scholarly journals ANTICRITERIALISM AND FUZZINESS OF WORLDS. CONCERNING EVGENY BORISOV’S CROSS-WORLD SEMANTICS

2021 ◽  
pp. 283-290
Author(s):  
Вадим Миронович Лурье
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics

Рассматриваются главным образом две проблемы, решение которых может быть особенно важным для кросс-мировой семантики: антикритериализм (представление о том, что идентичность не может до конца определяться какими бы то ни было критериями) и нечёткость миров (возможные миры, границы между которыми нечёткие). Эти проблемы важны, в частности, для таких приложений кросс-мировой семантики, как логика образований непрямых значений в естественном языке и логика нарратива. The study is focused on two problems related to cross-world semantics: anticriterialism (the idea that identity cannot be defined by any criteria whatsoever) and fuzziness of possible worlds (possible world semantics where the worlds are fuzzy). These two problems are important, in particular, for the logic of indirect meanings in natural language and the logic of narrative.

scholarly journals Crossworld Predication in Natural Language

2021 ◽  
pp. 260-272
Author(s):  
Евгений Васильевич Борисов
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Partial Functions ◽  
Possible World Semantics

Некоторые предложения естественного языка, такие как «Джон мог быть выше, чем Мэри, как она есть», не допускают адекватного анализа в терминах стандартной семантики возможных миров, поскольку содержат кросс-мировую предикацию, которая в стандартной семантике не отображается. Для логического анализа такого рода предложений автором была разработана (и представлена в других публикациях) логика для кросс-мировой предикации (СРL). В статье приведен ряд примеров, демонстрирующих широкую распространенность феномена кросс-мировой предикации в естественном языке и описаны главные особенности семантики СРL (кросс-мировая интерпретация предикатов и использование частичных функций от переменных к возможным мирам в истинностной оценке формул), а также охарактеризована специфика синтаксиса СРL и онтологии, лежащей в ее основе. Some sentences of natural language cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of standard possible world semantics because they involve cross-world predication that cannot be reflected by means of standard semantics. An instance is ‘John might be taller than Mary is’. In some other papers the author proposed a logic for cross-word predication (CPL) that can be used to logically analyze sentences of this sort. In this paper, some examples are adduced that show that cross-world predication is highly widespread in natural language. The main features of the semantics of CPL are described, namely cross-world interpretation of predicates, and using partial functions from variables to possible worlds in the evaluation of formulas. Finally, the specificity of the syntax of CPL, and the ontology behind the semantics of CPL is characterized.

Modal logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Bull's Eye ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Richard Montague

In reasoning we often use words such as ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘must’ and so on. For example, if we know that an argument is valid, then we know that it is necessarily true that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Modal logic starts with such modal words and the inferences involving them. The exploration of these inferences has led to a variety of formal systems, and their interpretation is now most often built on the concept of a possible world. Standard non-modal logic shows us how to understand logical words such as ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’, which are truth-functional. The modal concepts are not truth-functional: knowing that p is true (and what ‘necessarily’ means) does not automatically enable one to determine whether ‘Necessarily p’ is true. (‘It is necessary that all people have been people’ is true, but ‘It is necessary that no English monarch was born in Montana’ is false, even though the simpler constituents – ‘All people have been people’ and ‘No English monarch was born in Montana’– are both true.) The study of modal logic has helped in the understanding of many other contexts for sentences that are not truth-functional, such as ‘ought’ (‘It ought to be the case that p’) and ‘believes’ (‘Alice believes that p’); and also in the consideration of the interaction between quantifiers and non-truth-functional contexts. In fact, much work in modern semantics has benefited from the extension of modal semantics introduced by Richard Montague in beginning the development of a systematic semantics for natural language. The framework of possible worlds developed for modal logic has been fruitful in the analysis of many concepts. For example, by introducing the concept of relative possibility, Kripke showed how to model a variety of modal systems: a proposition is necessarily true at a possible world w if and only if it is true at every world that is possible relative to w. To achieve a better analysis of statements of ability, Mark Brown adapted the framework by modelling actions with sets of possible outcomes. John has the ability to hit the bull’s-eye reliably if there is some action of John’s such that every possible outcome of that action includes John’s hitting the bull’s-eye. Modal logic and its semantics also raise many puzzles. What makes a modal claim true? How do we tell what is possible and what is necessary? Are there any possible things that do not exist (and what could that mean anyway)? Does the use of modal logic involve a commitment to essentialism? How can an individual exist in many different possible worlds?

