scholarly journals The principle of equality and self-determination of peoples and the problem of recognition of new state formations

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (Extra-C) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
Yulia Nikolaevna Avdonina ◽  
Guzel Firdinatovna Nagumanova

The researchers put forward the thesis that in the case of systematic analysis of scientific views inherent in individual scientists, there is an opposition of the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples to the principle of the territorial integrity of states, and at the same time, in law enforcement practice there are various acts that do not meet the signs of uniformity in the interpretation of the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples. All this together leads not so much to a pluralism of opinions, but to the emergence of various kinds of legal conflicts. Additionally, the authors try to pose the problem of recognizing new state formations as subjects of international law, and also propose separate approaches to the processes that make it possible to recognize such states. So, at the end of the paper, the researchers set a vector for the continuation of the discussion, which speaks of giving such powers either the UN Security Council, or the Human Rights Council, or the International Court of Justice, subject to additional procedural requirements.    

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-468

Professor Yaël Ronen introduced the workshop as the fourth in a series of events on legal aspects of the Middle East conflict. The first two events concerned the Palestine Mandate of 1922. The third focused on the 1948 refugee issue. All these events have and are being held with the generous support of the Knapp Family Foundation and under the auspices of the International Law Forum of the Faculty of Law. Also, as part of the Shabtai Rosenne International Law Center Initiative, the first session was dedicated to the commemoration of the work of the late Shabtai Rosenne, whose scholarship spanned a host of international law issues but who is most renowned for his work on the International Court of Justice (ICJ).


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-739
Author(s):  
Xuexia Liao

Abstract This article revisits the package deal nature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and its implications for determining customary international law. A survey of the case law illustrates that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not given particular weight to the fact that the LOSC was negotiated and accepted as a package deal. Nevertheless, the ICJ’s declaration that Article 121, paragraph 3 of the LOSC is a customary rule tends to be based on a ‘package deal approach’, which focuses on the textual and logical links between the paragraphs that manifest an ‘indivisible régime’. By exploring the difficulties of determining the customary status of Article 76(2)–(7) concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which may arise in the pending Nicaragua v. Colombia II case, this article calls for a cautious attitude towards determination of customary rules from the LOSC.


Author(s):  
Penelope Nevill

This chapter examines the use of force to enforce sanctions in the absence of express authorization by the UN Security Council. After reviewing the history and background to enforcement of sanctions which primarily takes place at sea, the chapter addresses the question of what amounts to a use of force in this context, paying particular attention to whether sanctions enforcement is ‘law enforcement’ or a use of force in the sense of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by examining the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention concerning forcible measures used or threatened by state authorities against vessels or oil rigs and platforms. The chapter concludes by assessing the legal bases for the use of force to enforce sanctions, including those imposed by the United Nations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova

AbstractThe article examines how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has dealt with the concept of peoples and peoples' rights in its jurisprudence. Most prominent has been the Court's role with respect to the right of self-determination and it is this issue that forms the core of the article. A second important question dealt with is the role of indigenous peoples in ICJ case practice, as the struggle by those peoples to gain collective rights is a recent development in international law. Drawing on this analysis, the discussion proceeds to consider the role that the ICJ has played in the development of the rights of peoples in general and what its future role might be in this sphere of international law. The article also examines the way in which the Court has allowed peoples to participate in its proceedings and whether and how its treatment of peoples' rights has strengthened the general foundations of international law.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERGEY PUNZHIN ◽  
NATHALIE WILES

There are three topics within the body of Vereshchetin's academic work which deserve special attention: the law of the sea, space law, and the theory of international law. Vereshchetin's contribution as a judge to the practice and theory of international law can be appreciated through his individual opinions and declarations, in which he dealt with various issues of international law and the international judicial process: self-determination, countermeasures, diplomatic protection, and questions which concern the functioning of the Court (the role and powers of the ICJ, non liquet, bases for the revision of decisions, declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction and reservations to them, and so on).


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Howse ◽  
Ruti Teitel

Abstract One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve self-determination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an opportunity to clarify and develop the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by the ICJ’s decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Palmeter ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis

Modern discussions of the sources of international law usually begin with a reference to Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which provides: The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a.international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;b.international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;c.the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;d.subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
JURE VIDMAR

AbstractIn the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice took the position that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate any applicable rules of international law. This article does not dispute the final finding, but rather critically examines the Court's somewhat controversial reasoning and considers the added value of the opinion for the clarification of legal doctrine in relation to unilateral declarations of independence. An argument is made that the Court's interpretation of the question and the identification of the authors of the declaration had significant implications for the Court's final finding. Yet, the Court cannot be criticized for not answering the question of whether or not Kosovo is a state, whether Kosovo Albanians are beneficiaries of the right of self-determination, or even whether the ‘right to remedial secession’ is applicable. However, the Court may well have implicitly answered that recognition of Kosovo is not illegal.


1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. O. Umozurike

Namibia, formerly South-West Africa, continues from the point of view ofinternational law to represent the symbol of violated right. Even though the United Nations has been seized of the matter for many years and the International Court of Justice has been given the opportunity to adjudicate, the problem appears to be as intractable as ever. South Africa has established her administrative and military presence and means to defend what she considers to be her right with all the forces at her command. The country does not lack friends whose direct or indirect support it counts upon. Yet the fundamental issue remains: Are the people of Namibia entitled to self-determination and how may they exercise that right? It will be necessary to refer back to the history of Namibia from the time of the mandate.


Polar Record ◽  
1956 ◽  
Vol 8 (53) ◽  
pp. 125-151 ◽  

In an attempt to settle the dispute between the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile over sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, the United Kingdom made unilateral Applications to the International Court of Justice at The Hague on 4 May 1955. The Applications set out the British title, and asked the Court to declare that the Argentine and Chilean encroachments in British Antarctic territory were illegal and invalid under international law.Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.* The United Kingdom Government subsequently expressed its regret at these refusals, and placed on record the fact that it had now taken every step open to it to bring about a peaceful and amicable determination of this question of sovereignty in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. On 18 March 1956 the International Court announced that since neither Argentina nor Chile was prepared to accept the Court's jurisdiction, both cases had been removed from its list.


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