The Constrained Court

Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman

How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. The book shows how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, the book documents that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The book finds considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, it shows that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. This book shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sujit Choudhry ◽  
Robert Howse

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference has produced a torrent of public commentary. Given the fundamental issues about the relationship between law and politics raised by the judgment, what is remarkable is that that commentary has remained almost entirely in a pragmatic perspective, which asks how positive politics entered into the motivations and justifications of the Court, and looks at the results in terms of their political consequences, without deep or sustained reflection on the ultimate grounds for the role the Court took upon itself, or on the normative sources of its reasoning. In this article, we explore the Quebec Secession Reference through the lens of constitutional theory. In particular, we highlight three unconventional aspects of the Court’s reasoning: (a) the supplementation of the written constitution through an explicit process of amendment-like interpretation to craft a new legal framework governing the secession of a province from Canada, (b) the vesting by the Court of substantial, if not exclusive responsibility for interpreting the constitutional rules on secession in particular situations or contexts with political organs, not the courts, and (c) the ascent by the court to abstract normativity, in articulating a normative vision of the Canadian constitutional order, whence it derived the legal framework governing secession. In addition to drawing attention to these unusual aspects of the judgment, we articulate the theoretical justifications that both explain and justify those features of the judgment, and identify issues for future discussion.


1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 853-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin T. McGuire ◽  
Barbara Palmer

In the process of agenda setting, the U.S. Supreme Court is limited to selecting from among only those cases brought before it. Despite this limitation, the justices possess considerable discretion and can reshape the issues in a case as a means of advancing their policy preferences. With data drawn from the Court's opinions, we find that, over the past twenty-five years, the justices have evinced a frequent willingness to expand the issues on their plenary docket and resolve questions not formally presented by the parties. We conclude that, notwithstanding informal norms that disapprove of this practice, issue fluidity is an important component in a continuous program of agenda building.


Author(s):  
Mark Golub

This concluding chapter considers the implications of the book’s central claims: that constitutional law marks a contested site of racial formation, that color-blind constitutionalism represents an assertion of white racial interest and identity, and that the peculiar form of racial consciousness it enacts renders the pursuit of racial equality a violation of white rights. Taking up the question of political possibility within a legal system constituted by racial domination, the chapter suggests that racial equality may not be achievable within the current American constitutional order. It calls for a rethinking of American law and politics from the premise that racial equality will require a more fundamental transformation than these constraints would permit, and points toward an explicitly antiredemptive political vision upon which a more authentic racial democracy might be founded.


Author(s):  
Bennett Capers

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110321
Author(s):  
Kayla S. Canelo

Scholars have sought to understand the dual characterization of Supreme Court justices as both legal and political actors. One way to further uncover this complexity is to assess how the justices engage with the interest groups that file amicus curiae or “friend-of-the-Court” briefs. Scholars have revealed that the justices often “borrow language” from these briefs in their opinions. However, much less often, they cite the amici. These two uses are distinct in that one is revealed to the reader while the other is not. So which interest groups do the justices decide to cite and which do they borrow language from? I find the justices borrow more language from ideologically similar interests, but that ideology plays a less central role in the decision to cite. Specifically, I find that the justices are less likely to cite briefs filed by ideologically overt interests, but this only extends to the most ideologically “extreme” groups. Further, the justices are not more likely to cite briefs filed by interests that are ideologically similar to their own preferences. These findings provide insight into how the justices balance policy and legitimacy goals.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This book examines the impact of Supreme Court cases from Texas on the entire nation. It argues that the most important Supreme Court cases have originated in Texas, which help explain why it is Texas and not California that provides breadth and depth to constitutional adjudication. Texas litigants, lawyers, politicians, and judges all play important roles in the underlying interplay of law and politics at the local, state, and national levels. In all its facets, Texas offers a window to all constitutional law and the Supreme Court. The book shows that Texas's impact literally started at the beginning by precipitating a debate over national powers and then a war with Mexico, and that the fraught relationship between Texas, the nation, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court in the century and a half since Texas v. White has produced more constitutional law than any other state.


2020 ◽  
pp. 109-132
Author(s):  
Chris Hanretty

This chapter looks at the identity of the judges chosen to hear each case. The Supreme Court is unlike other courts: it does not sit en banc, and the five-, seven-, or nine-judge panels are not chosen randomly, but are drawn up by court officials working together with senior judges. This chapter looks at explanations of how these panels are chosen. The key finding is that specialists in the relevant area of law are prohibitive favorites to be chosen to hear cases in those areas of law—and this effect is stronger the more important the case is. There is no evidence of political factors playing a role—if anything, judges who agree with senior judges are less likely to be picked for important cases.


Author(s):  
Jill Cottrell

Examining the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the chapter picks up its concept of public participation in decision-making and a more active form of democracy than simply voting once in five years. In Kenya, Parliament and other legislatures, as well as executive bodies and the judiciary’s administration regularly invite public input into their decision-making processes. The courts have held some legislation, though not at the national level, invalid for want of adequate participation, while the Supreme Court, rather the chief justice, has set out principles of participation in a major judgment. The chapter traces the rationale and the history of this development, and attempts a preliminary assessment of its impact on Kenyan democracy. Suggestions are also made for making public participation more effective.


Author(s):  
G. Edward White

Volume 2 of this series devoted several chapters to the emergence of what it called “guardian review” on the Supreme Court, a posture in which justices acted as guardians of individual rights against restrictions by the state. This volume contains several chapters exploring the replacement of that posture with “bifurcated review,” featuring a deferential attitude toward some restriction of individual rights and aggressive scrutiny of others. This chapter describes the evolution from guardian to bifurcated review on the Court and matches it to changes in the Court’s internal decision-making protocols from the 1940s through to the 1970s.


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