Controls, Security, and Audit in Online Digital Accounting

2011 ◽  
pp. 318-383
Author(s):  
Ashutosh Deshmukh

Internal controls have existed since the dawn of business activities. Internal controls are basically systems of checks and balances. The purpose is to keep the organization moving along desired lines as per the wishes of the owners and to protect assets of the business. Internal controls have received attention from auditors, managers, accountants, fraud examiners and legislatures. Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 now requires the annual report of a public company to contain a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. Section 404 of the Act also requires the auditor to attest to and report on management’s assessment of effectiveness of the internal controls in accordance with standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C Coates

The primary goal of the SarbanesOxley Act was to fix auditing of U.S. public companies, consistent with its full, official name: the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002. By consensus, auditing had been working poorly, and increasingly so. The most important, and most promising, part of SarbanesOxley was the creation of a unique, quasi-public institution to oversee and regulate auditing, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In controversial section 404, the law also created new disclosure-based incentives for firms to spend money on internal controls, above increases that would have occurred after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. In exchange for these higher costs, which have already fallen substantially, SarbanesOxley promises a variety of long-term benefits. Investors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft, and benefit from more reliable financial reporting, greater transparency, and accountability. Public companies will pay a lower cost of capital, and the economy will benefit because of a better allocation of resources and faster growth. SarbanesOxley remains a work in progress -- section 404 in particular was implemented too aggressively - but reformers should push for continued improvements in its implementation, by PCAOB, rather than for repeal of the legislation itself.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Hoffman ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Jason L. Smith

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.


2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) require management and the auditor to report on internal controls over financial reporting. Section 404 is arguably the most controversial element of SOX, and much of the debate around the costs of implementing section 404 has focused on auditors' fees (Ernst & Young 2005). In this paper, we examine the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures made pursuant to section 404. Our sample includes 660 manufacturing firms that have a December 31, 2004 fiscal year-end and filed the section 404 report by May 15, 2005. We find that the mean (median) audit fees for the firms in our sample for fiscal 2004 is 86 (128) percent higher than the corresponding fees for fiscal 2003. Audit fees for fiscal 2004 are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure; however, audit fees for fiscal 2003 are not associated with an internal control material weakness disclosure (in the 10-K filed following fiscal 2004). We also find that the association between audit fees and the presence of a material weakness disclosure does not vary depending on the type of material weakness (systemic or non-systemic).


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 131-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen K. Asare ◽  
Brian C. Fitzgerald ◽  
Lynford E. Graham ◽  
Jennifer R. Joe ◽  
Eric M. Negangard ◽  
...  

SUMMARY We synthesize the literature on auditors' evaluation of, and reporting on, internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR), as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The purpose of the synthesis is (1) to provide information on how and how well auditors perform the task, which serves as feedback to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board on implementation issues and problems related to auditors' application of the professional standards on ICOFR; and (2) to identify gaps in the current literature and fruitful areas of future research. Consistent with Auditing Standard No. 5, we delineate five phases of the ICOFR audit: (1) planning; (2) scoping; (3) testing; (4) evaluation; and (5) reporting. We structure our synthesis using a framework that classifies the determinants of performance in each phase into five broad areas: (a) the auditor's attributes, (b) the client's attributes, (c) the interaction between the auditor and the client, (d) task attributes, and (e) environmental attributes. Key contributions include providing an ICOFR tasks taxonomy, proposing a model of the determinants of performance for each task, evaluating auditors' performance of the tasks in our taxonomy, highlighting findings and gaps of importance to regulators, and providing a road map for future research.


2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Kevin W. Kobelsky ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson

SYNOPSIS This paper analyzes the degree to which material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control reported under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) affect the future reporting of MWs. Particularly, we examine information technology (IT) and non-IT MWs and their breakdown into specific IT-related entity-level, non-IT-related entity-level, and account-level deficiencies. Analysis reveals that most account-level and entity-level deficiencies occur at a significantly higher rate in SOX 404 reports with at least one IT MW than in MW reports with only non-IT MWs. Further, the presence and count of both types of MWs and all three types of deficiencies are associated with increased future MWs, as are lower profitability, non-Big 6 auditor, and firm complexity. Specific control deficiencies related to senior management, training, and IT control environment have the strongest impact on future MWs. These results indicate that effective corporate governance of both the IT and non-IT domains is pivotal in establishing and maintaining strong internal controls over financial reporting. Data Availability:  Data are available from the public sources identified in the paper.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-110
Author(s):  
Alan Blankley ◽  
David Hurtt ◽  
Jason MacGregor

Purpose Central to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was a requirement that every company have an audit of its internal control over financial reporting. However, there were concerns that this requirement was overly burdensome, from a financial perspective, for small businesses. This concern promoted several delays in enforcing the law for small companies and ultimately caused congress to permanently exempt small businesses. Yet, there are some small companies that voluntarily elect to comply with the law. The purpose of this paper is to explore why these companies elect to incur these costly audits. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 5,834 non-accelerator US firms, this paper uses a robust logistic regression model to examine why some firms comply voluntary with SOX Section 404(b). Findings This study shows that small companies getting audits of internal controls may be doing so to restore investor confidence after reporting failures, to appear credible prior to raising funds, as a response to organizational changes, or in anticipation of being required to comply. Practical implications This study provides regulators with an improved understanding of when it is necessary to implement mandatory rather than voluntary guidance. Originality/value This study is the first to document why a client would voluntarily comply with SOX Section 404 (b).


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou

SUMMARY Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires managers to assess, and their auditors to express an opinion on, the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expect the ICFR audits to enhance the credibility of firms' financial statements. Prior research argues that audit characteristics that enhance the credibility of financial reporting are associated with stronger earnings-return associations. We examine whether earnings accompanied by the first-time Section 404 ICFR reports were associated with higher informativeness compared with earnings in the prior year when only financial statement audit reports were available. We conduct our analysis for a test sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR reports and clean previous Section 302 disclosures. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in earnings informativeness for the test sample with that for a control sample of non-accelerated filers. We find that earnings informativeness for companies with clean internal control reports was greater in the Section 404 adoption year than in the previous year, while there was no change in earnings informativeness for the non-accelerated filers. Also, there is no difference in the increase in earnings informativeness across firms with small and large compliance costs (measured by change in audit fees), suggesting that both groups benefited from the Section 404 ICFR audits.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.


Author(s):  
Achraf Seyam, CPA ◽  
Barry Copper, CPA

The importance of internal control is clear. Effective internal control makes sure non-profit organizations to carried out their mission and objectives, such as proper use of funds and provide professional services to the public without any risk of fraud and mismanagement or breach of ethics. Through continuous monitoring of non-profit’s performance and activities, internal controls dispose of the behaviors of non-profit organizations with their objectives. Internal controls also engaged in good management and make sure to provide appropriate financial reporting by providing accurate and complete reports to the management in a timely manner and make sure the sources are correctly allocated. Internal control is also the tool to safeguard assets that make sure the organizations physical and intangible assets are protected from fraud, misused, and error. Internal control is not only able to deter and detect fraud and error but also is able to reduce the chance to risks.


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