Dual-Class Shares and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the Canadian Markets

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samer Khalil ◽  
Michel L. Magnan ◽  
Jeffrey R. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
And Control

SUMMARY: This paper investigates whether audit fees vary with the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights arising from the presence of dual-class share structures. Dual-class shares exist in firms having two or more classes of shares with disproportionate voting rights. They affect audit fees through their effect on the supply for audit services. External auditors conduct wider (narrower) scope audits depending on whether dual-class shares increase (decrease) audit risk and/or auditor business risk. Wider (narrower) scope audits are more (less) costly for the auditors and for their clients. This paper documents a positive association between audit fees and the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights in a sample of Canadian firms during 2004. It extends current research by investigating whether dominant shareholdings affect audit pricing, and by examining audit pricing in Canada over a time period that witnessed significant changes in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and performance: Evidence from Chinese private listed companies based on cash flow rights and control rights

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hu Dan Semba ◽  
Haiyan Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This paper investigates the relationship between control rights, cash flow rights, and firm performance across a sample of 276 China’s private listed companies (CPC) from 2003 to 2008. This paper finds that the performance of firms with pyramid ownership structures (POS) is lower than that of firms with direct controlling ownership structures (DOS). The separation of control rights and cash flow rights, which is the main characteristic of POS, is negatively related to the firm performance. Furthermore, in order to reduce the negative influence of control rights, this paper proposes the following countermeasures: cash flow rights should be increased because it has a positive effect on the firm performance; the supervisory powers of shareholders meeting (SM) should be strengthened because it helps improve firm performance and overrule invalid decisions taken by independent directors in China. This is proved by the findings that show a positive correlation between the attendance rate at shareholders’ meetings and firm performance; moreover, there is no positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance.

Separation of cash flow rights and control rights and debt among Malaysian family firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norhidayah Abdullah ◽  
Wee Ching Pok
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Equal Proportion ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Minority Interests ◽  
And Control ◽  
Debt Policy

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of separation of cash flow rights (CFR) and control rights (CR) and debt policy of Malaysian listed family firms. Design/methodology/approach – The sample of this study consists of 256 observations from companies listed in the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia for the period between year 2005 and 2009. The multivariate ordinary least square regressions have been conducted in order to examine the relationships between separation of CFR and CR and debt. Findings – The study reveals that the separation of CFR and CR does not lead to the increase of debt policy among Malaysian listed family-owned firms. Thus, the results suggest there is no expropriation of minority interests in Malaysian family-owned firms. The plausible reason is that Malaysia has better investor or shareholder protection laws compared to other emerging markets such as Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines. Research limitations/implications – The first limitation is the underestimation of CFR and CR because the affiliated business of unlisted firms and foreign companies are excluded. The second limitation is the presence of 100 percent ownership in firms controlled by family-owned firms or in firms that are controlled by another firms which are under the controlled of family-owned firms, or both, will lead to equal proportion of CFR and CR. Thus, the degree of separation of CFR and CR of such firms are indeterminable. Originality/value – This paper investigates the expropriation of minority interests by Malaysian family-owned firms on which has not been explored.

scholarly journals Separation of control rights and cash-flow rights in emerging economies: theory and Mexican evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-57
Author(s):  
Richard Fairchild ◽  
Alma Garro Paulin
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Extreme Risk ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Researchers have identified that corporate ownership structures appear to be quite different in developed and developing economies. For instance, Castañeda Ramos (1999) provides evidence of considerable separation of cash-flow rights and control rights accruing to inside and outside equityholders in publicly listed firms in Mexico. Insiders use mechanisms such as dual voting rights, majority rules and pyramids to maximise their control rights while holding minimal cash-flow rights. In contrast, there is a much closer alignment of cash-flow rights and control rights in developed countries such as UK or US. The purpose of this paper is to develop a game-theoretic model that explains these features. We argue that factors in emerging markets, such as large private benefits of control, extreme risk, low investor protection, inefficient capital markets, and governments sympathetic to incumbent management at the expense of outside investors, all contribute to insiders’ incentives to create a separation of cash flow and control rights. We present evidence from Mexico that supports our results

scholarly journals UP THE HILL AND DOWN AGAIN: CONSTRAINING DUAL-CLASS SHARES

2021 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-551
Author(s):  
Bobby V. Reddy
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
High Growth ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Majority Control ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
The Hill

