Do Investors Fully Unravel Persistent Pessimism in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts?

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Veenman ◽  
Patrick Verwijmeren
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Announcement Returns ◽  
Low Probability ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study presents evidence suggesting that investors do not fully unravel predictable pessimism in sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts. We show that measures of prior consensus and individual analyst forecast pessimism are predictive of both the sign of firms' earnings surprises and the stock returns around earnings announcements. That is, we find that firms with a relatively high probability of forecast pessimism experience significantly higher announcement returns than those with a low probability. Importantly, we show that these findings are driven by predictable pessimism in analysts' short-term forecasts, as opposed to optimism in their longer-term forecasts. We further find that this mispricing is related to the difficulty investors have in identifying differences in expected forecast pessimism. Overall, we conclude that market prices do not fully reflect the conditional probability that a firm meets or beats earnings expectations as a result of analysts' pessimistically biased short-term forecasts. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; G20.

Identifying the News in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Revisions: An Alternative to the Random Walk Expectation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Pfeiffer ◽  
Karen Teitel ◽  
Susan Wahab ◽  
Mahmoud Wahab
Keyword(s):  
Random Walk ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Simple Random Walk ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Forecast Revisions ◽  
Conditioning Information ◽  
Using Data

Previous research indicates that analysts’ forecasts are superior to time series models as measures of investors’ earnings expectations. Nevertheless, research also documents predictable patterns in analysts’ forecasts and forecast errors. If investors are aware of these patterns, analysts’ forecast revisions measured using the random walk expectation are an incomplete representation of changes in investors’ earnings expectations. Investors can use knowledge of errors and biases in forecasts to improve upon the simple random walk expectation by incorporating conditioning information. Using data from 2005 to 2015, we compare associations between market-adjusted stock returns and alternative specifications of forecast revisions to determine which best represents changes in investors’ earnings expectations. We find forecast revisions measured using a ‘bandwagon expectations’ specification, which includes two prior analysts’ forecast signals and provides the most improvement over random-walk-based revision measures. Our findings demonstrate benefits to considering information beyond the previously issued analyst forecast when representing investors’ expectations of analysts’ forecasts.

scholarly journals The Earnings Expectations Game and the Dispersion Anomaly

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Veenman ◽  
Patrick Verwijmeren
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Return Predictability ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Forecast Dispersion ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
New Evidence

This study examines the role of differences in firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations in explaining why firms with high analyst forecast dispersion experience relatively low future stock returns. We first demonstrate that the negative relation between dispersion and returns is concentrated around earnings announcements. Next, we show that this relation disappears when we control for ex ante measures of firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations and that the component of dispersion explained by these measures drives the return predictability of dispersion. We further demonstrate that firms with low analyst dispersion are substantially more likely to achieve positive earnings surprises and provide new evidence consistent with both expectations management and strategic forecast pessimism explaining this result. Overall, we conclude that investor mispricing of firms’ participation in the earnings-expectations game provides a viable explanation for the dispersion anomaly. Accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.

The Trend in Firm Profitability and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferhat Akbas ◽  
Chao Jiang ◽  
Paul D. Koch
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Cross Section ◽  
The Other ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Earnings Surprise ◽  
Firm Profitability ◽  
Earnings Momentum ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study shows that the recent trajectory of a firm's profits predicts future profitability and stock returns. The predictive information contained in the trend of profitability is not subsumed by the level of profitability, earnings momentum, or other well-known determinants of stock returns. The profit trend also predicts the earnings surprise one quarter later, and analyst forecast errors over the following 12 months, suggesting that sophisticated investors underreact to the information in the profit trend. On the other hand, we find no evidence of investor overreaction, and our results cannot be explained by well-known risk factors. JEL Classifications: G12; G14.

scholarly journals The Role of Anchoring Bias in the Equity Market: Evidence from Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Stock Returns

2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ling Cen ◽  
Gilles Hilary ◽  
K. C. John Wei
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Stock Splits ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Forecast Revisions ◽  
Earnings Per Share ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Anchoring Bias

AbstractWe test the implications of anchoring bias associated with forecast earnings per share (FEPS) for forecast errors, earnings surprises, stock returns, and stock splits. We find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s FEPS is lower (higher) than the industry median. Further, firms with FEPS greater (lower) than the industry median experience abnormally high (low) future stock returns, particularly around subsequent earnings announcement dates. These firms are also more likely to engage in stock splits. Finally, split firms experience more positive forecast revisions, more negative forecast errors, and more negative earnings surprises after stock splits.

Tax-Motivated Loss Shifting

2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1657-1682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle M. Erickson ◽  
Shane M. Heitzman ◽  
X. Frank Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Corporate Reporting ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the implications of tax loss carryback incentives for corporate reporting decisions and capital market behavior. During the 1981 through 2010 sample period, we find that firms increase losses in order to claim a cash refund of recent tax payments before the option to do so expires, and we estimate that firms with tax refund-based incentives accelerate about $64.7 billion in losses. Tax-motivated loss shifting is reflected in both recurring and nonrecurring items and is more evident for financially constrained firms. Analysts do not generally incorporate tax-motivated loss shifting into their earnings forecasts, resulting in more negative analyst forecast errors for firms with tax-based incentives than for firms without. Holding earnings surprises constant, however, investors react less negatively to losses reported by firms with tax loss carryback incentives. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals Updating great expectations: The effect of peer salary information on own-earnings forecasts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Jones ◽  
Ricardo Santos
Keyword(s):  
Job Search ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Great Expectations ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Salary Information ◽  
The Impact

How jobseekers set their earnings expectations is central to job search models. To study this process, we track the evolution of own-earnings forecasts over 18 months for a representative panel of university-leavers in Mozambique and estimate the impact of a wage information intervention. We sent participants differentiated messages about the average earnings of their peers, obtained from prior survey rounds. Demonstrating the stickiness of (initially optimistic) beliefs, we find an elasticity of own-wage expectations to this news of around 7 per cent in the short term and 16 per cent over the long term, which compares to a 22 per cent elasticity in response to unanticipated actual wage offers. We further find evidence of heterogeneous updating heuristics, where factors such as the initial level of optimism, cognitive skills, perceived reliability of the information, and valence of the news shape how wage expectations are updated. We recommend institutionalizing public information about earnings.

