scholarly journals Kant e a Vontade: um percurso pela “Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes”

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-60
Author(s):  
Lindoaldo Campos
Keyword(s):  
Rio De Janeiro ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Supreme Principle

Resumo: Para Kant, a moral encontra fundamento nas determinações da faculdade volitiva, que, por sua vez, possui profundas implicações com as ideias de dever e liberdade. Sob esta perspectiva, norteado pelo lineamento constante de sua Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, o presente escrito intenta acompanhar o desenvolvimento de suas reflexões sobre a vontade, com o propósito de oferecer um incipiente contributo para a compreensão dos fundamentos em que se assenta o princípio supremo da moralidade que Kant tenciona fixar.  Palavras-chave: Kant. Moral. Vontade.   Abstract: For Kant, the morality finds foundation in the determinations of the volitional faculty, which, in turn, has deep implications with the ideas of duty and freedom. In this perspective, guided by the constant line of its Grounding of the metaphysics of morals, the present paper tries to follow the development of its reflections on the will, with the purpose of offering an incipient contribution to the understanding of the foundations on which the supreme principle of morality that Kant intends to fix.  Keywords: Kant. Morality. Will. REFERÊNCIASARISTÓTELES.Ética a Nicômacos. Tradução de Mário da Gama Kury. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1992, 3ª ed._______. Ética a Nicômaco (Livro VI). Tradução de Lucas Angioni [Dissertatio, UNICAMP/CNPq, 2011] Disponível em: http://unicamp.academia.edu/LucasAngioni>. Acesso em: 21 fev. 2016._______. Metafísica. Edição em grego-latim-espanhol, por Valentin Garcia Yebra. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1987.GADAMER, Hans-Georg. “Filosofia ou teoria da ciência?”. In:_____. A razão na época da ciência. Tradução de Ângela Dias. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Edições Tempo Brasileiro, 1983, p. 88-105.NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studenausgabe (KSA), vol. 6. Edição de Giorgio Colli e M. Montinari. Berlin/N. York, dtv/de Gruyter, 1988._______. Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studenausgabe (KSA), vol. 12. Edição de Giorgio Colli e M. Montinari. Berlin/N. York, dtv/de Gruyter, 2008.PLATÃO. A república. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000. 3ª ed._______. Protágoras. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000a. 3ª ed._______. Teeteto. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2001. 3ª ed. 

The Derivation without the Gap: Rethinking Groundwork I

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 18-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berys Gaut ◽  
Samuel Kerstein
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Supreme Principle

At the core of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals lies his ‘derivation’ of the categorical imperative: his attempt to establish that, if there is a supreme principle of morality, then it is this imperative. Kant's argument for this claim is one of the most puzzling in his corpus. The received view, championed by Aune and Allison, is that there is a fundamental gap in the argument, which Kant elides by means of a simple but deadly confusion, thus robbing the argument of all validity. We will here contest the received view, as well as Korsgaard's alternative interpretation of the argument. In place of these positions we will offer a reconstruction of the derivation which reveals its coherence and force. We will show that it illuminates some interesting grounds for rejecting certain candidates, including a utilitarian principle, for status as the supreme principle of morality. While certainly not free of all defects, the argument will be shown to be far more powerful and interesting than it has commonly been held to be.

Mental Faculties, the Moral Law, and Human Motivation

2021 ◽  
pp. 38-60
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
General Introduction ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Practical Principle ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

This chapter addresses the following topics pertaining to Section II of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals: 1. Kant’s conception of the faculty of desire and its relation to the faculties of feeling and cognition; 2. The significance of Kant’s distinction between will and choice in relation to human freedom of the will; 3. The distinction between maxims and imperatives as two fundamental types of practical principle; and 4. Kant’s conception of both nonmoral and moral motivation—the latter fundamental for understanding Kant’s theory of virtue. The chapter establishes Kant’s background ideas on these ideas and faculties and also addresses aspects of his theory of action.

From Deduction to Deed: Kant's Grounding of the Moral Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sussman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Intelligible World ◽  
Supreme Principle

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents the moral law as the sole ‘fact of pure reason’ that neither needs nor admits of a deduction to establish its authority. This claim may come as a surprise to many readers of his earlier Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the last section of the Groundwork, Kant seemed to offer a sketch of just such a ‘deduction of the supreme principle of morality’ (GMS 4: 463). Although notoriously obscure, this sketch shows that Kant hoped to base the moral law in the freedom that rational agents can claim as members of the ‘intelligible world’ that transcendental idealism makes available to us. In contrast, the second Critique abandons all aspirations of deriving morality from more basic notions of freedom and practical rationality.

