Market Reaction to Auditor Switching from Big 4 to Third-Tier Small Accounting Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
C. S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Auditor Switching ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Period 2 ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Second Tier

SUMMARY: After the demise of Arthur Andersen, the public accounting industry has witnessed a significant migration of public clients to second-tier (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman) and smaller third-tier accounting firms. While prior literature documents that smaller auditors are perceived by the stock market as an inferior substitute for a Big 4 auditor, this perception appears to have changed in recent years. In this paper, we analyze market responses to auditor switching from Big 4 to smaller accounting firms during 2002 to 2006. We break our sample period into two separate periods (Periods 1 and 2) based on when regulatory changes occurred. These changes included Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 404 implementation, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections, and a tightened Form 8-K filing deadline. We find a relatively more positive stock market reaction to clients switching from a Big 4 to a smaller third-tier auditor in Period 2. This relatively more positive reaction in Period 2 reflects companies seeking better services rather than a lower audit fee, when an audit quality drop is less likely. Overall, our results suggest that companies and investors have become more receptive to smaller accounting firms.

PCAOB Inspections and Large Accounting Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Linear Trend ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Over Time

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this paper is to analyze the PCAOB's inspection reports of large, annually inspected accounting firms. The inspection reports identify audit deficiencies that have implications for audit quality. By examining the inspection reports in detail, we can identify the nature and severity of audit deficiencies; we can track the total number of deficiencies over time; and we can pinpoint common, recurring audit deficiencies. We focus on large accounting firms because they play a dominant role in the marketplace (i.e., they audit public companies that comprise approximately 99 percent of U.S.-based issuer market capitalization). We document a significant, downward linear trend in the number of deficiencies from 2004 to 2009. We also identify common, recurring audit deficiencies, determine the financial statement accounts most often impacted by audit deficiencies, and isolate the primary emphasis of the financial statement impacted. Our findings generally are consistent comparing Big 4 and second-tier accounting firms, though a few differences emerge. In addition, we make comparisons with findings that have been documented for small, triennially inspected firms. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources.

Comparing the Auditor Quality of Arthur Andersen to that of the Big 4

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. Fuerman
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Arthur Andersen

This study compares the audit quality of Arthur Andersen with that of the Big 4 accounting firms. An expanded indicator of audit quality is developed based on the law of business misconduct literature and the legal process literature. A representation of audit quality is derived from an analysis of the legal actions initiated against these five large public accounting firms from 1996 to 2004. The legal action was partitioned into three year periods. In the first period, Arthur Andersen and the Big 4 evidenced no quality differential. In the second and third periods, the Big 4, in aggregate, rated higher on the audit quality indicator than did Andersen. The robustness of these findings is substantiated using multiple logistic regression and sensitivity analysis. When the individual firms are compared with Andersen, all four evidenced higher audit quality; three of the firms are significantly higher. This suggests that Andersen represents an outlier within the audit population. However, the analysis also indicates that overall audit quality declined in the period immediately following the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. This suggests that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions directed toward remedying auditing deficiencies is justified and not an overreaction to a “few bad apples.”

Non-CPAs and Office Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew G. Sherwood ◽  
Albert L. Nagy ◽  
Aleksandra B. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Human Resources ◽  
Growth Regulators ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS During the time surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Big 4 firms either spun-off or downsized their consulting practices. However, in recent years, consulting service lines of the large accounting firms have seen a dramatic resurgence and growth. Regulators have taken notice of, and expressed concern over, this renewed focus on consulting. The accounting firms claim that such services enhance audit quality, mainly due to the prominent role of non-accounting specialists in today's external audit function. This study examines whether the availability of non-CPAs in U.S. Big 4 firm offices is associated with audit quality. We find that greater access to non-CPAs in the office is associated with higher audit quality and conclude that office audit quality is not just a function of audit-specific human resources but also the availability of non-CPAs to support audit engagement teams. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the study.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

U.S. Big 4 and Local Auditors in the China Initial Public Offering Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950024 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi-Yuan Feng ◽  
Hua-Wei Huang ◽  
Mai Dao
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Corporate Fraud ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Investment Distortions ◽  
Ipo Pricing ◽  
Public Offering

This paper examines (1) whether auditor type affects initial public offering (IPO) pricing; (2) whether the effect of IPO pricing is different for clients with different ownership structures. We find that (1) firms being audited by Big 4 accounting firms receive IPO premium while others being audited by local accounting firms do not; (2) Big 4 auditors receive higher audit fees than China’s Top 10 or small local auditors. This paper extends the prior research (e.g., Kumar, P and N Langberg (2009). Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 40, 144–172) that reduces agency conflicts between shareholders and manager (by means of better audit quality) and also reconciles corporate misreporting and investment distortions.