AbstractThe headline recommendation of Jonathan Hill's 2021 UK Listing Review was that dual-class shares structures be permitted on the London Stock Exchange's premium tier. The aspiration was to encourage more high-quality UK equity listings, particularly of high-growth tech-companies, for which dual-class shares are especially beneficial. Dual-class shares allow founders to list their companies, and retain majority-control, while holding significantly less of the cash-flow rights in the company. However, in the UK, dual-class shares are usually discussed in qualified terms, in an attempt to placate sceptical institutional shareholders. Using the UK Listing Review as a platform, this article explores the constraints commonly proposed to be attached to dual-class shares, and argues that, although it is important to protect public shareholders, constraints must not be too severe. A balance must be respected, otherwise UK initiatives to relax rules on dual-class shares could deter the very companies they are intended to attract.

scholarly journals Corporate ownership and control: New evidence from Taiwan

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yin-Hua Yeh
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Management Participation ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Recent empirical literature on corporate governance has demonstrated that companies’ shares are generally concentrated in the hands of particular families or wealthy investors. Claessens et al. (2002) analyzed the ownership structure in East Asian eight countries, but misestimated the Taiwanese condition that made them not find the positive incentive or negative entrenchment effects in Taiwan. This study tries to clear the ultimate control in Taiwan, use the detailed data to better understand the ownership structure in Taiwan and investigates the determinants for deviation of control from cash flow rights. Based on the findings, the companies’ shares are common concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. We find that the deviation of control from cash flow rights is greater in the family-controlled companies than other type companies. Also the controlling shareholders use more pyramids and cross shareholding to increase their control rights that accompanies with deeply management participation. On the average, the controlling shareholders hold more than half board seats and usually occupy the chairman and general manger to enhance their control power in family-controlled companies. No matter in all sample or family-controlled companies, the controlling shareholders owns significantly less cash flow rights, occupy more board seats in deviation group companies than those without deviation. Corporate valuation is significantly lower in the companies with the divergence of control from cash flow rights than non-deviation companies.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and implications for minority shareholders in Turkey

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Burcin Yurtoglu
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Holding Companies ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
And Control

This paper reports on the ownership and control structures of publicly listed firms in Turkey using data from 2001. While holding companies and non-financial firms are the most frequent owners at the direct level, families ultimately own more than 80 percent of all publicly listed firms in Turkey. Pyramids and dual class shares are common devices that families use to separate their cash-flow rights from control rights. We also show that such deviations result in significantly lower market to book ratios suggesting large agency costs because of the conflict of interests between controlling families and minority shareholders

Free Cash Flow, Debt Monitoring, and Audit Pricing: Further Evidence on the Role of Director Equity Ownership

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Judy S. L. Tsui
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Ols Regression ◽  
Equity Ownership ◽  
Low Levels

This paper tests the hypothesis that the positive association between Free Cash Flow (FCF) and audit fees is stronger (weaker) for firms with low (high) levels of director equity ownership. Based on the debt monitoring hypothesis, we also test the hypothesis that the FCF/director equity ownership interaction is less (more) likely to exist for firms with high (low) levels of debt. OLS regression analyses of 157 and 140 low growth Australian firms audited by Big 6 auditors for the years 1992 and 1993 provide support for the hypotheses.

scholarly journals Do Private Benefits of Control Affect Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from China

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Liu ◽  
Guoqing Ge ◽  
Chong Ning ◽  
Xiaobo Tao ◽  
Yongbo Sun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
And Control

In this study, we examined whether private benefits of control can influence corporate social responsibility performance. We used both separations between cash flow and control rights and the length of the longest control chain to measure private benefits of control. Consistent with the private benefits motive, we found that firms with greater divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights, with longer control chains, are associated with lower corporate social responsibility performance. Further, we found that earnings management and capital occupation by the controlling shareholder are the two effective channels through which private benefits of control affect corporate social responsibility. Additionally, this negative association is more pronounced for firms located in regions with low degree of law environment and with CEOs appointed by the largest shareholder. Additional robustness tests using alternative CSR measurements, and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression support the main findings. This study highlights a new determination channel of private benefits of control and practically guides the introduction of corporate social responsibility activities in emerging markets.

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