Changes in Audit Market Competition and the Big N Premium

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Carson ◽  
Roger Simnett ◽  
Billy S. Soo ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Big 5 ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY We respond to calls for research into the effect of the decline in the number of Big N firms on market power and consequential impact on competition (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008; European Commission 2010; U.K. House of Lords 2011) by analyzing the change in Big N audit fee premium over the Big 6, Big 5, and Big 4 periods, and across different client segments. Using a large sample of Australian publicly listed companies over the years 1996–2007, we find that while premiums paid to Big N auditors have increased significantly for the Big 4 and Big 5 periods compared to the Big 6 period, the growth has not been shared equally across all client segments. In particular, while the largest global clients pay some of the highest premiums, the increase in premiums for this group in the Big 4 period has been lower than those experienced by other clients. We also observe that premiums paid to industry specialists have declined relative to the Big 6 period, but fee discounts offered to clients switching to a Big N auditor from a non-Big N auditor have increased. In all, we find that the premiums paid by Big N clients increased in line with consolidation in the number of Big N audit firms, but the impact varied across client segments.

“Big 4 fee premium” and audit quality: latest evidence from UK listed companies

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 680-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Campa
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
The Uk

PurposeUsing the most recent observations (2005‐2011) from a sample of UK listed companies, This paper aims to investigate whether Big 4 audit firms exhibit a “fee premium” and, if this is the case, whether the premium is related to the delivery of a better audit service.Design/methodology/approachUnivariate tests, multivariate regressions and two methodologies that control for self‐selection bias are used to answer the proposed research questions. Data are collected from DataStream.FindingsFindings provide consistent evidence about the existence of an “audit fee premium” charged by Big 4 firms while they do not highlight any significant relationship between audit quality and type of auditor with respect to the audit quality proxies investigated.Research limitations/implicationsEvidence from this paper might signal the need for legislative intervention to improve the competitiveness of the audit market on the basis that its concentrated structure is leading to “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients. Findings might also enhance Big 4 client bargaining power. However, as the paper analyses only one country, generalizability of the results might be a limitation.Originality/valueThis study joins two streams of the extant literature that investigate the existence of a “Big 4 audit fee premium” and different levels of audit quality among Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients. Evidence supports the concerns raised by the UK House of Lords in 2010 that the concentrated structure of the audit market could be the driver of “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients as it does not find differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients.

Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

The impact of non-timely 10-Q filings and audit firm size on audit fees

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 503-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiffany Chiu ◽  
Feiqi Huang ◽  
Yue Liu ◽  
Miklos A. Vasarhelyi
Keyword(s):  
Regression Model ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Prior studies suggest that non-timely 10-Q filings indicate higher potential risks than non-timely 10-K filings. Furthermore, larger audit firms tend to be more risk-averse and conservative about reporting. Inspired by these research streams, this paper aims to investigate the influence of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees and the impact of audit firm size on this association. Design/methodology/approach The cross-sectional audit fee regression model used in this study is similar to that used in prior audit fee research (Simunic, 1980; Francis et al., 2005; Hay et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2013). The model includes the following five major characteristics that would influence auditors’ fee decisions: auditee size (LNAT), complexity (REIVAT, FOREIGN, SEG), financial condition (LOSS, ROA, GROWTH, ZSCORE), special events (ICW, RESTATE, INITIAL, GC) and auditor type (BIG4). To examine the effect of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees, the variable NT10Q is included in the audit fee model. Findings The results indicate that when both non-timely 10-K and non-timely 10-Q filings are included in the regression model, only non-timely 10-Q filings are significantly associated with higher audit fees, suggesting that the presence of non-timely 10-Q filings signals more serious underlying problem than non-timely 10-K filings in the audit fees decision processes. In addition, we find that audit fees for firms audited by Big 4 auditors are 26.4 per cent higher when those firms file non-timely 10-Q reports, whereas there is no significant association between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees for firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors. Practical implications As no attention has been paid to the investigation of the impact of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees, with the aim of filling the gap of this specific research area, this study examines the association between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees and the influence of audit firm size on this association. Originality/value The contribution of this paper is threefold: first, it is the first study to examine the association between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees. The results show that non-timely 10-Q filings are a better and earlier indicator of audit risk than non-timely 10-K filings. Second, the results reveal that the relationship between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees is affected by audit firm size. Specifically, Big 4 auditors tend to charge higher audit fees in the presence of non-timely 10-Q filings, reflecting that they are more sensitive to audit risk than smaller audit firms are. Third, an examination of the quarterly effect of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees indicates a stronger effect from the first quarter’s non-timely 10-Q filings, compared to the second or third quarter.

