Tax-Induced Trading around the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ayers ◽  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
John R. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Side Effect ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Capital Gains Taxes ◽  
Investor Trading ◽  
Lock In Effect ◽  
Lock In

ABSTRACT: We examine investor trading around the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which reduced the capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent. We provide evidence that individual investors increase their demand for equity shares on the announcement day of TRA97, consistent with the capitalization of capital gains taxes. On the effective day of TRA97, we find that individual investors increase the supply of equity shares with accrued gains, consistent with the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes. Regression results suggest that the demand-side effect associated with tax capitalization is a more powerful effect on abnormal trading than the supply-side effect associated with lock-in for the median stock trading around TRA97. Overall, our results suggest that capital gains taxes influence both the demand and supply for equity by tax-sensitive investors and that the effect on demand is more pronounced than the effect on supply.

scholarly journals Tax-Motivated Trading by Individual Investors

2005 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 1605-1630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoran Ivković ◽  
James Poterba ◽  
Scott Weisbenner
Keyword(s):  
Capital Gains ◽  
Disposition Effect ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Lock In Effect ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
Statutory Tax Rate

We analyze stock trades made by individuals holding stock in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts. By comparing trades across these two types of accounts, we uncover a capital gains lock-in effect in taxable accounts. The lock-in effect is more pronounced for large stock transactions and for stocks held for at least 12 months. Over shorter horizons, the disposition effect outweighs the lock-in effect. Comparison of loss realizations in taxable and tax-deferred accounts yields evidence of tax-loss selling throughout the year. Effective accrual tax rates for stocks that experience substantial appreciation are substantially below the statutory tax rate on long-term gains.

The Effect of Shareholder-Level Capital Gains Taxes on Acquisition Structure

2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ayers ◽  
Craig E. Lefanowicz ◽  
John R. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Positive Association ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Capital Gains Taxes ◽  
The Individual

This study investigates the effect of shareholder capital gains taxes on the structure of corporate acquisitions. We analyze a sample of large publicly traded firms acquired in taxable cash-for-stock and tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1975 to 2000. We model acquisition structure (i.e., taxable cash-for-stock acquisitions versus tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions) as a function of target shareholder capital gains taxes and other economic factors believed to influence acquisition structure. Consistent with expectations, we find a positive association between the capital gains tax rate for individual investors and the use of tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions. In addition, we find that the effect of the capital gains tax rate for individuals decreases with target institutional ownership (a proxy that represents the likelihood the price-setting shareholder is not subject to the individual capital gains tax rate). We reconcile our analyses with previous studies and identify a plausible explanation for the lack of results in prior research. In supplemental analysis, we also report evidence that corporations “time” the completion of taxable acquisitions around major tax rate changes to minimize shareholder capital gains taxes. In sum, results suggest that shareholder-level taxes have a significant effect on the choice of taxable cash-for-stock versus tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions, and this effect varies with the tax status of target shareholders.

Germany's Repeal of the Corporate Capital Gains Tax: The Equity Market Response

2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 73-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Courtney H. Edwards ◽  
Mark H. Lang ◽  
Edward L. Maydew ◽  
Douglas A. Shackelford
Keyword(s):  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Price Response ◽  
Corporate Capital ◽  
Market Values ◽  
Lock In Effect ◽  
Lock In

In late 1999, the German government made a surprise announcement that it would repeal the large and long-standing capital gains tax on sales of corporate crossholdings effective in 2002. The repeal has been hailed as a revolutionary step toward breaking up the extensive web of crossholdings among German companies. The lock-in effect from the large corporate capital gains tax was said to act as a barrier to efficient acquisition and divestiture of German firms and divisions. Many observers predicted that once the lock-in effect was removed, Germany would experience a flurry of acquisition and divestiture activity. Several other industrialized countries were poised to follow suit, with similar proposals pending in France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. This paper provides evidence of the economic impact of the repeal by examining its effect on the market values of German firms. While event studies of tax legislation can be difficult, our study is aided by the fact that the repeal was both a surprise and was announced separately from other tax reform proposals. In addition, we provide cross-sectional evidence on the economic magnitude of the repeal, assess the likely beneficiaries from the repeal, and predict which sectors are most likely to experience a surge in acquisition and divestiture activity following the repeal. Our results suggest that the economic effects are highly concentrated. We find a positive association between firms' event period abnormal returns and the extent of their crossholdings, consistent with taxes acting as a barrier to efficient allocation of ownership. However, the reaction is limited to the six largest banks and insurers and their extensive minority holdings in industrial firms. These six large firms have a combined market capitalization equal to 22 percent of all 394 firms in this study. We also find evidence of a positive stock price response to the announcement for industrial companies held by these financial firms, consistent with shareholders in those firms benefiting from the likely reduction in investor-level tax burdens and expected increased efficiency following the tax law change.

Capital Gains Taxes and Stock Return Volatility

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhonglan Dai ◽  
Douglas A. Shackelford ◽  
Harold H. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
Capital Gains Taxes ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT This paper presents an empirical investigation of the impact of capital gains taxes on stock return volatility. We predict that the more stock returns are subject to capital gains taxation, the greater the increase in return volatility following a capital gains tax rate cut due to reduced risk-sharing in firms' cash flows between shareholders and the government. Consistent with this prediction, we find larger increases in the return volatility for more appreciated stocks than for less appreciated stocks and for non-dividend-paying stocks than for dividend-paying stocks after both 1978 and 1997 capital gains tax rate reductions. The findings imply that capital gains taxes convey a heretofore overlooked benefit of lower stock return volatility.

THE LOCK-IN EFFECT OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES: EVIDENCE FROM THE RJR NABISCO LEVERAGED BUYOUT

1995 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
WAYNE R. LANDSMAN ◽  
DOUGLAS A. SHACKELFORD
Keyword(s):  
Capital Gains ◽  
Leveraged Buyout ◽  
Capital Gains Taxes ◽  
Lock In Effect ◽  
Lock In
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