I/B/E/S Reported Actual EPS and Analysts' Inferred Actual EPS

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 853-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence D. Brown ◽  
Stephannie Larocque
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Earnings Forecast ◽  
Sample Period ◽  
Forecast Dispersion ◽  
Forecast Revisions ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Analyst Earnings

ABSTRACT Users of I/B/E/S data generally act as if I/B/E/S reported actual earnings represent the earnings analysts were forecasting when they issued their earnings estimates. For example, when assessing analyst forecast accuracy, users of I/B/E/S data compare analysts' forecasts of EPS with I/B/E/S reported actual EPS. I/B/E/S states that it calculates actuals using a “majority rule,” indicating that its actuals often do not represent the earnings that all individual analysts were forecasting. We introduce a method for measuring analyst inferred actuals, and we assess how often I/B/E/S actuals do not represent analyst inferred actuals. We find that I/B/E/S reported Q1 actual EPS differs from analyst inferred actual Q1 EPS by at least one penny 39 percent of the time during our sample period, 36.5 percent of the time when only one analyst follows the firm (hence, this consensus forecast is based on the “majority rule”), and 50 percent of the time during the last three years of our sample period. We document two adverse consequences of this phenomenon. First, studies failing to recognize that I/B/E/S EPS actuals often differ from analyst inferred actuals are likely to obtain less accurate analyst earnings forecasts, smaller analyst earnings forecast revisions conditional on earnings surprises, greater analyst forecast dispersion, and smaller market reaction to earnings surprises than do studies adjusting for these differences. Second, studies failing to recognize that I/B/E/S EPS actuals often differ from analyst inferred actuals may make erroneous inferences.

Changes in Internal Control Disclosure and Analyst Forecasts Around Mandatory Disclosure Required by the China SOX

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xudong Ji ◽  
Wei Lu ◽  
Wen Qu ◽  
Vernon J. Richardson
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Forecast Error ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Analyst Forecasts ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Analyst Earnings ◽  
Basic Standard ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS Beginning January 1, 2012, all publicly listed firms in China are required, under the Basic Standard of Enterprise Internal Control (China SOX), to provide an internal control report (ICR). Prior to that, many firms had elected to voluntarily comply with this regulation. We examine the change in internal control disclosure regimes and its impact on the properties of analyst earnings forecasts. We compare the quantity and severity of ICWs disclosed under voluntary versus mandatory regimes, and find evidence suggesting that the disclosure of more serious ICWs increases when ICW disclosures become mandatory. We then investigate the effect of ICW disclosures on analyst forecast error and dispersion. We find that measures of ICWs are negatively associated with desirable properties of analyst earnings forecasts. We also find a less positive association between ICW disclosures and forecast error and dispersion in the mandatory regime. JEL Classifications: G34; G38; M41.

The Reversal of Abnormal Accruals and the Market Valuation of Earnings Surprises

2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark L. DeFond ◽  
Chul W. Park
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Market Valuation ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Future Earnings ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Announcement Date ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
The Difference

If the market anticipates the reversing nature of abnormal working capital accruals, then the reported magnitude of earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals will differ from the underlying magnitude that is priced by the market. We expect the market's perception of this difference to affect the ERCs associated with earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals. We test our predictions using an abnormal accruals measure that captures the difference between reported working capital and a proxy for the market's expectations of the level of working capital required to support current sales levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find higher ERCs when abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of earnings surprises, and lower ERCs when abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of earnings surprises. We also find results consistent with analysts predictably considering the reversing implications of abnormal accruals in revising future earnings forecasts. These findings are consistent with market participants anticipating the reversing implications of abnormal accruals. However, analysis of subsequent stock returns provides evidence that market participants do not fully impound the pricing implications of abnormal accruals at the earnings announcement date.

Corporate Disclosure, Analyst Forecast Dispersion, and Stock Returns

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashiq Ali ◽  
Mark Liu ◽  
Danielle Xu ◽  
Tong Yao
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Forecast Dispersion ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Future Earnings ◽  
Disclosure Practice ◽  
Analyst Forecast Dispersion

This article examines whether a corporate disclosure practice is one of the reasons for the forecast dispersion anomaly—the negative relation between analyst forecast dispersion and future stock returns. Prior studies have shown that firms tend to delay the disclosure of bad news and that withholding of news leads to greater dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. Accordingly, we predict that firms with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts are more likely to experience poor earnings in the subsequent quarter, and find evidence consistent with this prediction. After controlling for the relation between forecast dispersion and future earnings, we find that forecast dispersion is no longer significantly negatively related to future stock returns. These results suggest that temporary withholding of bad news by firms increases forecast dispersion among analysts and leads to low subsequent stock returns.

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