scholarly journals The Brexit Fiasco and the Failure of Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitja Kovac

Abstract Modern game theory and the economic theory of federalism may offer an alternative view on the Brexit fiasco, in which the British government should not bear exclusive responsibility for current disaster. Moreover, the design of Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains an intrinsic dysfunctional mechanism that generates irrational strategies. Article 50 is underdeveloped and should be redrafted. The two-year deadline provision should be replaced with a reasonable time period and should provide for a third-party dispute resolution mechanism in instances where free negotiations between the EU and the withdrawing Member State in the reasonable time period fail to achieve a winwin solution. This article also argues that the current sub-optimal institutional framework on the vertical and horizontal division of competences might be an additional generator of Euroscepticism. In order to prevent the decline of public support the EU should do less in current fields and should do much more in fields where it failed to exercise its authority and which cannot be addressed effectively at the local levels. The EU should redesign itself as an institution that mitigates broad potential sources of negative externalities, reinforcing the rule of law, protecting liberal democracy with all related civil liberties, reinforcing its political-global dimension, protecting its common cultural heritage, and combating destructive nationalisms, isolationisms and cultural introspections.

Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). The Withdrawal Agreement, adopted on the basis of Article 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU), spells out the terms and conditions of the UK departure from the EU, including ground-breaking solutions to deal with the thorniest issues which emerged in the context of the withdrawal negotiations. Admittedly, the Withdrawal Agreement is only a part of the Brexit deal. The Agreement, in fact, is accompanied by a connected political declaration, which outlines the framework of future EU–UK relations. The chapter then offers a chronological summary of the process that led to the adoption of the Withdrawal Agreement, describing the crucial stages in the Brexit process — from the negotiations to the conclusion of a draft agreement and its rejection, to the extension and the participation of the UK to European Parliament (EP) elections, to the change of UK government and the ensuing constitutional crisis, to the new negotiations with the conclusion of a revised agreement, new extension, and new UK elections eventually leading to the departure of the UK from the EU.


Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter focuses on the current interaction between European Union and UK law. EU law is currently a source of UK law. However, the relationship between the two regimes is expected to change in the future as a consequence of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stipulates that the European Communities Act 1972 will be ‘repealed on exit day’, which would be 29 March 2019 provided that the two-year period since Article 50 TEU was triggered is not extended. Once the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed, EU law will cease to be a source of UK law. No major immediate changes to the national competition legislation are to be expected, but future reforms could distance the UK system from the EU rules.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 67-68
Author(s):  
Federico Ortino

Even when it comes to investment, despite appearances to the contrary, it does not seem to me that there is a shift to the non-discrimination principle. First, there is no doubt that absolute standards such as fair and equitable treatment or the provision on expropriation have by far overshadowed the relative standards, in particular national treatment. Second, while the MFN standard has, on the other hand, been a key provision in investment treaty arbitration, particularly as an instrument to expand the scope of the ISDS system (based on more favorable provisions found in third-party treaties), there are clear signs in recent investment treaties of the willingness to curtail the use of the MFN provision as a way to extend the procedural and substantive protections of investors. This seems to be the current position, for example, of both the United States and the European Union (EU). Third, when it comes to the apparent disappearance of the absolute standards of treatment in some of the treaties being negotiated by the European Union (such as with Japan), this is more simply due to a question of the nature of the EU external competence in commercial matters. In its recent opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA, the Court of Justice of the EU has determined that the EU does not have exclusive competence to conclude agreements covering non-FDI and ISDS. The EU has thus responded to such opinion by splitting investment protection (with ISDS) from the rest of the trade agreement, thus keeping investment liberalization (including market access and national treatment) in the latter. In this way, while the trade agreement will fall under the exclusive competence of the EU, the former will still require ratification by each member state. While it is not clear whether the backlash vis-à-vis investment protection and ISDS in some quarters within some of the member states will eventually lead to the end of EU investment treaties, a decision in this sense has not yet been taken by EU institutions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Vincents Olsen ◽  
Christian F. Rostbøll

The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all-affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the ‘all-affected status principle’ that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it is undemocratic for a member state such as the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 841
Author(s):  
Gabriel Mengual Pujante

