PCAOB Inspections of Smaller CPA Firms: The Perspective of Inspected Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Daugherty ◽  
Wayne Tervo
Keyword(s):  
Negative Impact ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
The Public ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process

SYNOPSIS: We solicit perceptions of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection process from the leadership of triennial firms (100 or fewer publicly traded audit clients, inspected triennially) receiving their initial inspection. Our research is motivated by a growing stream of academic research related to triennial firms. Practitioners have called for research to determine whether the performance of audits in the Sarbanes-Oxley era may fail to attain the stated objective of enhancing investor confidence in the capital markets. Academics note further PCAOB inspection research can provide important insights into the consequences of PCAOB inspection for auditors and other market participants. In general, smaller respondents reported initial PCAOB inspections resulted in a negative impact on many aspects of their audit practices, while medium and larger firms reported more favorable consequences. Collectively, responding firms evaluated their initial inspection team’s performance favorably, but were more critical of other aspects of the inspection process. Levels of satisfaction with nearly all aspects of PCAOB inspections appear to increase with firm size and the passage of time. We interpret our findings as suggesting the efficacy of PCAOB inspections may be enhanced by focusing on potential unintended consequences and inspection process modifications rather than on inspectors’ qualifications and actions.

Does Recent Academic Research Support Changes to Audit Reporting Standards?

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Bédard ◽  
Paul Coram ◽  
Reza Espahbodi ◽  
Theodore J. Mock
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Research Support ◽  
The Public ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Information Gap ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Process

SYNOPSIS The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), and the U.K. Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have proposed or approved standards that significantly change the independent auditor's report. These initiatives require the auditor to make additional disclosures intended to close the information gap; that is, the gap between the information users desire and the information available through the audited financial statements, other corporate disclosures, and the auditor's report. They are also intended to improve the relevancy of the auditor's report. We augment prior academic research by providing standard setters with an updated synthesis of relevant research. More importantly, we provide an assessment of whether the changes are likely to close the information gap, which is important to financial market participants and other stakeholders in the audit reporting process. Also, we identify areas where there seems to be a lack of sufficient research. These results are of interest to all stakeholders in the audit reporting process, as the changes to the auditor's report are fundamental. Additionally, our summaries of research on the auditor's report highlight where there is limited research or inconsistent results, which will help academics identify important opportunities for future research.

Auditing the Auditors: A Case on PCAOB Inspection Reports of Registered Public Accounting Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. B1-B18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Daugherty ◽  
Marshall K. Pitman
Keyword(s):  
Public Accounting ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Public Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Evidence ◽  
Inspection Process

SUMMARY: We present a timely practice-oriented case related to the inspection process of registered firms by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). This case allows auditing students an opportunity to explore the unique challenges that public accounting firms auditing U.S. public companies face with respect to the PCAOB inspection process. The case focuses on large and small registered firms (inspected annually and triennially, respectively) receiving an inspection report where the PCAOB identified certain matters considered to be audit deficiencies of such significance that the inspection team believed the audit firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support the auditor’s opinion. The case exposes students to the PCAOB inspection process, highlights many deficiencies noted to date by the PCAOB inspectors, and emphasizes the importance of sufficient and appropriately documented audit evidence to support audit opinions. By reviewing ‘deficient’ inspection reports, students gain an appreciation for common audit deficiencies as well as the subjective nature of portions of the authoritative literature and the inspection process itself. The case reinforces students’ understanding of the practical matters involved in appropriately obtaining, evaluating, and documenting audit evidence, as well as educates students on the PCAOB inspection process in order to address important competencies required of Sarbanes-Oxley era audit professionals.

scholarly journals Is The Pcaob a “Heavily Controlled Component” Of The Sec?: An Essential Question In The Constitutional Controversy

2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna M. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Free Enterprise ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Essential Question ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, described as “the most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President’s appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years.” Established by Congress as the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB” or the “Board”) was structured as “a strong, independent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies.” Its principal mission was to prevent the type of auditing failures that contributed to the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other public companies in the period leading up to the passage of the Act.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

Do Strategic Reasoning and Brainstorming Help Auditors Change Their Standard Audit Procedures in Response to Fraud Risk?

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 811-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicky B. Hoffman ◽  
Mark F. Zimbelman
Keyword(s):  
Academic Research ◽  
Strategic Reasoning ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Planning Decisions ◽  
Public Company

ABSTRACT: The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently reported that its inspections show that auditors fail to effectively modify their standard audit procedures in response to fraud risk. Prior academic research is consistent with this finding. Our study examines the effects of two interventions on auditors' planning decisions in a high-fraud-risk setting: strategic reasoning and brainstorming in groups. Both interventions are predicted to lead auditors to more effectively modify their planned audit procedures. We use a panel of fraud experts to identify effective modifications to the audit plan of a specific fraud case. The experts' recommendations are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of practicing auditors' audit plans with and without the two interventions. We predict and find that each intervention leads to more effective modifications to the standard audit procedures and that the combination of the interventions is not significantly more effective than either intervention used alone.

PCAOB Enforcements: A Review of the First Three Years

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. A15-A34 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Gilbertson ◽  
Terri L. Herron
Keyword(s):  
Disciplinary Action ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company

SUMMARY: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) to oversee audits of public companies. When violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or PCAOB rules are found, the PCAOB may impose sanctions as severe as revoking a firm’s registration or barring a person from participating in audits of public companies. This paper describes the PCAOB enforcement actions issued through 2008. We examine characteristics of the disciplined firms, their PCAOB inspections, the related issuer clients, and the circumstances that resulted in the disciplinary proceedings. Consistent with prior research, we find that firms with issues rising to the level of disciplinary action generally have longer inspections and more audit deficiencies than firms with inspection deficiencies not resulting in sanctions. Disciplined firms also tend to have fewer partners, audit more SEC issuers, and have clients that are smaller and less financially sound.

scholarly journals Audit Quality: Insights from the Academic Literature

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 385-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik ◽  
Uma K. Velury
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Public ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Public Company

SUMMARY This study presents a review of academic research on audit quality. We begin with a review of existing definitions of audit quality and describe general frameworks for establishing audit quality. Next, we summarize research on indicators of audit quality such as inputs, process, and outcomes. Finally, we offer some suggestions for future research. The study should be useful to academics interested in audit quality as well as to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and other regulators.

scholarly journals Auditing Subsequent Events: Perspectives from the Field

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. A10-A24 ◽  
Author(s):  
David N. Herda ◽  
James J. Lavelle
Keyword(s):  
Academic Research ◽  
Research Synthesis ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Research Questions

SUMMARY: A research synthesis team formed by the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association recently authored a paper (Chung et al. 2013) addressing the audit of subsequent events (SEs). The audit of SEs is a difficult audit area, as approximately one-third of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's inspection reports and numerous Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement releases identify deficiencies in this area (Chung et al. 2013). Chung et al. (2013) developed a model and proposed a series of research questions encouraging future academic research in this area. In this paper, we address several of these questions by surveying 76 practicing auditors. We summarize the auditors' responses and present recommendations that may be useful in improving audits of SEs.

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