Liberty and Socialism

Author(s):  
Alan Ryan

This chapter examines whether socialism may be more consistent with liberty than capitalism is. It concentrates on two issues, one related to property and the other to education. It first considers whether the abolition of private property rights in the means of production would in itself be an assault on freedom. Some defenders of socialism, as well as its critics, think of socialism as the search for justice, welfare, or fraternity at the expense of freedom—or “bourgeois freedoms.” The chapter proceeds by discussing whether a “no-ownership” regime would allow room for greater or lesser intellectual freedom, for a more or less libertarian educational system. It argues that serious socialism must be concerned with constitutional issues, and especially with issues of decentralization, on the one hand, and the protection of individuals against maladministration, on the other.

2004 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-573
Author(s):  
James R. Stoner

It was not the exquisite self-consciousness of a Henry James that I had in mind when I wondered about equality and hierarchy in Locke, but the assertive self-consciousness or—what is for Locke ultimately the same—self-interestedness of an Andrew Carnegie, as exemplified both in the acquisition and the dispersion of his fortune. After all, it was Locke's genius in chapter five of the Second Treatise to make the case for private property on different grounds than had Aristotle because he conceived of property in a different way: as the fruit, not of nature, but of human creativity, less interesting for its use in leisure than for its origin in labor. As Strauss and even Zuckert have suggested, the brilliance of Locke's argument does not eclipse its underlying contradiction, that on the one hand the initial right to acquire seems to depend on there being “enough and as good” left for others, as though man lived amidst natural plenty, while on the other hand the account of the progressive rise in value consequent to enclosure (and the post hoc justification for property rights that it implies) describes natural scarcity. Holding that “a man may deliberately contradict himself in order to indicate his thought rather than to reveal it,” Strauss takes Locke's “revolutionary” teaching about “‘dynamic’ property” to indicate his true intention:


1978 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 450-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Furniss

This paper attempts to throw new light on what one might terra the ‘operational component’ of social democratic thinking, functional socialism, by focusing on the creation. organization, and transformation of property rights. I argue that while democratic socialism does provide a political and philosophical schema that justifies distribution rules not sanctioned in ‘the market’,1 the novelty of the solution (and thus the necessary difference from existing advanced industrial societies, including the United States) is exaggerated. In addition. the tension between the attenuation of private property rights and their arrogation by the state on the one hand and citizen control over state activities on the other is not sufficiently perceived. My main purpose is to delineate and explore these problems. I also suggest ways in which the argument might be strengthened.


Taxation ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 60-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Brennan

Does the fact that considerations of distributive justice entitle governments to interfere with the distribution (of income/wealth/consumption) that emerges from market interactions imply that the property rights structure on which that market distribution is based has no normative authority in structuring government/citizen interactions? That claim is one implied by Nagel and Murphy in their book The Myth of Ownership. Chapter 3 proposes that this claim is false; but insists that denying that claim does not entail denying the legitimacy of public redistribution through the tax-transfer process. One central claim is that the concept of horizontal equity—that individuals should pay taxes in relation to their aggregate returns from market activity—may be thought of as a principle that appropriately reconciles the competing normative claims of the private property rights structure on the one hand with other requirements of distributive justice.


Author(s):  
Caitlyn Ashley ◽  
Elizabeth Spencer Berthiaume ◽  
Philip Berzin ◽  
Rikki Blassingame ◽  
Stephanie Bradley Fryer ◽  
...  

