Narrative Language and Possible Worlds in Postmodern Fiction. A Borderline Study of Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-264
Author(s):  
Adriana Diana Urian ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
World System ◽  
Narrative Text ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Postmodern Fiction ◽  
Fictional Worlds ◽  
Narrative Worlds ◽  
Narrative Language

"Narrative Language and Possible Worlds in Postmodern Fiction. A Borderline Study of Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time. The present paper is a study of more traditional hermeneutics combined with a tinge of possible world modality, with the purpose of creating a thorough picture of narrative worlds and balancing it against the possible world system, with practical applications onto postmodern fiction, in Ian McEwan’s novel The Child in Time. The article focuses on exposing narrative language, worlds and characters, viewing them through Seymour Chatman’s perspective and slightly counterbalancing this approach with the possible world semantics system (as envisioned by Kripke, Lewis, Nolan, Putnam) for a diverse understanding of the inner structure and functioning of narrative text and fictional worlds. Keywords: possible worlds, possible-world semantics, narrative worlds, fictional worlds, narrative language, fiction, postmodern fiction, fictional characters "

scholarly journals KAIP APIBRĖŽIAMOSIOS DESKRIPCIJOS VARTOJAMOS SINGULIARINIAMS TEIGINIAMS IŠREIKŠTI?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Evgeny Borisov
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Subject Term ◽  
The Subject

Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas: kokios sąlygos turi būti patenkintos, kad, ištarę sakinį su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija kaip sakinio subjektu, mes išreikštume singuliarinį teiginį (Kaplano prasme). Autorius teigia, kad Wettsteino įsitikinimas, jog teiginio singuliariškumas nustatomas ištarimo metu nurodant apibrėžiamosios deskripcijos referentą, yra nenuoseklus. Straipsnyje siūlomas kitas singuliariškumo kriterijus: teiginys yra singuliarinis, jeigu jame dalyvaujanti apibrėžiamoji deskripcija įvertinama vieninteliame galimame pasaulyje, o jeigu apibrėžiamoji deskripcija turi būti įvertinta daugiau nei vieno galimo pasaulio atžvilgiu, tai teiginys yra bendrasis (general). Šis kriterijus veiksmingas aiškinant kontroversiškus atvejus – kai išreiškiame teisingą singuliarinį teiginį, kurio subjekto dėmuo nedera su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija, pavartota ištartame sakinyje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: apibrėžiamoji deskripcija, nuoroda, singuliarinis ir bendrasis teiginys, galimų pasaulių semantika. How Do We Use Definite Descriptions to Express Singular Propositions?Evgeny Borisov AbstractThe paper is devoted to the question: under what conditions do we express a singular proposition (in the Kaplanian sense) when uttering a sentence containing a definite description as the subject term. It is argued that Wettstein’s claim that singularity of a proposition is determined by the demonstration of the referent of definite description accompanying the utterance contains an inconsistency. An alternative criterion of singularity is proposed: we express a singular proposition if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a single possible world, and we express a general one if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a range of possible worlds. This criterion is effective in explaining controversial cases in which we manage to express a true singular proposition with a subject constituent that does not fit the definite description used in the utterance.Keywords: definite description, reference, singular and general propositions, possible world semantics

scholarly journals Crossworld Predication in Natural Language

2021 ◽  
pp. 260-272
Author(s):  
Евгений Васильевич Борисов
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Partial Functions ◽  
Possible World Semantics

Некоторые предложения естественного языка, такие как «Джон мог быть выше, чем Мэри, как она есть», не допускают адекватного анализа в терминах стандартной семантики возможных миров, поскольку содержат кросс-мировую предикацию, которая в стандартной семантике не отображается. Для логического анализа такого рода предложений автором была разработана (и представлена в других публикациях) логика для кросс-мировой предикации (СРL). В статье приведен ряд примеров, демонстрирующих широкую распространенность феномена кросс-мировой предикации в естественном языке и описаны главные особенности семантики СРL (кросс-мировая интерпретация предикатов и использование частичных функций от переменных к возможным мирам в истинностной оценке формул), а также охарактеризована специфика синтаксиса СРL и онтологии, лежащей в ее основе. Some sentences of natural language cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of standard possible world semantics because they involve cross-world predication that cannot be reflected by means of standard semantics. An instance is ‘John might be taller than Mary is’. In some other papers the author proposed a logic for cross-word predication (CPL) that can be used to logically analyze sentences of this sort. In this paper, some examples are adduced that show that cross-world predication is highly widespread in natural language. The main features of the semantics of CPL are described, namely cross-world interpretation of predicates, and using partial functions from variables to possible worlds in the evaluation of formulas. Finally, the specificity of the syntax of CPL, and the ontology behind the semantics of CPL is characterized.

