The Effect of Employee Treatment Policies on Internal Control Weaknesses and Financial Restatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1167-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Guo ◽  
Pinghsun Huang ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Nan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Employee Benefits ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Treatment Policies ◽  
Employee Treatment

ABSTRACT This study investigates the role of employment policies in reducing internal control ineffectiveness and financial restatements. We provide new evidence that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of ineffective internal control. We also find that employee-friendly policies significantly reduce the propensity for employee-related material weaknesses. These results suggest that greater employee benefits facilitate the acquisition, development, and motivation of the workforce and ameliorate the loss of valuable human capital, thereby mitigating employee failures to implement internal control tasks properly. Moreover, we document novel results that financial restatements, especially those caused by unintentional errors, are less likely to arise in firms that invest more in employee benefits. Collectively, our emphasis on the effect of employee treatment policies on the integrity of internal control and financial reporting distinguishes our paper from previous studies that focus on the role of top executives in accounting practices. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

Determinants of the Persistence of Internal Control Weaknesses

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Kevin W. Kobelsky ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Management Training ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Specific Control

SYNOPSIS This paper analyzes the degree to which material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control reported under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) affect the future reporting of MWs. Particularly, we examine information technology (IT) and non-IT MWs and their breakdown into specific IT-related entity-level, non-IT-related entity-level, and account-level deficiencies. Analysis reveals that most account-level and entity-level deficiencies occur at a significantly higher rate in SOX 404 reports with at least one IT MW than in MW reports with only non-IT MWs. Further, the presence and count of both types of MWs and all three types of deficiencies are associated with increased future MWs, as are lower profitability, non-Big 6 auditor, and firm complexity. Specific control deficiencies related to senior management, training, and IT control environment have the strongest impact on future MWs. These results indicate that effective corporate governance of both the IT and non-IT domains is pivotal in establishing and maintaining strong internal controls over financial reporting. Data Availability:  Data are available from the public sources identified in the paper.

Business Strategy, Internal Control over Financial Reporting, and Audit Reporting Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen A. Bentley-Goode ◽  
Nathan J. Newton ◽  
Anne M. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Business Strategy ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This study examines whether a company's business strategy is an underlying determinant of the strength of its internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) and auditors' internal control reporting quality. Organizational theory suggests that companies following an innovative “prospector” strategy are likely to have weaker internal controls than companies following an efficient “defender” strategy. Consistent with theory, we find that firms with greater prospector-like characteristics are more likely to report and less likely to remediate material weaknesses, incremental to known determinants of material weaknesses. We also find that auditors' internal control reporting quality is lower among clients with greater prospector-like characteristics when measured using the timeliness of reported material weaknesses. Our findings indicate that business strategy is a useful summary indicator for evaluating companies' internal control strength and suggest that internal control reporting is an important area for audit quality improvement among prospector-like clients. JEL Classifications: D21; 21; M41. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources as indicated in the text.

IT Does Matter: The Folly of Ignoring IT Material Weaknesses

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene Kim ◽  
Vernon J. Richardson ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Reporting Systems ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

SYNOPSIS Information technology (IT) has a large and growing impact on firms and executives. While there are questions about the ability of IT to create a competitive advantage, we make the case that ignoring IT may be to an organization's and its executives' peril. Using the lens of internal control issues associated with financial reporting systems, we illustrate how internal control weaknesses associated with IT (ITMWs) can have both a dramatic and negative impact on the firm and its leadership. ITMWs take longer to remediate; are associated with more subsequent restatements, less accurate forecasts, higher audit fees, and lower earnings quality; and are more likely associated with executives losing their positions than non-ITMWs. We argue that ITMW remediation requires more time to plan, rewrite, and implement IT changes than to implement non-IT changes. Extant literature suggests that executives should focus their efforts on IT vulnerabilities and risks rather than IT opportunities. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

The Severity of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting Deficiencies: Differences among Types and Industries

2014 ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Tatiana Mazza ◽  
Stefano Azzali
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Service Industry ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Fixed Assets

This study analyzes the severity of Internal Control over Financial Reporting deficiencies (Deficiencies, Significant Deficiencies and Material Weaknesses) in a sample of Italian listed companies, in the period 2007- 2012. Using proprietary data the severity of the deficiencies is tested for account-specific, entity level and information technology controls and for industries (manufacturing and services vs finance industries). The results on ICD severity is compared with one of the most frequent ICD (Acc_Period End/Accounting Policies): for account-specific, ICD in revenues, purchase, fixed assets and intangible, loans and insurance are more severe while ICD in Inventory are less severe. Differences in ICD severity have been found in the characteristic account: ICD in loan and insurance for finance industry and ICD in revenue, purchase for manufacturing and service industry are more severe. Finally, we found that ICD in entity level and information technology controls are less severe than account specific ICD in all industries. However, the results on entity level and information technology deficiencies could also mean that the importance of these types of control are under-evaluated by the manufacturing and service companies.