Resumen: La promesa de hecho ajeno es una modalidad contractual ampliamente conocida en la Unión Europa y, a su vez, paradigma de uno de los principios fundamentales del Derecho privado: la relatividad de los contratos. Desde una perspectiva axiológica y práctica, el operador jurídico debe conocer el escenario que puede devengarse en un supuesto internacional. Por ello, resulta oportuno trazar una aproximación al sector de la competencia judicial internacional en el Derecho Internacional Privado de la UE.Palabras clave: promesa de hecho ajeno, relatividad de los contratos, Reglamento Bruselas I-bis, contrato de prestación de servicios, competencia judicial internacional.Abstract: The promise of a third party´s fact is a contractual modality widely known in the European Union and, in turn, paradigm of one of the fundamental principles of private law: the relativity of contracts. From an axiological and practical perspective, the legal operator must know the landscape that may arise in an international case. For this reason, it is appropriate to draw an approximation to the sector of the international judicial competence in the EU Private International Law.Keywords: promise of a third party´s fact, relativity of contracts, Brussels Regulation I-bis, contract for the provision of services, international judicial competence.


Author(s):  
Catherine Barnard ◽  
Emilija Leinarte

This chapter addresses the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement dealing with the protection of citizens’ rights. It explains the scope of application and the content of the rights afforded to EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU after Brexit. The chapter also looks at the enforcement of citizens’ rights, both in the EU and the UK. While the rights of EU citizens already in the UK, and rights of UK citizens in the EU, are fairly generously protected under the WA, the mechanism for enforcement of such rights raises questions of effectiveness. Moreover, the special jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement, while a logical outcome from the perspective of EU constitutional law, will disappoint those who supported the UK government’s insistence that ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU was one of the UK’s red lines during the Article 50 TEU negotiations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 409-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Gordon

The United Kingdom 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union – challenges of pursuing the decision to withdraw – challenges for the UK constitution in commencing, executing, concluding, and legitimising EU withdrawal – domestic constitutional requirements for triggering Article 50 TEU – roles of UK government, UK Parliament, and devolved institutions in Brexit – a second referendum or a national general election on withdrawal terms – exiting the EU as a challenge of the UK’s political constitution – Brexit as exposing limitations of the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and architecture – Brexit as an unprecedented event and the centrality of politics – constitutional factors contributing to the outcome of the referendum – concerns about sovereignty and the (im)possibility of a national response – potential implications of the referendum for the UK and for the EU


1997 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-53
Author(s):  
N.S.J. Baxter

In February 1992 the Treaty of European Union was signed at Maastricht. It committed member States to new Community goals which included increasing government cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy along with justice and home affairs (Steiner, 1994). The following “pillars” to develop the Union were identified. First of all, the protection of the rights and interests of people was strengthened by introducing citizenship of the European Union (EU); secondly a commitment was made to implement a common foreign and security policy indicated a movement towards a common defence of the Union against third party States. The third pillar seeks to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring their safety and security through member States, by working closely in the areas of justice and home affairs (Benyon et al, 1993). It is this latter aspect which has implications for policing within the EU.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-368
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer

The EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill completed its passage through Parliament and received Royal Assent on 16 March. On 29 March, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to the European Union, Tim Barrow, handed over the Prime Minister's formal letter of notification under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union to the President of the European Council, thereby triggering the withdrawal process. Inevitably, however, the period since the last report was dominated not so much by Brexit as by the unexpected General Election.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 512-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aileen McHarg ◽  
James Mitchell

In the 2016 Brexit referendum, Scotland voted decisively to Remain in the EU, while a UK-wide majority voted to Leave. This article discusses responses to the constitutional significance of a territorially divided result, both prior to and following the referendum, including in litigation over the ‘constitutional requirements’ necessary to trigger the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 TEU ( R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union). It considers what these debates reveal about the uncertain and contested nature of the UK’s territorial constitution, focusing on issues of constitutional security for devolved institutions and competences, and constitutional voice for the devolved territories in handling issues of intertwined competence. It argues that the Brexit episode reveals major weaknesses in the dominant reliance on political mechanisms to give recognition to the constitutional significance of devolution, which do not adequately displace continued legal adherence to the assumptions of a unitary constitution.


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