Impossible Worlds

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ira Kiourti
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Impossible World ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Accessibility Relation ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Potential Applicability ◽  
Controversial Topic ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Modern Work

Impossible worlds constitute an increasingly popular yet controversial topic in logic and metaphysics. The term “impossible worlds” parallels the term “possible worlds” and commonly refers to setups, situations, or totalities (“worlds”) that are inconsistent, incomplete, non-classical, or non-normal in possible-world semantics and metaphysics. These may verify a proposition and its negation, be silent as to the truth value of a proposition, or somehow fail to conform to the (classical) laws of logic. Some authors object to the term “impossible world,” preferring to talk of nonstandard worlds or partial situations instead. While the term “impossible world” is sometimes used to refer to a world that is inaccessible from another relative to some specified accessibility relation, impossible worlds are often conceived of as absolutely impossible in a broadly logical, conceptual, or metaphysical sense. As in the case of possible worlds, modern talk of impossible worlds originates with semantic interpretations of modal and non-classical logics, yet the potential applicability of these worlds to logical, metaphysical, and semantic philosophical puzzles has allowed them to permeate the wider philosophical arena. Arguments for impossible worlds often parallel those for possible worlds (see From Possible Worlds to Impossible Worlds) and focus largely on the proposed applications for such worlds (see Applications). As with possible worlds, there are various metaphysical conceptions of impossible worlds (see the Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds), and objections to such worlds are often theory specific (see Objections to Applications and Objections to Impossible Worlds). This article focuses on modern work on impossible worlds and its critics.

A Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Safety from the Perspective of Ascribers

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Yingjin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Probabilistic Approach ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Significant Component ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
The Subject

Abstract “Epistemic safety” refers to an epistemic status in which the subject acquires true beliefs without involving epistemic luck. There is a tradition of cashing out safety-defining modality in terms of possible world semantics (as put forward by Duncan Pritchard), and even Julian Dutant's and Martin Smith's normalcy-based notions of safety also take this semantics as a significant component of them. However, such an approach has to largely depend on epistemologists’ ad hoc intuitions on how to individuate possible worlds and how to pick out “close” worlds. In contrast, I propose a probabilistic approach to safety to maximally preclude the preceding type of ad hoc-ness. The main idea is as follows: Each epistemic vignette wherein a subject S holds a true belief p has to be evaluated by a safety-ascriber, hence, S holds a true belief p safely iff according to the safety-ascriber's evaluation (which is based on her background knowledge), the probability of the occurrence of the truth-maker of p is above a pre-fixed “safety threshold”. My theory will be applied to Lottery Cases, Gettierized Cases and Skeptical Cases to test the scope of its applicability.

scholarly journals Intersubjective approach to intentionality and internal objects

2021 ◽  
Vol - (6) ◽  
pp. 27-41
Author(s):  
Andriy Vasylchenko
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Internal Object ◽  
Internal Objects ◽  
Mental Objects ◽  
Graham Priest

Intentionality — the orientation of mental states to objects (things, properties, states of things, events) — has been considered a hallmark of the psyche since Brentano’s time. In this article, we consider the problem of intentionality from the second-person approach, or the standpoint of intersubjectivity. Our analysis shows that intentionality is intrinsically projective. The projective nature of intentionality is related to internal objects that play a crucial role in fixing the person’s subjective experience and serve as a fulcrum in the development of the person. The internal object can be treated as a set of properties and tropes. The logic of intentionality proposed by Graham Priest and the theory of primary (that is, belonging to the Freudian system «unconscious») psychological attitudes developed by Linda Brakel created the preconditions for seman- tical analysis of projective intentionality. In the article, we rely on the logic of projective intentionality that reorients the resources of modal logics and semantics of possible worlds to the investigation and formalization of primary thinking. Considering the problem of mental existence within the framework of the second-person approach, we show that Wittgenstein’s reasoning about the «beetle in a box» does not refute the thesis of the privacy of mental meanings. Finally, involving the possible world semantics, we develop a neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontology of mental objects.

scholarly journals ANTICRITERIALISM AND FUZZINESS OF WORLDS. CONCERNING EVGENY BORISOV’S CROSS-WORLD SEMANTICS

2021 ◽  
pp. 283-290
Author(s):  
Вадим Миронович Лурье
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics

Рассматриваются главным образом две проблемы, решение которых может быть особенно важным для кросс-мировой семантики: антикритериализм (представление о том, что идентичность не может до конца определяться какими бы то ни было критериями) и нечёткость миров (возможные миры, границы между которыми нечёткие). Эти проблемы важны, в частности, для таких приложений кросс-мировой семантики, как логика образований непрямых значений в естественном языке и логика нарратива. The study is focused on two problems related to cross-world semantics: anticriterialism (the idea that identity cannot be defined by any criteria whatsoever) and fuzziness of possible worlds (possible world semantics where the worlds are fuzzy). These two problems are important, in particular, for the logic of indirect meanings in natural language and the logic of narrative.