Client Stock Market Reaction to PCAOB Sanctions Against a Big 4 Auditor*

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROL CALLAWAY DEE ◽  
AYALEW LULSEGED ◽  
TIANMING ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Stock Market Reaction ◽  
Big 4

Risk Shifts in the Market for Audits: An Examination of Changes in Risk for “Second Tier” Audit Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Roger D. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Business Risk ◽  
Switching Activity ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Risk Characteristics ◽  
Changes In Risk ◽  
Second Tier

SUMMARY: The market for audit services has been affected in recent years by significant changes like the demise of Andersen and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. One impact of these market changes has been an increase in the frequency of auditor switches, and in particular, the frequency of clients switching from Big 4 auditors to smaller audit firms. We examine whether this switching activity has resulted in changes in the risk characteristics of publicly traded clients of Second Tier audit firms. This analysis is important as regulators are concerned about audit market concentration and would like to see the Second Tier audit firms expand their share of the publicly traded client market. Results indicate that Second Tier firms are accepting clients with potentially increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base, but they also appear to be “shedding” clients that have increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base. Some of the differences in risk characteristics for those departing clients are more pronounced in the period after 2000, when we expect the most significant changes in the audit market occurred. Second Tier auditors are increasingly exposed to more business risk as they accept larger clients coming from Big 4 predecessor auditors, which may increase their exposure to litigation.

An Analysis of SEC and PCAOB Enforcement Actions against Engagement Quality Reviewers

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
William F. Messier ◽  
Thomas M. Kozloski ◽  
Natalia Kochetova-Kozloski
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Audit Process ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Quality Review ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Quality Control Mechanism

SUMMARY: Engagement quality review is an integral part of the audit process. It is designed to be a quality control mechanism for assessing the quality of an audit engagement. Since the 1990s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased sanctions against partners serving as engagement quality reviewers. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued an auditing standard on engagement quality review as required by Section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This practice note reports on an analysis of SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions against engagement quality reviewers (EQRs). Our results show the following: We identified 28 cases since 1993 that involve some type of sanction against an EQR. Only eight cases involved the Big 4/5 public accounting firms. All of the 28 cases involved sanctions due to violations of GAAS and 75 percent contained GAAP violations. Twenty-three cases identified GAAS violations related to a lack of due professional care. Further analysis of those cases showed that the EQR demonstrated a lack of professional skepticism in 22 cases, over-relied on management representations in 20 cases, and ignored materiality concerns in five cases. About half of the 28 cases resulted in the EQR being denied the privilege of practicing before the SEC or PCAOB for three or more years. Our findings provide important implications for practitioners and regulators, and areas for future research for those interested in engagement quality review.

Investor Reaction to the Prospect of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren C. Reid ◽  
Joseph V. Carcello
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

ABSTRACT The PCAOB recently considered implementing mandatory audit firm rotation in hopes of better aligning auditors' interests with investors' interests, suggesting that the PCAOB views long auditor tenure as problematic. However, the accounting profession argues that long tenure actually improves audit quality. This study provides insight into investors' views by evaluating the market's reaction to events related to the potential adoption of rotation that occurred between 2011 and 2013. The results provide some evidence that the market reacts negatively (positively) to events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation, although these results are sensitive to the market index used to calculate abnormal returns. More importantly, particularly given the lack of a U.S.-specific control group, cross-sectional tests provide strong evidence that the market reaction is more negative (positive) on dates that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation given longer auditor tenure. Moreover, we also find that the market reaction is more negative (positive) on dates that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation given a Big 4 auditor. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Earnings Management and Stock Market Reaction

2019 ◽  
pp. 32-52
Author(s):  
Antonio Melo Cerqueira ◽  
Claudia Ferreira Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Accounting Regulation ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Stock Market Reaction ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Entire Economy

This chapter aims to analyze if and the extent to which earnings management activities are detected by market participants. For that purpose, this chapter reviews prior literature on stock market reaction to earnings management and earnings quality. A main conclusion obtained with this approach is that stock market participants are to some extent misled by earnings management activities consistent with those activities making the firm's information environment more opaque, thus increasing the difficulty for investors to interpret financial statements. Both the theoretical and empirical contributions provided in such works are relevant given the potential negative consequences of earnings management for stakeholders, firms, and even for the entire economy. In addition, it must be emphasized that accounting regulation is fundamental to balance the trade-off between more informative financial statements and reducing the level of managers' opportunistic choices.

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