The Groundwork

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-27
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Practical Standpoint ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Common ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

This essay notes background in Kant’s first Critique, reviews the aims and arguments of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals section by section, and calls attention to several remaining questions and controversies. The Preface states the overall aim to identify the supreme principle of morality and to defend its claim to be rationally necessary. Section one uses common moral thought about duty and moral worth to identify the basic principle of a good will. Section two argues from the common idea of duty that this same principle is the supreme moral principle, that its requirements are expressed in several formulations, that this is the only possible Categorical Imperative, and that it presupposes that moral agents have autonomy of the will. The third section argues from a practical standpoint that we must take ourselves to be rational agents with autonomy of the will and therefore subject to the Categorical Imperative.

La morale kantienne et la philosophie transcendantale

Dialogue ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marceline Morais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
The Right

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to discuss the transcendental status of Kant's moral philosophy. Despite what is usually thought among scholars, we intend to demonstrate that morality for Kant is not part of transcendental philosophy. We shall at first recall the reasons that have driven Kant to separate morality from the transcendental philosophy. Kant's position seems both firm and clear: morality, although involving a priori concepts such as the moral law, is not a transcendantal knowledge because its major concept, the will, is not pure enough; it refers somehow to experience. On the other hand, after considering the positions of renowned scholars such as Gueroult, Delbos, and Höffe, who claim that Kant's morality became partially or totally transcendantal since the writing of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, we suggest that Kant had then found the right way to establish on a critical basis a future metaphysics of morals.

Kant’s Formula of the Universal Law of Nature Reconsidered

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faviola Rivera-Castro
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Clear Distinction ◽  
Logical Interpretation ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Universal Law

I criticize the widely accepted “practical” interpretation of the universality test contained in Kant’s first formula of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – the formula of the universal law of nature. I argue that this interpretation does not work for contradictions in conception because it wrongly takes contradictions in the will as the model for them and, as a consequence, cannot establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction. This interpretation also assumes an understanding of universality that departs from Kant’s own and, cannot, for this reason, capture the kind of contradiction that he explicitly claims to establish. I provide an alternative interpretation, which I call revised logical interpretation, that allows us to account for contradictions in conception, including those examples that the practical interpretation cannot handle, as well as to establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction.

scholarly journals The Reciprocity Thesis in Kant and Hegel

1996 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 54-69
Author(s):  
Alan Patten
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Rational Agent ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Moral Will

Following Henry Allison's terminology in his book Kant's Theory of Freedom I shall take the reciprocity thesis to be the thesis that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts. To be free, the reciprocity thesis claims, is to be subject to the demands of morality; to be subject to the demands of morality is to be free. Despite quite different understandings of the domains of ethics and morality, Kant and Hegel both affirm versions of the reciprocity thesis. Kant's best known statement of the thesis can be found at the beginning of Chapter III of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: “a free will and a will under moral laws”, he asserts, “are one and the same. Consequently if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality, together with its principle, follows by mere analysis of the concept of freedom”. This assumption of reciprocity is an explicit premise in the subsequent argument that, since a rational agent must take himself to be free, he must consider himself subject to the moral law. And it reappears again in the Critique of Practical Reason's reversal of this argument, which claims that, since a rational agent has a sense of himself as subject to the moral law (the so-called “fact of reason”), he therefore has a consciousness of his freedom. Finally, it is worth noting that something like the reciprocity thesis underlies much of the argument of Chapters I and II of the Groundwork as well as the opening arguments of the second Critique: for in these texts Kant frequently moves directly from the proposition that the moral will must be determined independently of all of its desires and inclinations (it is free) to the conclusion that it must be subject to the moral law.

Knowledge and Evaluation

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Malinovich
Keyword(s):  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Evaluative Criteria ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Good For ◽  
Criteria For Evaluation ◽  
The Way

According to an accepted view of the nature of evaluation, which many trace to Hume, knowledge does not provide us with the criteria for judging whether something is good. For this, it is said, we need something like a pro-attitude such as C. L. Stevenson argues for, or a decision such as R. M. Hare argues for. Some act of the will is required to create the criteria for evaluation. I shall argue against this view. I shall argue that the criteria for evaluating something are identical with the criteria for classifying it and that, therefore, the knowledge which provides us with the criteria for classification provides us with the criteria for evaluation.In Section I, I give a brief account of the way in which knowledge provides the criteria for a classification and the significance of borderline cases and degree differences in classification. In Section II, I develop the idea of degree differences in classification and tie it to the idea of evaluation. In Section III, I defend my account of evaluative criteria by contrasting it with R. M. Hare's account, and I argue that the criteria for the class concept of man are at the basis of moral evaluation. I end with a brief illustration of my thesis from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals.

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