scholarly journals Null results for the steal-framing effect on out-group aggression

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Japanese University ◽  
Null Results ◽  
Group Members

AbstractWhether intergroup conflict is a necessary condition for the evolution of human prosociality has been a matter of debate. At the center of the debate is the coevolutionary model of parochial altruism—that human cooperation with in-group members has coevolved with aggression toward out-group members. Studies using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma–maximizing difference game to test the model have repeatedly shown that people do not exhibit out-group aggression, possibly because of an inappropriate operationalization and framing of out-group aggression. The coevolutionary model predicts out-group aggression when the actor understands that it will lead to the in-group’s benefit. However, in the game, such an aspect of out-group aggression that benefits the in-group is typically not well communicated to participants. Thus, this study tested the hypothesis that out-group aggression in the game would be promoted by a framing that emphasizes that attacking out-group members enhances the in-group’s gain. Results of two laboratory experiments with 176 Japanese university students in total showed that such a framing did not promote out-group aggression and individuals invested more money to cooperate with in-group members only, avoiding the strategy of cooperating with in-group members to harm out-group members. These results do not support the coevolutionary model.

Null Results for the Steal-Framing Effect on Out-Group Aggression

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Japanese University ◽  
Null Results ◽  
Group Members

Abstract Whether intergroup conflict is a necessary condition for the evolution of human prosociality has been a matter of debate. At the center of the debate is the coevolutionary model of parochial altruism—that human cooperation with in-group members has coevolved with aggression toward out-group members. Studies using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma–maximizing difference game to test the model have repeatedly shown that people do not exhibit out-group aggression, possibly because of an inappropriate operationalization and framing of out-group aggression. The coevolutionary model predicts out-group aggression when the actor understands that it will lead to the in-group’s benefit. However, in the game, such an aspect of out-group aggression that benefits the in-group is typically not well communicated to participants. Thus, this study tested the hypothesis that out-group aggression in the game would be promoted by a framing that emphasizes that attacking out-group members enhances the in-group’s gain. Results of two laboratory experiments with 176 Japanese university students in total showed that such a framing did not promote out-group aggression and individuals invested more money to cooperate with in-group members only, avoiding the strategy of cooperating with in-group members to harm out-group members. These results do not support the coevolutionary model.

Group Discussion Effects on Conflict Behavior and Self-Justification

1976 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Myers ◽  
Paul J. Bach
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Research ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Group Discussion ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Social Conflicts ◽  
Group Polarization

Although most social conflicts involve opposing groups of people, experimental research on conflict behavior has almost exclusively utilized individual participants. The present research compared the conflict behavior of individuals and groups using an expanded prisoner's dilemma matrix cast in the language of an economic (gas war) simulation. There was no difference in the conflict behavior of individual and group players, both being highly noncooperative. But on post-experimental scales assessing subjects' evaluations of their own and opponent's behavior, individuals tended to justify their own behavior and groups were even more inclined toward self-justification. This result confirms the group polarization hypothesis and supports the contention of Janis (1972) that in situations of intergroup conflict, intragroup communication is likely to strengthen the group's perception of the inherent morality of its actions.

A Strategy with Novel Evolutionary Features for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawei Li ◽  
Graham Kendall
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Features ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Identification Mechanism ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

In recent iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments, the most successful strategies were those that had identification mechanisms. By playing a predetermined sequence of moves and learning from their opponents' responses, these strategies managed to identify their opponents. We believe that these identification mechanisms may be very useful in evolutionary games. In this paper one such strategy, which we call collective strategy, is analyzed. Collective strategies apply a simple but efficient identification mechanism (that just distinguishes themselves from other strategies), and this mechanism allows them to only cooperate with their group members and defect against any others. In this way, collective strategies are able to maintain a stable population in evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma. By means of an invasion barrier, this strategy is compared with other strategies in evolutionary dynamics in order to demonstrate its evolutionary features. We also find that this collective behavior assists the evolution of cooperation in specific evolutionary environments.

scholarly journals Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing: Evaluating the Dual-Process Account in North America and Bulgaria

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolay R. Rachev ◽  
Sandra Jeanette Geiger ◽  
Jáchym Vintr ◽  
Desislava Kirilova Kirilova ◽  
Anna Nabutovsky ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
University Students ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Factor Analyses ◽  
Confirmatory Factor Analyses ◽  
Confirmatory Factor ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Within Subjects

The framing effect occurs when different presentations of the same problem lead to predictably different preferences. The dual-process framework of higher cognition assumes that the effect violates rational principles, but alternative accounts and recent evidence have contested this interpretation. Contributing to this debate, we tested the dual-process assumption by investigating associations between susceptibility to framing and the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms, conceptualized as actively open-minded thinking and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. We conducted two online studies among North American (N = 259) and Bulgarian (N = 248) university students and administered several framing problems within subjects, presumably a necessary condition for the associations to appear. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that susceptibility to framing was associated with decreased actively open-minded thinking and increased bullshit receptivity in both sites. Exploratory multi-group analyses demonstrated partial strong invariance and showed that the findings generalize across both sites in terms of direction and partially in terms of magnitude. These results broadly support the dual-process account of the framing effect. Our study further contributes to adapting existing measures to a novel setting and expanding the findings across borders and populations.

scholarly journals Aggression, fast and slow: Intuition also favors defensive aggression

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Zachary Ingbretsen ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman ◽  
Mina Cikara
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Scientific Literature ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Social Encounters ◽  
Opposite View

In certain threatening social encounters, humans seem to act distrustfully, uncooperatively, even aggressively by default, and must reason themselves towards comity and moderation. Yet, the contemporary scientific literature mostly supports the opposite view, according to which we are “intuitively prosocial”: acting cooperatively by default in positive-sum interactions in games such as the Prisoner’s dilemma. Could a change in the nature of the game elicit a different profile of default behavior? Across four studies we investigate whether intuition might also favor defensive aggression. We develop a “pre-emptive strike game” in which two players make a series of decisions about whether to live-and-let-live, or instead pay a small cost to imposing a large cost on the other player, knocking them out of the game. In this setting we find that default aggression prevails. Moreover, this aggressive tendency can be overridden when playing the game against in-group members, but tends not to be when playing against out-group members. In short, when faced with a social partner who may choose to harm them, people default towards defensive aggression.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document