scholarly journals La valeur de la connaissance des émotions

Labyrinth ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Bertille De Vlieger
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Emotional Knowledge

The Value of the Emotional Knowledge Emotional knowledge is a form of self-knowledge which holds great interest for ordinary individuals. It is not obtained by any obligation but rather because we think it is crucial to obtain (Cassam 2017). In this article it is a matter of demonstrating that emotional knowledge holds an instrumental and a prudential value. By arguing that it can allow a control over our emotions, I shall maintain that emotional knowledge affects individual marginalization or acceptance in society. In addition, this type of knowledge is revealing of our personality by allowing us to identify our affective identities. Finally, I shall defend the idea that emotional knowledge contributes to the conduct of a good life. As such, my hypothesis could be viewed as incompatible with widespread ideas (Montaigne 2019), according to which the knowledge of our own emotions can trigger negative emotional states, e.g. mental rumination, anxiety, that do not contribute to our well-being.  

Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Individual Good ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Good For

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?

An Analysis of Prudential Value

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Relationship

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.

scholarly journals The Prudential Value of Autonomy

2020 ◽  
pp. 234-258
Author(s):  
Jonathan Pugh
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Central Values ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Respect For Autonomy ◽  
Special Value

The principle of respect for autonomy is undeniably afforded particular salience in Western bioethics. At least part of the reason for this is that autonomy is often understood to have a central role in the good life. In this chapter, the author argues that autonomy does not have merely instrumental prudential value; instead, autonomy is at least partly constitutive of well-being, since there is a special value in living a life that is one’s own. He defends a well-known argument that speaks in favour of this conclusion, before going on to consider the value of different elements of autonomy, according to the framework adopted in this book. The author concludes by assessing how autonomy can conflict with other central values in bioethics, and how the claim that autonomy has significant prudential value has important implications for how we should understand the concept of beneficence in bioethics.

Assessment of health related issues in individuals’, couples’, and families’ daily life

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 146-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meinrad Perrez ◽  
Michael Reicherts ◽  
Yves Hänggi ◽  
Andrea B. Horn ◽  
Gisela Michel ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Emotion Regulation ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Ecological Validity ◽  
Reliability And Validity ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Computer Assisted ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Self Reports ◽  
Health Related ◽  
Lower Variability

Abstract. Most research in health psychology is based on retrospective self reports, which are distorted by recall biases and have low ecological validity. To overcome such limitations we developed computer assisted diary approaches to assess health related behaviours in individuals’, couples’ and families’ daily life. The event- and time-sampling-based instruments serve to assess appraisals of the current situation, feelings of physical discomfort, current emotional states, conflict and emotion regulation in daily life. They have proved sufficient reliability and validity in the context of individual, couple and family research with respect to issues like emotion regulation and health. As examples: Regarding symptom reporting curvilinear pattern of frequencies over the day could be identified by parents and adolescents; or psychological well-being is associated with lower variability in basic affect dimensions. In addition, we report on preventive studies to improve parental skills and enhance their empathic competences towards their baby, and towards their partner.

Challenges and opportunities for the affective sciences.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew S. Fox ◽  
Regina Lapate ◽  
Alexander J. Shackman ◽  
Richard J Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
Core Feature ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Improved Methods ◽  
Health And Well Being

Emotion is a core feature of the human condition, with profound consequences for health, wealth, and wellbeing. Over the past quarter-century, improved methods for manipulating and measuring different features of emotion have yielded steady advances in our scientific understanding emotional states, traits, and disorders. Yet, it is clear that most of the work remains undone. Here, we highlight key challenges facing the field of affective sciences. Addressing these challenges will provide critical opportunities not just for understanding the mind, but also for increasing the impact of the affective sciences on public health and well-being.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of the ‘good life’: eudaimonic well-being is associated with insular cortex volume

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 615-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Lewis ◽  
Ryota Kanai ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
Timothy C. Bates
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Insular Cortex ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
The Good Life

Understanding and Counseling the Chronic Drug User

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Wayne W. Dyer ◽  
John Vriend
Keyword(s):  
Drug User ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Emotional States

Effectively understanding and counseling the chronic drug user and others who are dependent upon agents and substances outside themselves to bring about affects of well being and more positive emotional states in their lives requires that the counselor understand how emotions and sensations occur, and what their relationship is to internal and external thinking. The authors present a paradigm of external and internal thinking as these apply as causes for positive and negative emotional shifts. The concepts of internally and externally oriented thinking and behaving are discussed, and these are related to counseling the dependent drug user. Finally, strategies for dealing with the dependent drug user, always an externally oriented person, are presented.

A Critique of Raz’s Liberal Perfectionism: Morality and Politics

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-364
Author(s):  
Bi‐Hwan Kim
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Liberal Perfectionism

Joseph Raz Has Long Been Well Known as a Legal philosopher and theorist of practical reason. But it is only in the last decade that he has come to be widely identified as the most prominent defender of a distinctive interpretation of the liberal tradition. Raz wholeheartedly endorses the communitarian view that the individual is a social being, who needs society to establish his/her self-identity and to gain objective knowledge of the good, rather than a self-contained subject abstracted from any specific social experience. Unlike neutralist liberals, such as Rawls and Dworkin, he rejects ‘the priority of right over the good’, stressing the interdependent relationship between right and the good. Yet he remains very much a liberal in his commitment to the value of autonomy (or freedom) and argues powerfully for the desirability (or necessity) of incommensurable plural conceptions of the good life for the well-being of people, as well as for the liberal virtue of toleration, and for their attendant liberal democratic political institutions.

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