Group Discussion Effects on Conflict Behavior and Self-Justification

1976 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Myers ◽  
Paul J. Bach
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Research ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Group Discussion ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Social Conflicts ◽  
Group Polarization

Although most social conflicts involve opposing groups of people, experimental research on conflict behavior has almost exclusively utilized individual participants. The present research compared the conflict behavior of individuals and groups using an expanded prisoner's dilemma matrix cast in the language of an economic (gas war) simulation. There was no difference in the conflict behavior of individual and group players, both being highly noncooperative. But on post-experimental scales assessing subjects' evaluations of their own and opponent's behavior, individuals tended to justify their own behavior and groups were even more inclined toward self-justification. This result confirms the group polarization hypothesis and supports the contention of Janis (1972) that in situations of intergroup conflict, intragroup communication is likely to strengthen the group's perception of the inherent morality of its actions.

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of A Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_part_2) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest-competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

Null Results for the Steal-Framing Effect on Out-Group Aggression

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Japanese University ◽  
Null Results ◽  
Group Members

Abstract Whether intergroup conflict is a necessary condition for the evolution of human prosociality has been a matter of debate. At the center of the debate is the coevolutionary model of parochial altruism—that human cooperation with in-group members has coevolved with aggression toward out-group members. Studies using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma–maximizing difference game to test the model have repeatedly shown that people do not exhibit out-group aggression, possibly because of an inappropriate operationalization and framing of out-group aggression. The coevolutionary model predicts out-group aggression when the actor understands that it will lead to the in-group’s benefit. However, in the game, such an aspect of out-group aggression that benefits the in-group is typically not well communicated to participants. Thus, this study tested the hypothesis that out-group aggression in the game would be promoted by a framing that emphasizes that attacking out-group members enhances the in-group’s gain. Results of two laboratory experiments with 176 Japanese university students in total showed that such a framing did not promote out-group aggression and individuals invested more money to cooperate with in-group members only, avoiding the strategy of cooperating with in-group members to harm out-group members. These results do not support the coevolutionary model.

scholarly journals Null results for the steal-framing effect on out-group aggression

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Japanese University ◽  
Null Results ◽  
Group Members

AbstractWhether intergroup conflict is a necessary condition for the evolution of human prosociality has been a matter of debate. At the center of the debate is the coevolutionary model of parochial altruism—that human cooperation with in-group members has coevolved with aggression toward out-group members. Studies using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma–maximizing difference game to test the model have repeatedly shown that people do not exhibit out-group aggression, possibly because of an inappropriate operationalization and framing of out-group aggression. The coevolutionary model predicts out-group aggression when the actor understands that it will lead to the in-group’s benefit. However, in the game, such an aspect of out-group aggression that benefits the in-group is typically not well communicated to participants. Thus, this study tested the hypothesis that out-group aggression in the game would be promoted by a framing that emphasizes that attacking out-group members enhances the in-group’s gain. Results of two laboratory experiments with 176 Japanese university students in total showed that such a framing did not promote out-group aggression and individuals invested more money to cooperate with in-group members only, avoiding the strategy of cooperating with in-group members to harm out-group members. These results do not support the coevolutionary model.

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of a Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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