A Cooperative Species

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Cooperative Groups ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Shame And Guilt ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ethnographic Data

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.

Book Reviews

2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 797-803
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Santa Fe ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
The Common ◽  
The University

Matthijs van Veelen of University of Amsterdam reviews “A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution” by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. The EconLit abstract of the reviewed work begins: Explores why humans cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good and examines the cultural, biological, and other processes that explain how humans became exceptionally cooperative. Discusses the evolution of altruism in humans; social preferences; the sociobiology of human cooperation; cooperative Homo economicus; ancestral human society; the coevolution of institutions and behaviors; parochialism, altruism, and war; the evolution of strong reciprocity; socialization; social emotions; and human cooperation and its evolution. Bowles is Head of the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute and teaches economics at the University of Siena. Gintis is at the Santa Fe Institute, the Central European University, and the University of Siena. Name and subject indexes.

Public Service, Public Goods, and the Common Good

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Agencies ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Appointed Officials

The proper provision of public goods by a well-functioning, impartial government is not the only thing necessary for attaining the common good, but it is essential. The economic view of the human person as a rational, self-interested maximizer has become pervasive in analyzing government dysfunction and is employed by international agencies to generate proposals to realign the economic incentives of government officials. But this mindset assumes and encourages self-interest and undermines idoneidad (suitability)—which includes integrity, motivation, and competence—as the most fundamental characteristic that must be demanded of both elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. The failure of public institutions in Argentina is employed as a telling example of such problems.

Some Bad

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Physical Health ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Immoral Action ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Mental And Physical Health ◽  
Do So

Despite its virtues, empathy-induced altruism can at times harm those in need, other people, and the altruistically motivated person. Specifically, it can hurt those in need when acted on without wisdom and sensitivity or when a cool head is required. It can produce paternalism. It is less likely to be evoked by nonpersonalized, abstract, chronic needs. It can be a source of immoral action, leading us to show partiality toward those for whom we feel empathic concern even when we know that to do so is neither fair nor best for all. Indeed, when our behavior is public, empathy-induced altruism can pose a more serious threat to the common good than does self-interest. Finally, it can at times jeopardize our mental and physical health—even our life. Any attempt to call on empathy-induced altruism to build a more humane society needs to take these problems into account lest we do more harm than good.

scholarly journals The Common Good in an Age of Moral Hyperpluralism: A Catholic Bioethical Perspective

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 345
Author(s):  
John Kleinsman
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Gift ◽  
Innovative Work ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Contemporary Account

This article will argue that the notion of the common good is imperilled by a particular contemporary account of the moral good; one which, because of its (somewhat narrow) emphasis on the individual, readily lends itself to a state of 'moral hyperpluralism' in which 'the good' is primarily defined in terms of the promotion and protection of self-interest. At the same time, it will be argued that any quest to recover the notion of the common good cannot be achieved by either returning to, or holding onto, a more traditional account of morality. It will also be proposed that, as part of the quest to recover the common good, close attention needs to be paid to how the term is understood. The tension between individual autonomy and the welfare of society, and the differing ways in which this tension is resolved within different moral paradigms, will emerge as central to any discussion about the ongoing place of the common good in contemporary legal and moral debates. Finally, it is suggested that a solid basis for articulating a robust account of the common good may be found in the foundational and innovative work being done by thinkers of the gift to establish an alternative account of morality. 

Harriet Martineau and the Impersonality of Pain

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Ablow
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Harriet Martineau ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter argues that one of the most famous invalids of the age—and one of the most important political theorists—used her many writings on illness to imagine a model of impersonality uniquely well suited to the responsibilities of legislation. The relation of the legislator to the community represents a recurring problem for utilitarianism: if self-interest is the only reliable motivation, it becomes difficult to account for the legislator's—and hence, the ideal citizen's—supposed commitment to the common good. In Harriet Martineau's account, only the enlightened sufferer is able to regard all persons as equally valuable, and hence, their own pain is of no greater or lesser consequence than that experienced by anyone else.