Efficient Mining of Frequent Item Sets on Large Uncertain Databases

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Ms. Madhuri K. Waghchore ◽  
Prof. S. A. Sanap
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Location Based Services ◽  
Incremental Mining ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Poisson Binomial Distribution ◽  
Synthetic Datasets ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Frequent Item Sets ◽  
Sensor Monitoring

In applications like location-based services, sensor monitoring systems and data integration diligence the data manipulated is highly ambiguous. mining manifold itemsets from generous ambiguous database illustrated under possible world semantics is a crucial dispute. Mining manifold Itemsets is technically brave because the ambiguous database can accommodate a fractional number of possible worlds. The mining process can be formed as a Poisson binomial distribution, by noticing that an Approximated algorithm is established to ascertain manifold Itemsets from generous ambiguous database exceedingly. Preserving the mining result of scaling a database is a substantial dispute when a new dataset is inserted in an existing database. In this paper, an incremental mining algorithm is adduced to retain the mining consequence. The cost and time are reduced by renovating the mining result rather than revising the whole algorithm on the new database from the scrap. We criticize the support for incremental mining and ascertainment of manifold Itemsets. Two common ambiguity models in the mining process are Tuple and Attribute ambiguity. Our approach reinforced both the tuple and attribute uncertainty. Our accession is authorized by interpreting both real and synthetic datasets.

scholarly journals ‘Can,’ Compatibilism, and Possible Worlds

1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
Considerable Discussion

Most compatibilists have sought to defend their view by means of an analysis of the concept of ‘can’ in terms of subjunctive conditionals. Keith Lehrer opposes this analysis; he nevertheless embraces compatibilism. In a recent paper he has proposed a novel analysis of the concept of ‘can’ within the framework of possible-world semantics. The paper has provoked considerable discussion. In it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth of compatibilism (p. 241). Others have claimed that this is not so, but at least one commentator has asserted that Lehrer's analysis strongly supports compatibilism. In this section I shall give a brief exposition of relevant portions of Lehrer's account of ‘can’ and then in the next section I shall seek to show that it fails to render compatibilism any more plausible than incompatibilism. Indeed, I shall seek to show that, if one of Lehrer's primitive concepts (the concept of an ‘advantage’) is understood as it seems it should be understood, then there would seem to be good reason to believe that his analysis supports not compatibilism but incompatibilism.

A First-Order Logic of Limited Belief Based on Possible Worlds

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Lakemeyer ◽  
Hector J. Levesque
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Base ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
First Order ◽  
Epistemic States

In a recent paper Lakemeyer and Levesque proposed a first-order logic of limited belief to characterize the beliefs of a knowledge base (\KB). Among other things, they show that their model of belief is expressive, eventually complete, and tractable. This means, roughly, that a \KB\ may consist of arbitrary first-order sentences, that any sentence which is logically entailed by the \KB\ is eventually believed, given enough reasoning effort, and that reasoning is tractable under reasonable assumptions. One downside of the proposal is that epistemic states are defined in terms of sets of clauses, possibly containing variables, giving the logic a distinct syntactic flavour compared to the more traditional possible-world semantics found in the literature on epistemic logic. In this paper we show that the same properties as above can be obtained by defining epistemic states as sets of three-valued possible worlds. This way we are able to shed new light on those properties by recasting them using the more familiar notion of truth over possible worlds.

FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE AND POSSIBLE WORLDS IN IAN MCEWAN’S THE CHILD IN TIME

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 123-132
Author(s):  
Adriana Diana Urian ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Free Indirect Discourse ◽  
Postmodern Fiction ◽  
Indirect Discourse ◽  
Subsequent Discussion ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Narrative Syntax

The paper discusses the nature of free indirect discourse and the manner in which it appears within postmodern fiction, more precisely in Ian McEwan’s novel The Child in Time, through the modality of possible world semantics. First it explains how free indirect discourse should be understood in this context, outlining the theoretical introduction and justification of this particular approach. The subsequent discussion focuses on speech acts and how they can be understood theoretically and in a fictional universe. It then showcases how free indirect discourse works in Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time, which offers an excellent case study for this type of analysis, given the fact that the novel is a third person narrative, an indirect account of events, and a reported story, and thus a perfect sample of free indirect discourse in fiction. Finally, by blending these perspectives within the narrative universe and observing how they render a structural matrix of fiction upon which worlds of possibility can be modally distinguished, the paper will prove that the analysis of free indirect discourse completes the picture of narrative syntax within possible world determinism.

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