scholarly journals On the essentials of international law in Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (60) ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Liu Huawen

Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law was formally established in November, 2020 at the First Central Conference on Work Related to Overall Law-based Governance in the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC). It includes a wealth of ideas about international law, which are embodied in his propositions on and accounts of international law, and it has been developed under the current change of the world situation never seen for a century. Essentially, for his thought on international law, the core principles are the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the central idea is to promote building a community with a shared future for mankind, and the main proposition is that the common values of mankind be the guideline for the global governance and international law. As reflected in his thought on the rule of law, the international governance of law is also closely related to the domestic rule of law. His propositions concerning the international governance of law shall be the important guidelines for China to study and practice international law, and will promote and then lead the progress and development of contemporary international law.

Author(s):  
Susan Longfield Karr

For humanist sixteenth-century jurists such as Guillaume Budé, Ulrich Zasius, Andrea Alciati the ‘rule of law’ was central. In response to the use of law and legal theory to legitimize arbitrary forms of authority, they called for substantive reforms in legal education and practice, which could alleviate the dangers of masking the arbitrary will of rulers with the language of security, utility, and the common good. By focusing on fundamental categories such as ius, natural law, and ius gentium they effectively argued for a universal ‘rule of law’ that could hold political and legal authorities to a higher criterion of justice. In so doing, they redefined fundamental legal categories, ideas, and terms that continue to underpin and structure modern understandings of universal jurisprudence and international law to this day.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierluigi Chiassoni

The history of the Italian Republic has been a history of a remarkable cultural, social, economic, and legal progress for almost thirty years. Of course, many serious issues were left unattended (organized crime and the limits of political immorality rate among the foremost); but, on the whole, the balance was not so bad (our Constitution and our laws concerning judicature, divorce, abortion, and the national health service, for instance, were taken as examples by other European countries coming out from dictatorships and cultural depression). Terrorism, in the 1970s-1980s, was (taken as) a major drawback; in any case, terrorists on both extremes were finally, and utterly, defeated with the sole arms of the rule of law (no “special renditions”, no torture, no special military tribunals were resorted to as “necessary evils”, like in the dark global times following September 11), supported by a conscious and responsible civil society. The political establishment, however, did not grow up in morality, responsibility, and sense for the common good at the same pace of the most advanced sectors of civil society.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-130
Author(s):  
V.V. Ershov ◽  

Introduction. The term “legal state” can be found in numerous international and national legal instruments, as well as in the works of contemporary scholars and scholars of previous generations. This word combination is widely used by politicians and lawyers. Its various applications dictate the need for a definition of the essence of the “rule of law” and its manifestations. Theoretical Basis. Methods. From the position of scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding, according to which only principles and norms of law contained in a single, multilevel and developing system of national and international law forms implemented in the state, the article concludes that it is theoretically debatable that in the special literature, international and national legal documents and legal acts two separate concepts of “rule of law” and “legal state” exist. Results. The notion of the rule of law has a long history of development. In the relevant context, the concept appeared as early as in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. At present, there are also many scientific works devoted to the study of this issue, which is still relevant. The article analyses the notion of the “rule of law” from the perspective of legal positivism as well as the scientifically grounded and scientifically debatable concept of integrative legal understanding. Based on the results of the study, the author concludes that the concept of “the rule of law” has evolved in different historical epochs under the influence of social, economic factors, emerging scientific views, but is still incomplete. From the perspective of the scientifically based concept of an integrative legal understanding, the author believes that it is theoretically more reasonable to view the rule of law as the goal of regulating legal relations in a legal state, self-limited not only by “internal” law, but also limited by “external” law. Discussion and Conclusion. Concepts of the rule of law according to the types of legal understanding of the researchers can be classified into concepts developed on the basis of: legal positivism (‘thin’ concepts; scientifically debatable concepts of integrative legal understanding, arguably synthesising both the right and the wrong); scientifically substantiated concepts of integrative legal understanding. According to the latter approach, a valid legal state is not only self-limited by “internal” law, but is also limited by “external” law, and theoretically more precisely by the principles and norms of law contained in a single, evolving and multilevel system of national and international law forms.