Constructing the Impossible

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-163
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Formal Languages ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Degree Of Acceptance ◽  
Broad Role ◽  
Natural Way

Please keep the original abstract. A number of philosophers have flirted with the idea of impossible worlds and some have even become enamored of it. But it has not met with the same degree of acceptance as the more familiar idea of a possible world. Whereas possible worlds have played a broad role in specifying the semantics for natural language and for a wide range of formal languages, impossible worlds have had a much more limited role; and there has not even been general agreement as to how a reasonable theory of impossible worlds is to be developed or applied. This chapter provides a natural way of introducing impossible states into the framework of truthmaker semantics and shows how their introduction permits a number of useful applications.

scholarly journals KAIP APIBRĖŽIAMOSIOS DESKRIPCIJOS VARTOJAMOS SINGULIARINIAMS TEIGINIAMS IŠREIKŠTI?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Evgeny Borisov
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Subject Term ◽  
The Subject

Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas: kokios sąlygos turi būti patenkintos, kad, ištarę sakinį su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija kaip sakinio subjektu, mes išreikštume singuliarinį teiginį (Kaplano prasme). Autorius teigia, kad Wettsteino įsitikinimas, jog teiginio singuliariškumas nustatomas ištarimo metu nurodant apibrėžiamosios deskripcijos referentą, yra nenuoseklus. Straipsnyje siūlomas kitas singuliariškumo kriterijus: teiginys yra singuliarinis, jeigu jame dalyvaujanti apibrėžiamoji deskripcija įvertinama vieninteliame galimame pasaulyje, o jeigu apibrėžiamoji deskripcija turi būti įvertinta daugiau nei vieno galimo pasaulio atžvilgiu, tai teiginys yra bendrasis (general). Šis kriterijus veiksmingas aiškinant kontroversiškus atvejus – kai išreiškiame teisingą singuliarinį teiginį, kurio subjekto dėmuo nedera su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija, pavartota ištartame sakinyje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: apibrėžiamoji deskripcija, nuoroda, singuliarinis ir bendrasis teiginys, galimų pasaulių semantika. How Do We Use Definite Descriptions to Express Singular Propositions?Evgeny Borisov AbstractThe paper is devoted to the question: under what conditions do we express a singular proposition (in the Kaplanian sense) when uttering a sentence containing a definite description as the subject term. It is argued that Wettstein’s claim that singularity of a proposition is determined by the demonstration of the referent of definite description accompanying the utterance contains an inconsistency. An alternative criterion of singularity is proposed: we express a singular proposition if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a single possible world, and we express a general one if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a range of possible worlds. This criterion is effective in explaining controversial cases in which we manage to express a true singular proposition with a subject constituent that does not fit the definite description used in the utterance.Keywords: definite description, reference, singular and general propositions, possible world semantics

Impossible Worlds

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ira Kiourti
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Impossible World ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Accessibility Relation ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Potential Applicability ◽  
Controversial Topic ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Modern Work

Impossible worlds constitute an increasingly popular yet controversial topic in logic and metaphysics. The term “impossible worlds” parallels the term “possible worlds” and commonly refers to setups, situations, or totalities (“worlds”) that are inconsistent, incomplete, non-classical, or non-normal in possible-world semantics and metaphysics. These may verify a proposition and its negation, be silent as to the truth value of a proposition, or somehow fail to conform to the (classical) laws of logic. Some authors object to the term “impossible world,” preferring to talk of nonstandard worlds or partial situations instead. While the term “impossible world” is sometimes used to refer to a world that is inaccessible from another relative to some specified accessibility relation, impossible worlds are often conceived of as absolutely impossible in a broadly logical, conceptual, or metaphysical sense. As in the case of possible worlds, modern talk of impossible worlds originates with semantic interpretations of modal and non-classical logics, yet the potential applicability of these worlds to logical, metaphysical, and semantic philosophical puzzles has allowed them to permeate the wider philosophical arena. Arguments for impossible worlds often parallel those for possible worlds (see From Possible Worlds to Impossible Worlds) and focus largely on the proposed applications for such worlds (see Applications). As with possible worlds, there are various metaphysical conceptions of impossible worlds (see the Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds), and objections to such worlds are often theory specific (see Objections to Applications and Objections to Impossible Worlds). This article focuses on modern work on impossible worlds and its critics.

Narrative Language and Possible Worlds in Postmodern Fiction. A Borderline Study of Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-264
Author(s):  
Adriana Diana Urian ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
World System ◽  
Narrative Text ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Postmodern Fiction ◽  
Fictional Worlds ◽  
Narrative Worlds ◽  
Narrative Language

"Narrative Language and Possible Worlds in Postmodern Fiction. A Borderline Study of Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time. The present paper is a study of more traditional hermeneutics combined with a tinge of possible world modality, with the purpose of creating a thorough picture of narrative worlds and balancing it against the possible world system, with practical applications onto postmodern fiction, in Ian McEwan’s novel The Child in Time. The article focuses on exposing narrative language, worlds and characters, viewing them through Seymour Chatman’s perspective and slightly counterbalancing this approach with the possible world semantics system (as envisioned by Kripke, Lewis, Nolan, Putnam) for a diverse understanding of the inner structure and functioning of narrative text and fictional worlds. Keywords: possible worlds, possible-world semantics, narrative worlds, fictional worlds, narrative language, fiction, postmodern fiction, fictional characters "

A Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Safety from the Perspective of Ascribers

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Yingjin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Probabilistic Approach ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Significant Component ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
The Subject

Abstract “Epistemic safety” refers to an epistemic status in which the subject acquires true beliefs without involving epistemic luck. There is a tradition of cashing out safety-defining modality in terms of possible world semantics (as put forward by Duncan Pritchard), and even Julian Dutant's and Martin Smith's normalcy-based notions of safety also take this semantics as a significant component of them. However, such an approach has to largely depend on epistemologists’ ad hoc intuitions on how to individuate possible worlds and how to pick out “close” worlds. In contrast, I propose a probabilistic approach to safety to maximally preclude the preceding type of ad hoc-ness. The main idea is as follows: Each epistemic vignette wherein a subject S holds a true belief p has to be evaluated by a safety-ascriber, hence, S holds a true belief p safely iff according to the safety-ascriber's evaluation (which is based on her background knowledge), the probability of the occurrence of the truth-maker of p is above a pre-fixed “safety threshold”. My theory will be applied to Lottery Cases, Gettierized Cases and Skeptical Cases to test the scope of its applicability.

scholarly journals Intersubjective approach to intentionality and internal objects

2021 ◽  
Vol - (6) ◽  
pp. 27-41
Author(s):  
Andriy Vasylchenko
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Internal Object ◽  
Internal Objects ◽  
Mental Objects ◽  
Graham Priest

Intentionality — the orientation of mental states to objects (things, properties, states of things, events) — has been considered a hallmark of the psyche since Brentano’s time. In this article, we consider the problem of intentionality from the second-person approach, or the standpoint of intersubjectivity. Our analysis shows that intentionality is intrinsically projective. The projective nature of intentionality is related to internal objects that play a crucial role in fixing the person’s subjective experience and serve as a fulcrum in the development of the person. The internal object can be treated as a set of properties and tropes. The logic of intentionality proposed by Graham Priest and the theory of primary (that is, belonging to the Freudian system «unconscious») psychological attitudes developed by Linda Brakel created the preconditions for seman- tical analysis of projective intentionality. In the article, we rely on the logic of projective intentionality that reorients the resources of modal logics and semantics of possible worlds to the investigation and formalization of primary thinking. Considering the problem of mental existence within the framework of the second-person approach, we show that Wittgenstein’s reasoning about the «beetle in a box» does not refute the thesis of the privacy of mental meanings. Finally, involving the possible world semantics, we develop a neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontology of mental objects.

Efficient Mining of Frequent Item Sets on Large Uncertain Databases

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Ms. Madhuri K. Waghchore ◽  
Prof. S. A. Sanap
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Location Based Services ◽  
Incremental Mining ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Poisson Binomial Distribution ◽  
Synthetic Datasets ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Frequent Item Sets ◽  
Sensor Monitoring

In applications like location-based services, sensor monitoring systems and data integration diligence the data manipulated is highly ambiguous. mining manifold itemsets from generous ambiguous database illustrated under possible world semantics is a crucial dispute. Mining manifold Itemsets is technically brave because the ambiguous database can accommodate a fractional number of possible worlds. The mining process can be formed as a Poisson binomial distribution, by noticing that an Approximated algorithm is established to ascertain manifold Itemsets from generous ambiguous database exceedingly. Preserving the mining result of scaling a database is a substantial dispute when a new dataset is inserted in an existing database. In this paper, an incremental mining algorithm is adduced to retain the mining consequence. The cost and time are reduced by renovating the mining result rather than revising the whole algorithm on the new database from the scrap. We criticize the support for incremental mining and ascertainment of manifold Itemsets. Two common ambiguity models in the mining process are Tuple and Attribute ambiguity. Our approach reinforced both the tuple and attribute uncertainty. Our accession is authorized by interpreting both real and synthetic datasets.

scholarly journals ‘Can,’ Compatibilism, and Possible Worlds

1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
Considerable Discussion

Most compatibilists have sought to defend their view by means of an analysis of the concept of ‘can’ in terms of subjunctive conditionals. Keith Lehrer opposes this analysis; he nevertheless embraces compatibilism. In a recent paper he has proposed a novel analysis of the concept of ‘can’ within the framework of possible-world semantics. The paper has provoked considerable discussion. In it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth of compatibilism (p. 241). Others have claimed that this is not so, but at least one commentator has asserted that Lehrer's analysis strongly supports compatibilism. In this section I shall give a brief exposition of relevant portions of Lehrer's account of ‘can’ and then in the next section I shall seek to show that it fails to render compatibilism any more plausible than incompatibilism. Indeed, I shall seek to show that, if one of Lehrer's primitive concepts (the concept of an ‘advantage’) is understood as it seems it should be understood, then there would seem to be good reason to believe that his analysis supports not compatibilism but incompatibilism.

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