Eminent Domain is the power of the government or quasi-government entities to take private or public property interests through condemnation. Eminent Domain has been a significant issue since 1879 when, in the case of Boom Company v. Patterson, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that the power of eminent domain may be delegated by state legislatures to agencies and non-governmental entities. Thus, the era of legal takings began. Though an important legal dispute then, more recently eminent domain has blossomed into an enduring contentious social and political problem throughout the United States. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Thus, in the wake of the now infamous decision in Kelo v. City of New London, where the Court upheld the taking of private property for purely economic benefit as a “public use,” the requirement of “just compensation” stands as the primary defender of constitutionally protected liberty under the federal constitution. In response to Kelo, many state legislatures passed a variety of eminent domain reforms specifically tailoring what qualifies as a public use and how just compensation should be calculated. Texas landowners recognize that the state’s population is growing at a rapid pace. There is an increasing need for more land and resources such as energy and transportation. But, private property rights are equally important, especially in Texas, and must be protected as well. Eminent domain and the condemnation process is not a willing buyer and willing seller transition; it is a legally forced sale. Therefore, it is necessary to consider further improvements to the laws that govern the use of eminent domain so Texas landowners can have more assurance that this process is fair and respectful of their private property rights when they are forced to relinquish their land. This report compiles statutes and information from the other forty-nine states to illustrate how they address key eminent domain issues. Further, this report endeavors to provide a neutral third voice in Texas to strike a more appropriate balance between individual’s property rights and the need for increased economic development. This report breaks down eminent domain into seven major topics that, in addition to Texas, seemed to be similar in many of the other states. These categories are: (1) Awarding of Attorneys’ Fee; (2) Compensation and Valuation; (3) Procedure Prior to Suit; (4) Condemnation Procedure; (5) What Cannot be Condemned; (6) Public Use & Authority to Condemn; and (7) Abandonment. In analyzing these seven categories, this report does not seek to advance a particular interest but only to provide information on how Texas law differs from other states. This report lays out trends seen across other states that are either similar or dissimilar to Texas, and additionally, discusses interesting and unique laws employed by other states that may be of interest to Texas policy makers. Our research found three dominant categories which tend to be major issues across the country: (1) the awarding of attorneys’ fees; (2) the valuation and measurement of just compensation; and (3) procedure prior to suit.


MEST Journal ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-30
Author(s):  
Anthony Cesario

Without a doubt, one of the most controversial issues currently being debated is abortion. Several decades ago, philosopher and economist Walter Block offered a compromise of the seemingly uncompromisable problem based on libertarian principles, which he called evictionism. Evictionism is based on the theory of self-ownership and the implications that follow, which are the non-aggression principle and private property rights. It is a principled compromise between the traditional pro-life and pro-choice positions. According to evictionism, it would not be illegal for a pregnant woman to evict a fetus at any time for any reason because she is the one who owns her womb, but it would be illegal for her to kill the fetus unnecessarily once it’s viable. This means that before viability, an eviction that necessarily results in the death of the fetus would be legal. After viability, however, an eviction that unnecessarily results in the death of a fetus would be considered murder and consequently illegal. Unfortunately, though, very few people have heard of this compromise. What’s worse of those who have heard of it, even fewer have been convinced by it. Consequently, there have been several written debates between Block and his critics about their perceived problems with his proposed compromise. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed summary of one of the first main debates that Block has had on the topic.


2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Lamb

AbstractThis article offers an interpretation of British philosopher William Godwin's theory of property ownership, as outlined in hisEnquiry Concerning Political Justice. Godwin's work can be read as presenting an incoherent account of property rights, which, on the one hand, justifies its existence on seemingly utilitarian grounds while, on the other, impugns its legitimacy on egalitarian grounds. But the contradiction apparent in Godwin's position is actually illusory and can in fact be plausibly interpreted as comprising a coherent two-level understanding of political morality, wherein the right to own private property is best comprehended as a “right to do wrong.”


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 217-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Robertson

The 1987 filmRoboCopis not just a science fiction action story; it is also a critique of the neoliberal resurgence in law and politics at the end of the twentieth century. In particular it critiques the privatisation of police services, and the expansion of private property claims to cover a cyborg policeman, notwithstanding its human components. I connect the critique in the film with the broader academic literature dealing with the privatisation of police forces and the expansion of private property claims, particularly copyright and patents. Finally, I consider whether, as a result of the neoliberal expansion of private property rights over the last few decades, the law could now justify a private property claim over a cyborg like the one in the film.


1973 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-176
Author(s):  
Christopher Armstrong ◽  
H. V. Nelles

Two opposing groups of business interests — large, internationally-oriented financiers on the one hand and local businessmen and small manufacturers on the other — engaged in economically-based political conflict over the proper nature of the federal system in early twentieth-century Canada. The national financial community proved unable to protect its conception of private property rights by legal and political means at the national level, and the resulting victory of provincial rather than federal control over property rights made possible the creation of a publicly owned hydro-electric system in Ontario.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document