scholarly journals Dialektika Regulasi Pertambangan Pemerintah Indonesia dan PT Freeport Indonesia melalui Pendekatan Obsolescing Bargaining Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Angga Danu Fadil Irawan
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Host State ◽  
National Corporation

Implementasi UU No. 4 Tahun 2009 tentang Pertambangan Mineral dan Batubara di Indonesia menjadi awal dari polemik renegosiasi kebijakan dan kepentingan ekonomi politik yang berlawanan di antara Pemerintah Indonesia (Host State) dan PT Freeport Indonesia (Multi National Corporation). Artikel ini akan menganalisis bagaimana proses renegosiasi Izin Usaha Pertambangan Khusus (IUPK) yang tertera di dalam UU No. 4 Tahun 2009 melalui skenario daya tawar (bargaining power) di antara kedua aktor yang bertikai. Analisis dilakukan melalui pendekatan kualitatif dengan metode analisis deskriptif yang bersumber pada studi kepustakaan. Penulis akan menitikberatkan analisis melalui spektrum paradigma neomerkantilisme untuk melakukan eksplorasi variabel yang lebih berorientasi pada kepentingan negara (state centric model of bargaining). Melalui pendekatan tersebut, Pemerintah Indonesia dan PT Freeport Indonesia akan diartikulasikan posisi tawarnya melalui Obsolescing Bargaining Model. Hasil analisis mengacu pada posisi dominan Pemerintah Indonesia dalam proses renegosiasi IUPK sehingga hasil artikulasi daya tawar akan lebih berorientasi pada keuntungan Pemerintah Indonesia sebagai Host-State.

scholarly journals Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlado Vivoda
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Oil Industry ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Host State ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Oil Company

This paper establishes a model for analyzing the dynamics of the host state-international oil company (IOC) bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the model advances our ability to investigate bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil industry. It is a sophisticated mechanism which identifies the complex array of relationships and bargains within which the host state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. The model builds on and leverages the key contributions of earlier bargaining models. It enables us to integrate relevant ideas from existing scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account other actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a host state. Practically, the model will help actors choose strategies more systematically, leading to higher relative bargaining power that may translate to preferable bargaining outcomes.

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

scholarly journals INVESTIGATING BARGAINING POWER OF FARMERS AND PROCESSORS IN IRAN'S DAIRY MARKET

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZEINAB SHOKOOHI ◽  
AMIR HOSSEIN CHIZARI ◽  
MAHDI ASGARI
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Expectation Maximization Algorithm ◽  
Raw Milk ◽  
Annual Data ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Dairy Farmers ◽  
Bilateral Bargaining ◽  
Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization ◽  
Milk Market

AbstractThe farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market.

Political Power and Bargaining Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 47-82
Author(s):  
Keith Dowding
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Social Power ◽  
Power Index ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Index Approach ◽  
Study Power ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Made In

The chapter opens with some distinctions made in the study of power and semi-formally defines ‘outcome’ and ‘social’ or ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ showing the latter is a subset of the former. It argues both are legitimate ways of examining power. It argues that whilst ‘social power’ is often our concern, especially when discussing issues of freedom, domination and inequality we need to start by considering outcome power. Understanding why people can fail in their aims even when others are not acting against them – failure in their outcome power – is necessary for to understand the scope of social power. The chapter then examines the relationship between outcome power and freedom and discussesMorriss’s distinction between ability and ableness. Power is a dispositional concept and the ability that people have need to be distinguished from their exercise of their powers. It argues that if we only look at abilities we could eliminate the term power from our language since all we would need to is to look at their capacities or resources, but we also need to examine the way that agents change others incentives to act. The chapter introduces the formal aspects of the power index approach and through that discussion distinguishes power and luck. It then introduces bargaining power, formally distinguishes threats and offers and explains Harsanyi’s bargaining model of power and the extra element of reputation. It then discusses the relationship of luck and group power introducing the notion of systematic luck. It then concludes by discussing how we can study power in society.

Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanxi Li ◽  
Hao Xiao ◽  
Dongmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Certainty Equivalents ◽  
The Social ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Power Of Incentives ◽  
High Effort

AbstractThis article is the first to study a bargaining model in a moral hazard framework where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. We show that the power of incentives increases with the agent’s bargaining power if the contracts induce a high effort. However, under reasonable assumptions about the agent’s utility function, the contracts induce a high effort less often as the agent’s bargaining power increases. As for the social welfare, we are surprised to find that a utilitarian, who cares about the sum of the two parties’ certainty equivalents, is worse off as the agent’s bargaining power increases. These results are in sharp contrast to the literature, which features risk-neutral agents protected by limited liability.

Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 809-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Morelli
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Institutional Differences

I propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time. Institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play, the equilibrium majorities, and the policy outcome. The ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is, however, invariant to fundamental institutional differences, and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. The bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game, in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office. The order of play is endogenous, and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker. The role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied.

Bargaining power in apartment sales in Corsica: A latent class approach

Urban Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (13) ◽  
pp. 2754-2772
Author(s):  
Steven Caudill ◽  
Claudio Detotto ◽  
Dominique Prunetti
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Latent Class ◽  
Latent Class Model ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Class Model ◽  
Downtown Area ◽  
Segmented Markets ◽  
Weighted Means ◽  
Using Data

This paper extends the bargaining model of Harding et al. (Harding J, Rosenthal S and Sirmans CF (2003) Estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes, Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 178–188), to a latent class framework. This allows for differences in market power in thin and segmented markets. We estimate a latent class model using data on apartment sales in Corsica over the period 2006 to 2016. Our results indicate that the Corsican housing market has two distinct segments or regimes and that bargaining power of buyers and sellers is not the same in these two segments. In particular, we find that local French residents have strong bargaining power in Regime 1 but non-French residents have weak bargaining power. Regime 2 is characterised by strong bargaining power for local French, Corsican French and non-French participants. Based on auxiliary regressions and a comparison of weighted means associated with each regime, we conclude that compared with Regime 2, the apartments associated with the first regime are more spacious, less likely to be new, more likely to have a garden and typically have longer travel times to local amenities such as doctors, pharmacies and the downtown area. From this we conclude that apartments associated with Regime 1 are more likely to be rural and at a greater distance from the coast. Distance from a city is likely to present an informational disadvantage to non-French residents, who may already face language and legal obstacles.

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