The Ethics of Voting

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Stacey Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Third ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Individual Vote ◽  
The Common

The first question that is often raised in a discussion of the ethics of voting is whether or not there is a duty to vote. The view that there is a duty to vote is supported by two main arguments. The first holds that since the value of democratic governance is high persons should vote to preserve stable democracy. The second is that there is a duty to vote because if nobody voted the effects would be disastrous. The first of these arguments is criticized by Jason Brennan, who holds that since each individual vote will play little to no role in preserving stable democracy nobody has a duty to vote. The second is criticized by Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan, who argue that it is incomplete unless its supporters can show that democracy needs everyone to vote to continue. The question of whether there is a duty to vote naturally leads to the question of whether it is permissible for persons to vote in their own self-interest. Jason Brennan argues that persons should only (morally) vote for candidates or policies that they are justified in believing would promote the common good. It is unclear, however, what “the common good” consists of. This discussion of the morality of voting in one’s self-interest leads to the question of whether voting for a politician because she has made campaign promises is morally analogous to a voter selling her vote. In discussing this issue it is important to distinguish between the “restricted” defense of markets in votes (that the purchased votes are to be cast in favor of what the buyer is justified in believing is the common good) and the “unrestricted” defense of such a market (that purchased votes can be cast in any way the buyer pleases). Much of this discussion focuses on the morality of unrestricted markets in votes. Christopher Freiman has offered four main arguments in favor of such a market: (1) that it will make both the buyer and the seller better off; (2) that it is required by respect for voter liberty; (3) that it is relevantly similar to other practices that are currently allowed, such as logrolling; and (4) that it would enable electoral outcomes to better express voter preferences. None of these arguments are persuasive. The first is based on illicitly inferring from the claim that persons would voluntarily buy and sell votes if a market were allowed to the claim that they would thereby desire that this market be allowed. The second argument is flawed because if some persons would prefer that a market not be allowed, this could provide a sufficient reason to restrict their liberty by precluding them from selling their votes. The third argument overlooks important disanalogies between votes traded between voters, and votes traded between legislators. The fourth argument is based on the implausible assumption that vote sellers would not misrepresent their political preferences in a market for votes.

Freedom, Self-Interest, and the Common Good

1987 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Richard J. Connell ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common

Institutional Design for Collective Action: Tweaking the Rules of the Game for the Common Good

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heinz-Dieter Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Peer Review ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Urban Safety ◽  
The Common ◽  
Rules Of The Game

Abstract At present, institutional design is an under-theorized and underdeveloped part of the social sciences. In this paper I focus on designs for situations of collective action where the outcome is controlled by the choices of several self-interested actors. In those situations the goal of institutional design is to alter the rules of the game so that self-interested actors find it rational to cooperate. I explore the viability of that definition by considering two examples of institutional design: urban safety and academic peer review. I discuss the implications of my findings for our conception of rational self-interest and propose that three design principles – publicity, boundaries, and contiguity – can be inferred from the analysis.

scholarly journals Self-Interest and the Common Good in Book I of Homer's Iliad

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Fred Humphrey
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Trojan War ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Judgment Of Paris

If you recall Homer's Iliad, you will remember that the poem, as we are often told, is the story of the Trojan War. The mythological background of the war is tied to a most unlikely source - namely, "the judgment of Paris." All the gods and goddesses, according to the poets, with the exception Eris (the goddess of strife or discord), were invited to the wedding of Thetis and Peleus. When Eris tried to attend the celebration, she was turned away. To spite those who had denied her entrance, Eris tossed a golden apple inscribed with the words, "To the Fairest," amongst the goddesses attending the wedding festivities.

scholarly journals Emergent Prosocial Behavior During Dynamic Human Group Formation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Badman ◽  
Masahiko Haruno ◽  
Rei Akaishi
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Experimental Session ◽  
Cooperative Groups ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Group Interest ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Tit For Tat

For scientists, policy makers, and the general population, there is increasing interest in how humans form cooperative groups. However, how group-oriented behavior emerges during the dynamic process of group formation is still unknown. We hypothesize that humans will exhibit emergent prosocial behavior as their immediate group size increases. Using a network-embedded-dyad prisoner dilemma task, with periodic opportunities to retain or remove group members, we find subjects consistently follow a well-performing reciprocal base policy (tit-for-tat-like) across the experimental session. However, subjects’ strategies also became more forgiving and less exploitative as group size increased, with a default preference shift to cooperation. Thus, human cooperation may emerge from a desire to create and maintain larger and more cooperative groups, and multiscale strategy that considers both self-interest and group-interest.

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