Market Competition, Audit Fee Stickiness, and Audit Quality: Evidence from China

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
Yingwen Guo ◽  
Phyllis Lai Lan Mo
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Certified Public Accountants ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Auditor Reporting

SUMMARY This study examines how audit fee stickiness varies with changes in market competition in China and its effect on audit quality. The Chinese audit market structure has changed significantly since the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) issued a proposal to enhance the competitiveness of large domestic audit firms by promoting the consolidation of domestic audit firms in 2007. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find a decrease in upward stickiness and an increase in downward stickiness as market concentration increases in the post-Proposal period. The asymmetry between upward and downward fee stickiness is greater in local markets that are more dominated by the top 10 domestic auditors. Moreover, we find that upward (downward) fee stickiness has a negative (positive) association with audit quality as measured by earnings management and auditor reporting conservatism. JEL Classifications: D40; M42.

The Impact of the Big 4 Consolidation on Audit Market Share Equality

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Dunn ◽  
Mark Kohlbeck ◽  
Brian W. Mayhew
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Levels Of Analysis ◽  
Big 5 ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The City

SUMMARY: We investigate the Big 5 to Big 4 consolidation and its impact on audit market share equality. We extend the GAO’s (2008) study on audit firm industry market concentration to examine whether the remaining Big N firms’ market shares are more equal after the Big 4 consolidation. We also extend the GAO study to examine audit market shares at the city and city-industry levels. We find that while overall market concentration increases, the Big 4 have more equal market shares than the Big 5 had prior to the consolidation at all levels of analysis. The increase in market share equality may explain why there has been inconsistent evidence of an association between market concentration and competition after the consolidation (Feldman 2006; GAO 2008). However, we find that the largest four clients in each market we examine are more likely to share the same auditor after consolidation, which suggests the largest clients face constrained choices.

The Relationship between Audit Market Competition and Audit Fee

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-215
Author(s):  
Hyun Jae Park ◽  
Jaewan Park ◽  
Hye Jeong Nam
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Relationship

The Effect of Office Changes within Audit Firms on Clients' Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-99
Author(s):  
Carl W. Hollingsworth ◽  
Terry L. Neal ◽  
Colin D. Reid
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Additional Analysis ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation

SUMMARY While prior research has examined audit firm and audit partner rotation, we have little evidence on the impact of within-firm engagement team disruptions on the audit. To examine these disruptions, we identify a unique sample of companies where the audit firm issuing office changed but the audit firm did not change and investigate the effect of these changes on the audit. Our results indicate that companies that have a change in their audit firm's issuing office exhibit a decrease in audit quality and an increase in audit fees. In additional analysis, we partition office changes into two groups—client driven changes and audit firm driven changes. This analysis reveals that client driven changes are more likely to result in a higher audit fee while audit quality is unchanged. Conversely, audit firm driven changes do not result in a higher audit fee but do experience a decrease in audit quality.

scholarly journals AUDIT MARKET COMPETITION: AUDITOR CHANGES AND THE IMPACT OF TENDERING

1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIVIEN BEATTIE ◽  
STELLA FEARNLEY
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
The Impact

Dressing for the Occasion? Audit Quality in the Presence of Competition for New Clients

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Moser
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Auditor Choice ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of increased audit market competition on audit quality and auditor choice. I develop a model comprising two auditors who compete for a new client by choosing the audit quality for their respective existing clients and using the audited report as a signal. I identify factors that influence auditor quality decisions as well as the behavior of clients, who potentially misstate their reports. Auditors are tempted to alter audit quality because they are eager to appear desirable from a new client's perspective. Interestingly, while recipients of the audited report adjust their conjectures about audit quality, there are conditions under which auditors lower their audit quality to increase the likelihood of being hired. The analysis extends the existing literature by describing a new approach to modeling the auditors' motivation to signal reputation for certain behavior.

Audit Committee Accounting Expertise and the Mitigation of Strategic Auditor Behavior

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Hansen ◽  
Ling Lei Lisic ◽  
Timothy A. Seidel ◽  
Michael S. Wilkins
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Legal Liability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Credence Goods ◽  
Professional Regulation ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Accounting Expertise

Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing.

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