scholarly journals Confianza y cooperación. Una perspectiva evolutiva

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Acedo ◽  
Antoni Gomila
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Hominid Evolution ◽  
Trust Relationships ◽  
Normative Expectations

RESUMENEn esta contribución pretendemos reivindicar la necesidad de tener en cuenta las relaciones de confianza a la hora de tratar de entender la evolución de la cooperación. En este artículo, tras motivar el interés de tener en cuenta el papel de la confianza en la evolución de la cooperación, revisamos el concepto de confianza, como una actitud compleja que presupone vinculación afectiva y expectativas normativas, y proponemos una tipología que permite ordenar su variedad. Sostenemos que la complejidad de la cooperación humana tiene que ver con la manera en que los homínidos desarrollaron el andamiaje psicológico que hizo posible la confianza, y tratamos de proponer un escenario de su origen.PALABRAS CLAVECONFIANZA, COOPERACIÓN, EVOLUCIÓN SOCIALABSTRACTIn this paper we contend that trust has to be taken into account to explain the evolution of human cooperation. After showing that current models within evolutionary game theory overlook the role of trust, we offer our understanding of this concept, as a complex attitude that involves affective filiations and normative expectations, and put forward a typology of kinds of trust. We argue that the complexity of human cooperation was made possible in the psychological scaffolding that characterizes hominid evolution and made trust relationships possible. We also advance an hypothesis about the origin of trust.KEYWORDSTRUST, COOPERATION, SOCIAL EVOLUTION

scholarly journals Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory

PLoS ONE ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. e0140646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Di Stefano ◽  
Marialisa Scatà ◽  
Aurelio La Corte ◽  
Pietro Liò ◽  
Emanuele Catania ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yidan Chen ◽  
Lanying Sun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trust Relationships

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

scholarly journals Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Genetic Interactions ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Hamilton’S Rule ◽  
Analytical Approaches ◽  
Hamilton's Rule

The evolution of social traits remains one of the most fascinating and feisty topics in evolutionary biology even after half a century of theoretical research. W. D. Hamilton shaped much of the field initially with his 1964 papers that laid out the foundation for understanding the effect of genetic relatedness on the evolution of social behavior. Early theoretical investigations revealed two critical assumptions required for Hamilton's rule to hold in dynamical models: weak selection and additive genetic interactions. However, only recently have analytical approaches from population genetics and evolutionary game theory developed sufficiently so that social evolution can be studied under the joint action of selection, mutation, and genetic drift. We review how these approaches suggest two timescales for evolution under weak mutation: (i) a short-term timescale where evolution occurs between a finite set of alleles, and (ii) a long-term timescale where a continuum of alleles are possible and populations evolve continuously from one monomorphic trait to another. We show how Hamilton's rule emerges from the short-term analysis under additivity and how non-additive genetic interactions can be accounted for more generally. This short-term approach reproduces, synthesizes, and generalizes many previous results including the one-third law from evolutionary game theory and risk dominance from economic game theory. Using the long-term approach, we illustrate how trait evolution can be described with a diffusion equation that is a stochastic analogue of the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics. Peaks in the stationary distribution of the diffusion capture classic notions of convergence stability from evolutionary game theory and generally depend on the additive genetic interactions inherent in Hamilton's rule. Surprisingly, the peaks of the long-term stationary distribution can predict the effects of simple kinds of non-additive interactions. Additionally, the peaks capture both weak and strong effects of social payoffs in a manner difficult to replicate with the short-term approach. Together, the results from the short and long-term approaches suggest both how Hamilton's insight may be robust in unexpected ways and how current analytical approaches can expand our understanding of social evolution far beyond Hamilton's original work.

scholarly journals Social evolution leads to persistent corruption

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (27) ◽  
pp. 13276-13281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joung-Hun Lee ◽  
Yoh Iwasa ◽  
Ulf Dieckmann ◽  
Karl Sigmund
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Analytical Methods ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Damped Oscillations

Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.

Corpus-Based Intention Recognition in Cooperation Dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Francisco C. Santos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Window Of Opportunity ◽  
Intention Recognition ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
Cognitive Cost

Intention recognition is ubiquitous in most social interactions among humans and other primates. Despite this, the role of intention recognition in the emergence of cooperative actions remains elusive. Resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory, herein we describe a computational model showing how intention recognition coevolves with cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping some individuals with the capacity of assessing the intentions of others in the course of a prototypical dilemma of cooperation—the repeated prisoner's dilemma—we show how intention recognition is favored by natural selection, opening a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive. We introduce a new strategy (IR) that is able to assign an intention to the actions of opponents, on the basis of an acquired corpus consisting of possible plans achieving that intention, as well as to then make decisions on the basis of such recognized intentions. The success of IR is grounded on the free exploitation of unconditional cooperators while remaining robust against unconditional defectors. In addition, we show how intention recognizers do indeed prevail against the best-known successful strategies of iterated dilemmas of cooperation, even in the presence of errors and reduction of fitness associated with a small cognitive cost for performing intention recognition.

scholarly journals The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Anderton
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Geographic Space ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Holocaust ◽  
Moore Neighborhood

A standard evolutionary game theory model is used to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a population that make it vulnerable to accepting the genocidal aims of political leaders. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, genocide architects can engineer the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people-group into one that supports, or does not resist, the architects’ atrocity goals. The model reveals policy interventions that prevent the social evolution of genocide among the population. The model is then extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in a Moore neighborhood. Key concepts of the analyses are applied to the onset and spread of genocide during the Holocaust (1938-1945) and to the prevention of genocide in Côte d'Ivoire (2011). [JEL codes: C73, D74]

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document