Author(s):  
Mike McConville ◽  
Luke Marsh

This chapter argues that the conflict earlier described between the executive and the judiciary should reset the debate about the meaning of the ‘rule of law’. To this end, it explores the implications that the history of the Judges’ Rules has for both the ‘Rule of Law’ and the role of judges in relation to the common law. By shedding light on the ambiguous nature of the Rules, it first questions whether they were ‘law’, and if so, whether judges could be said to legitimate authors of them—itself a controversial and heavily contested notion. In this regard, it examines the principal justifications for judicial law-making, and questions how these might relate to other major judicially created or endorsed features of the modern criminal justice landscape, namely, state-induced guilty pleas and the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR). Additionally, it challenges the locus classicus of Tom Bingham as to the meaning of the ‘Rule of Law’. By focusing on the ignored value of adversarial proceedings, it demonstrates how Bingham’s celebrated analysis of the Rule of Law is flawed and its list of ‘ingredients’ left wanting. In consequence, it argues that those transformative initiatives conceived outside formal adversary structures (including the Judges’ Rules, state-induced guilty pleas, and the CrimPR) cannot meet the tests of legitimate policy-making or the rule of law. The chapter ends by looking beyond the debate on judicial law-making in order to address a related deep-seated problem that arises from judges’ involvement in setting criminal justice policy: their entrenched homogeneity.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 428-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Devin O. Pendas

The Nuremberg Trial may well be the most famous trial of the twentieth century, which is as it should be. After all, the Nuremberg Trial, while perhaps not as unprecedented as is frequently assumed, did mark a decisive turning point in the history of international law. It marked the first broadly successful attempt to impose the rule of law not just on the conduct of war but also, in a limited way, on domestic atrocities as well. The fame of this single trial has had the unfortunate side-effect of overshadowing the literally thousands of other Nazi trials that took place after World War II, however. These additional trials can be divided into three categories: those that took place in the domestic courts of victim nations, those that took place in occupation courts, and, perhaps least well-known, those that took place inGermancourts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 009059172110397
Author(s):  
Paul Sagar

This essay has two purposes—first, to identify Adam Smith as intervening in the debate between Montesquieu and Hume regarding the nature, age, and robustness of English liberty. Whereas Montesquieu took English liberty to be old and fragile, Hume took it to be new and robust. Smith disagreed with both: it was older than Hume supposed, but not fragile in the way Montesquieu claimed. The reason for this was the importance of the common law in England’s legal history. Seeing this enables the essay’s second purpose: achieving a more thorough and nuanced understanding of Smith’s account of liberty. This requires us to go beyond repeating Smith’s famous claim that modern liberty was the result of the feudal barons trading away their wealth and power for inane status goods. As I demonstrate, this is only one part of a much wider story: of liberty requiring, and also being constituted by, the rise of the regular administration of justice, and ultimately the rule of law. Although Smith’s history of the English courts and common law has been almost entirely neglected by scholars, it is indispensable to understanding both his reply to Montesquieu and Hume and his wider political theory of modern freedom.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-388
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby

This article, first delivered at The University of Queensland as the Naida Haxton AM Oration 2019, explores some of the components of the rule of law. It starts with building blocks in the common law system, including law reporting for the derivation of precedents. It describes the notable career of Naida Haxton and her approach to law reporting. It then extends to municipal and international law, including that relevant to universal human rights. In that connection, it describes the author’s work as chair of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korea. It explains its successes and disappointments. Finally, it concludes with the importance of building effective protections for peace and security and justice, including addressing existential challenges such as pandemics, global climate change, and the control of nuclear weapons. The author argues that these components of the rule of law are ultimately integrated and essential to the safety and protection of human beings and the biosphere everywhere.


1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-247
Author(s):  
Marcel Brus

From 26 to 29 June the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries convened at the premisses of the Peace Palace in The Hague to discuss the issue of peace and the rule of law in international affairs. This meeting was the start of a campaign for aDecade of International Law. This was the first occasion that an extraordinary ministerial conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was not held in one of its member countries. The Hague was chosen to underline the historic ties between this city and the (early) development of international law. This year it will be 90 years ago that the First Hague Peace Conference was held on the initiative of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia. This conference (together with the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907) became a landmark in the history of the codification of international law and especially the development of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of international disputes between states. The two most important conventions that were adopted at that conference were the Convention with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land and the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.


Author(s):  
Anthony Carty

The view that no form of international law existed in seventeenth-century France, and that this time was a part of ‘prehistory’, and thus irrelevant for international legal thought today is challenged. In addition, the traditional claim of Richelieu to be an admirer of Machiavelli and his Ragion di Stato doctrine to the detriment of the aim of concluding treaties and keeping them (as sacred), is refuted by careful historical research. In Richelieu’s thinking, there is a role for law to play but it is law as justice, law in the classical natural law tradition. Those who rule are subject to the rule of law as justice, the rule of God, or the rule of reason. In Richelieu’s world, kings and ministers are rational instruments of the practical implementation of God’s will on earth.


1992 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Nardin

In this paper I am going to argue a familiar but still controversial thesis about the relation between international ethics and international law, which I would sum up in the following list of propositions:First, international law is a source as well as an object of ethical judgements. The idea of legality or the rule of law is an ethical one, and international law has ethical significance because it gives institutional expression to the rule of law in international relations.Secondly, international law—or, more precisely, the idea of the rule of law in international relations—reflects a rule-oriented rather than outcome-oriented ethic of international affairs. By insisting on the priority of rules over outcomes, this ethic rejects consequentialism in all its forms.


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