scholarly journals Concurrent Games in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Author(s):  
Bastien Maubert ◽  
Sophie Pinchinat ◽  
Francois Schwarzentruber ◽  
Silvia Stranieri

Action models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) represent precisely how actions are perceived by agents. DEL has recently been used to define infinite multi-player games, and it was shown that they can be solved in some cases. However, the dynamics being defined by the classic DEL update product for individual actions, only turn-based games have been considered so far. In this work we define a concurrent DEL product, propose a mechanism to resolve conflicts between actions, and define concurrent DEL games. As in the turn-based case, the obtained concurrent infinite game arenas can be finitely represented when all actions are public, or all are propositional. Thus we identify cases where the strategic epistemic logic ATL*K can be model checked on such games.

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1213-1238
Author(s):  
Dominik Klein ◽  
Rasmus K Rendsvig

Abstract The paper analyses dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the Stone topology, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action model transformations continuous with respect to the Stone topology and present results on the recurrent behaviour of said maps. Among the recurrence results, we show maps induced by finite action models may have uncountably many recurrent points, even when initiated on a finite input model. Several recurrence results draws on the class of action models being Turing complete, for which the paper provides proof in the postcondition-free case. As upper bounds, it is shown that either 1 atom, 3 agents and preconditions of modal depth 18 or 1 atom, 7 agents and preconditions of modal depth 3 suffice for Turing completeness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARTELD KOOI ◽  
BRYAN RENNE

We presentArrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 1071-1097
Author(s):  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Wiebe van der Hoek ◽  
Christos Moyzes ◽  
Michael Wooldridge

Abstract We develop a logic for reasoning about semi-public environments , i.e. environments in which a process is executing, and where agents in the environment have partial and potentially different views of the process. Previous work on this problem illustrated that it was problematic to obtain both an adequate semantic model and a language for reasoning about semi-public environments. We here use program models for representing the changes that occur during the execution of a program. These models serve both as syntactic objects and as semantic models, and are a modification of action models in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in the sense that they allow for ontic change (i.e. change in the world or state). We show how program models can elegantly capture a notion of observation of the environment. The use of these models resolves several difficulties identified in earlier work, and admit a much simpler treatment than was possible in previous work on semi-public environments.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Folhadela Benevides ◽  
Isaque Macalam Saab Lima

This work proposes an extension of Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Communication Actions by adding the notion of postconditions from Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Assigments to deal with boolean assignments to action models. Other concurrent logics, like Concurrent Epistemic Action Logic introduced by Ditmarsch, Hoek and Kooi, do not deal with boolean assignments. We present an axiomatization and show that the proof of soundness, completeness and decidability can be done using a reduction method.


Author(s):  
Bastien Maubert ◽  
Sophie Pinchinat ◽  
François Schwarzentruber

We define reachability games based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), where the players? actions are finely described as DEL action models. We first consider the setting where a controller with perfect information interacts with an environment and aims at reaching some desired state of knowledge regarding the observers of the system. We study the problem of existence of a strategy for the controller, which generalises the classic epistemic planning problem, and we solve it for several types of actions such as public announcements and public actions. We then consider a yet richer setting where observers themselves are players, whose strategies must be based on their observations. We establish several decidability and undecidability results for the problem of existence of a distributed strategy, depending on the type of actions the players can use, and relate them to results from the literature on multiplayer games with imperfect information.


Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Ditmarsch ◽  
W. Van Der Hoek ◽  
B. P. Kooi

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates.


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