Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1487-1516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean T. McGuire ◽  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Ryan J. Wilson

ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether the agency conflicts inherent in a dual class ownership structure are associated with the level of firms' tax avoidance. Dual class ownership presents a unique agency problem because insiders control a majority of the votes of a firm despite having claims to a minority of the firm's cash flows. We examine the level of tax avoidance for a sample of dual class firms and find that the extent of tax avoidance declines as the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights increases. We also compare the level of tax avoidance of dual class firms to a sample of propensity matched single class firms and find that dual class firms engage in less tax avoidance as the wedge between insiders' voting rights and cash flow rights increases. These findings are consistent with dual class ownership entrenching managers and allowing them to perform at a suboptimal level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-836 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linna Shi ◽  
Huai Zhang

SYNOPSIS This paper investigates the difference between two widely used measures of accruals and their differential impact on accrual strategy returns. The two measures are accruals computed using consecutive changes in the balance sheet items and accruals computed as earnings minus cash flows from operating activities, both from the cash flow statement. Our investigations reveal that the difference between the two measures is caused by four items and non-articulations in changes in working capital accounts and depreciation expenses, in addition to non-articulation events as identified by Hribar and Collins (2002). We find that the non-articulation in working capital accounts and depreciation expenses between the cash flow statement and other financial statements is surprisingly prevalent and economically significant, and it can be attributed to special events, errors made by Compustat, firms' inconsistent definitions, and non-standard classifications of assets/liabilities. We show that, after excluding non-articulation events, the accrual strategy returns are higher for accruals computed using balance sheet items than accruals computed using cash flow statement items. Further investigations suggest that the return differentials are mainly due to other funds from operations and the non-articulation in changes in accounts receivable. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M41. Data Availability: Data used are available from the sources identified in the study.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arno Forst ◽  
Barry Hettler ◽  
Ran Ron Barniv

We examine the association of insider ownership with financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion in a sample of U.S. dual-class firms. Insider ownership exerts two effects: a positive incentive effect and a negative entrenchment effect. The lack of significant findings in prior research regarding the association between insider ownership and forecast accuracy may be attributable to the offsetting forces of these two effects. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. firms that maintain more than one class of common stock, we are able to disentangle incentive and entrenchment effects which are confounded in single-class firms. We find that disproportionate insider control is negatively associated with forecast accuracy and positively associated with forecast dispersion. Moreover, insider cash flow rights (insider voting rights) are positively (negatively) associated with forecast accuracy and negatively (positively) associated with forecast dispersion, consistent with incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects of ownership affecting financial analysts’ forecasting environment in opposite directions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyun A. Hong ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Gerald J. Lobo

This study examines the role of financial reporting conservatism in mitigating underinvestment problems. Recognizing that volatile cash flows increase the need to access external capital markets and that agency conflicts and information asymmetry make external capital costlier than internal capital, which leads managers to forgo valuable investment projects, Minton and Schrand document a negative relation between cash flow volatility and investment. We draw on Minton and Schrand’s framework to isolate underinvestment problems and hypothesize and document that conservatism mitigates the negative relation between cash flow volatility and investment and that this mitigative effect is more pronounced for firms with ex ante more severe agency conflicts. We also document that conservatism mitigates the sensitivity of investment to cash flow volatility by facilitating access to external capital.


2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Rigamonti

This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005. At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.


2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Francis ◽  
Katherine Schipper ◽  
Linda Vincent

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Moussa Fatma ◽  
Jameleddine Chichti

This research tests the efficiency of the ownership structure and the debt policy as mechanism of resolution of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers due to the problem of overinvestment, in the limitation of the problem of the free cash flow, by estimating three stage least square simultaneous model and on the basis of a sample of 35 non-financial Tunisian listed companies selected for the period 1999–2008. Our results are in favour of the theory of free cash flows of Jensen (1986) that stipulates that the debt policy represents the principal governance mechanism that can limit the risk of free cash flow. However, the ownership concentration and managerial ownership increase the risk of the free cash flow.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheol Lee ◽  
Jong Eun Lee ◽  
Myung Seok Park

SYNOPSIS In this study, we examine whether the ability of working capital (WC) accruals to predict future earnings and cash flows differs between registrants whose auditors are subject to annual Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections and those whose auditors are subject to triennial PCAOB inspections. We find that WC accruals of clients audited by auditors subject to annual PCAOB inspections enhance earnings persistence more and map into future cash flow realizations better than those audited by auditors subject to triennial PCAOB inspections. These findings are stronger for operating asset accruals than for operating liability accruals. Furthermore, after PCAOB inspection reports are released, improvements in WC accrual reliability are more evident for clients audited by annually inspected auditors than for clients audited by triennially inspected auditors. Overall, our findings suggest that more frequent PCAOB inspections help to improve WC accrual reliability. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: The data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document