountability may have already been attained via improved audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

Auditor Independence and Auditor-Provided Tax Service: Evidence from Going-Concern Audit Opinions Prior to Bankruptcy Filings

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dahlia Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
The Public ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Information Spillover

SUMMARY: This study examines whether auditors’ provision of tax services impairs auditor independence by focusing on auditors’ going-concern opinions among a sample of bankruptcy filing firms. The evidence from the bankruptcy setting is particularly salient given that the bankruptcy of corporations such as Enron motivated several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. More recently, auditors’ provision of tax service to their audit clients has been the focus of new rules by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Consistent with improved audit quality from information spillover, the study documents a significant positive correlation between the level of tax services fees and the likelihood of correctly issuing a going-concern opinion prior to the bankruptcy filing. One implication of this result is that restricting tax services by auditors of poorly performing firms may diminish the quality of auditors’ reporting decisions without leading to an improvement in auditor independence.

scholarly journals An Account Analysis Of PCAOB Inspection Reports For Triennially-Inspected Audit Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Landis ◽  
Scott I. Jerris ◽  
Mike Braswell
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Business Combinations ◽  
Client Engagement ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
Business Transactions ◽  
Cpa Firms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Primary Type

Since 2005, the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) has been issuing inspection reports for triennially-inspected audit firms as part of its overall mission to improve audit quality. This study analyzes the findings in the PCAOB inspection reports by classifying the audit deficiencies cited in the reports by area of deficiency and type of audit failure. CPA firms can utilize these findings in their efforts to reduce client engagement audit risk. The results indicate that the overall number of cited deficiencies is declining each year, revenue and asset accounts are the most frequently cited accounts, business combinations and equity transactions are the most cited transactions, and insufficient testing or documentation is the primary type of audit failure. We also document that most departures from GAAP occur in the accounting for business transactions or in liability accounts.

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