scholarly journals Facilis descensus averno: WTO dispute settlement and trade-wars - is the WTO heading where it should?

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-132
Author(s):  
Petres Botond-Zoltan
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Influential Factors ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Rule Based System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Globalized World ◽  
Trade Wars

Trading is arguably the most important element of our modern society, and its importance in the globalized world is second to none. International commerce nowadays involves more complex supply chains, more sophisticated financial operations and more economic agents. However, states do remain influential factors in that ecosystem, and together they create the framework of international trade. That framework is closely supervised and controlled by none other, than the World Trade Organization. Although, the creation of the WTO did not guarantee, that there would be no tensions between trading nations. Trade wars cause no surprise for an economist or lawyer assessing international trade. But did the most appropriate organization handle these trade wars right? In this article we will succinctly analyse the current framework, and will try to answer whether the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (hereinafter “DSM”) is compatible with all the cases. There is no room for error: if there are certain cases where the DSM only aggravates the problem, then these cases have to be identified and have to be handled with special attention. We are familiar with the disruptive effects of a trade war; hence we are challenged to do our utmost to prevent them – and to rethink what, according to John H. Jackson, has to be a rule-based system.

Exploring Aggressive Legalism: Is Now A Good Time to Promote This Approach in Greater Asia?

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Lu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Status ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Asian Developing Countries

AbstractAggressive legalism, a trade policy-making strategy targeted at actively utilizing WTO rules to defend trade interests, has greatly benefited major Eastern Asian countries in past years. This paper examines whether this strategy should be promoted around greater Asia in this era. First, this paper updates the status of adoption of aggressive legalism in East Asian countries including Japan, Korea and China. Second, it looks into the current and possible future utilization of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism by selected countries which are frequent “targets” of trade remedy measures, namely India, Thailand and Indonesia. Finally, it discusses the participation of Asian developing countries in the WTO. Relying upon case studies and statistical analysis, the author finds that Asian countries’ rising image in international trade signals a trend of adopting aggressive legalism in Great Asia. This trend will undoubtedly promote the energetic development of international trade globally. However, room for more progressive participation in the WTO still exists, especially in developing countries.

scholarly journals WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: INDONESIA’S PROSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 300
Author(s):  
Mrs. Koesrianti
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Effective Mechanism ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Rule Based System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Trading ◽  
Time Frames ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

A rule-based system of World Trade Organization (WTO) should be supported by effective mechanism of disputes that ensure the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings toward the respondent could be enforced. The WTO DSM aims to provide predictability and security in international trade by providing strict time-frames, and was designed to be mutually agreed by the disputing members, flexible and binding. For the developing countries in the WTO, they need major effort in terms of training and institutional reform to meet the challenges of participation in the WTODSM. Indonesia has involved in the WTODSM. Sistem perdagangan WTO harus didukung oleh mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang efektif. Kepatuhan pada putusan Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) sangat penting agar manfaat perdagangan dapat dirasakan oleh seluruh anggota WTO, termasuk negara-negara berkembang. Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) WTO memberikan keamanan dan prediktabilitas atas proses sengketa di WTO yang dibutuhkanoleh seluruh anggota WTO sehingga memberikan kesempatan luas bagi negara-negara anggota WTO untuk berpartisipasi dalam mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa di WTO, termasuk Indonesia.

Revisiting African States Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement through Intra-Africa RTA Dispute Settlement

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malebakeng Forere
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
East African ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
East African Community ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Southern Africa Development Community

AbstractWhereas developed countries were the main players in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the era of the WTO saw a sharp increase in the developing countries’ participation in trade disputes. Thus, developing countries are active complainants and defendants in the WTO dispute settlement processes. Nevertheless, African states are still marginalised, and this situation has attracted attention of many scholars. As a result, scholars in the field have come up with many reasons to explain why African states do not appear as either complainants or respondents. The reasons for Africa’s non-participation have been argued to include cost of WTO litigation relative to the gains, low trade volumes, legal knowledge and non-integration of African countries in the WTO system. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement. The goal in this article is to confirm or dispel assumptions that African states have interests that they need to safeguard through dispute settlement but are inhibited from doing so because of the reasons mentioned above. Unlike other studies, the determination on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement will be approached from African states’ participation in intra-Africa RTA dispute settlement mechanisms. While there are six intra-Africa RTAs notified to the WTO, this work focuses on only two – East African Community and Southern Africa Development Community.

Does the WTO exacerbate international conflict?

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332096020
Author(s):  
J Tyson Chatagnier ◽  
Haeyong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Member States ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Compliant Behavior ◽  
Economic Tools

As one component of its mission to reduce trade barriers and encourage the liberalization of international commerce, the World Trade Organization provides states with a forum in which they can raise and resolve complaints about partners’ unfair trading practices. This mechanism streamlines the process of identifying non-compliant behavior, and provides real incentives for the removal of such policies. By furnishing a form of dispute resolution, the institution should be both trade-inducing and peace-enhancing for member states. However, this very mechanism also has the potential to aggravate existing dispute for two reasons. First, it removes the opportunity for states to use economic policies as instruments of structural linkage in resolving disputes. Second, it deprives its members of powerful economic tools that could be used in lieu of militarized responses. Using the implementation of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, as well as the subsequent expiration of Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (the so-called ‘peace clause’), we examine whether the opportunity to resolve trade disputes through the organization affects the likelihood that member states engage in militarized conflict with one another. We find that membership in a trade institution facilitates peaceful interaction, but that judicialization erases these benefits. We conclude that institution building requires caution and attention to the possibility of unintended consequences.

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