Why do Restatements Decrease in a Clawback Environment? An Investigation into Financial Reporting Executives' Decision-Making during the Restatement Process

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (6) ◽  
pp. 2515-2536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Pyzoha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Archival Studies ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Auditor Quality

ABSTRACT Prior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.

scholarly journals Integration of Internal Control and Financial Statement Audits: Are Two Audits Better than One?

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Determinants and Market Consequences of Auditor Dismissals after Accounting Restatements

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 1051-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen M. Hennes ◽  
Andrew J. Leone ◽  
Brian P. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Market Consequences

ABSTRACT This study examines the conditions under which financial restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market responds to those dismissal announcements. We find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. We also document that among corporations with Big 4 auditors, those that are larger and more complex operationally are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Combined, this evidence suggests that firms with higher switching costs and fewer replacement auditor choices are less likely to dismiss their auditors after a restatement, which is informative to the debates about the costs and benefits of mandatory auditor rotation and limited competition in the audit market. Additionally, we examine contemporaneous executive turnover and find evidence that boards view auditor dismissals as complementary rather than substitute responses to restatements. Finally, we investigate the market reaction to auditor dismissals after restatements. The market reaction to the dismissal is significantly more positive following more severe restatements (5.9 percent) relative to less severe restatements (0.6 percent) when the client engages a comparably sized auditor. This positive market reaction is consistent with firms restoring financial reporting credibility by replacing their auditors and highlights the important role that auditors play in the financial markets. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

The Failure to Remediate Previously Disclosed Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline S. Hammersley ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Jian Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Material Weaknesses

SUMMARY In this paper, we study a sample of companies that fail to remediate previously disclosed material weaknesses (MWs) in their internal control systems and, thus, disclose the same MWs in two consecutive annual reports. Their failure to remediate is surprising given that regulators, credit rating agencies, and academics contend that the remediation of MWs is important. We form a control sample of companies that initially disclosed MWs in their internal control systems, but subsequently remediated these weaknesses, and investigate the characteristics of the remediated and unremediated MWs, the characteristics of remediating versus non-remediating companies, and the consequences to non-remediating companies. Regarding the characteristics of companies failing to remediate, we find that companies are less likely to remediate previously disclosed MWs when the weaknesses are more pervasive (i.e., when they are described as at the entity level, when there are more individual weaknesses) and when their operations are more complex (i.e., they have more segments and have foreign operations). In addition, companies with smaller audit committees are less likely to remediate. Regarding the consequences, we find that companies failing to remediate MWs experience larger increases in audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignation as the number of MWs increases. We also find that non-remediating companies are more likely to receive modified audit opinions and going-concern opinions. Finally, we find that companies failing to remediate are more likely to miss filing deadlines and experience increased cost of debt capital (i.e., they receive poorer credit ratings when entity level MWs are present, and are charged higher interest rates). Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility?

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 761-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Myung Seok Park ◽  
Benson Wier
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Accruals Quality ◽  
Corporate Social

ABSTRACT This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. We find that socially responsible firms are less likely (1) to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, (2) to manipulate real operating activities, and (3) to be the subject of SEC investigations, as evidenced by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases against top executives. Our results are robust to (1) controlling for various incentives for CSR and earnings management, (2) considering various CSR dimensions and components, and (3) using alternative proxies for CSR and accruals quality. To the extent that we control for the potential effects of reputation and financial performance, our findings suggest that ethical concerns are likely to drive managers to produce high-quality financial reports. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

scholarly journals Factors Influencing Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Malaysian Property Companies

2019 ◽  
pp. 559-568
Author(s):  
Erlane K. Ghani ◽  
Mazni Zulkifli ◽  
Rahayu Abdul Rahman
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Small Companies ◽  
Internal Auditor ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Property Companies

This study examines the factors influencing material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting among the companies in the property industry in Malaysia. Specifically, this study examines six factors namely firm age, firm size, financial health, financial reporting complexity, rapid growth and corporate governance. Using content analysis on the annual reports of 80 property companies, this study shows that only firm size has a significant influence on the material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Other factors however, show no significant influence on the material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. The result in this study indicates that small companies tend to have material weaknesses in internal control due to them having limited resources in building effective internal control. These companies generally could not afford to spend on expertise such as internal auditor or consultant to assist in improving and strengthening internal control. The findings of this study shed some lights to the regulators and practitioners on the factors influencing material weaknesses in the internal control over financial reporting. Of consequence, this would reduce information asymmetry between the insiders and outsiders of a company and thus, increasing the quality of financial reporting.

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