Perfect Duties to Oneself as an Animal Being

This chapter considers the category of duties to oneself as an animal being: duties to avoid suicide and forms of self-mutilation, sexual self-abuse, and drunkenness and gluttony. Kant’s arguments for the claim that each of these types of action is morally wrong appeals to the “humanity formula” of his supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative). Importantly, the role of teleology in some of Kant’s arguments is discussed and a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ teleology is introduced. The chapter argues that while Kant mentions the natural purpose of one’s sexual powers in his argument against sexual self-abuse, his argument does not depend on it. However, as explained in later chapters, Kant’s ethics does rely on appeals to moral teleology, referring to the moral end of self-perfection.

The Science of Ethics

In the introduction to The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant explains the bases for considering this doctrine a science. This involves articulating the principles that govern a scientific ethics and explaining how the science is organized. These matters are taken up in section 1, “The Science of Ethics” of this chapter. Kant also offers a justification of the supreme principle of morality pertaining to a doctrine of virtue as a doctrine of ends. This is the topic of section 2, “The Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue,” which Kant expresses as “Act according to a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.” An interpretation of Kant’s argument is spelled out and criticized. The concluding section raises a looming worry about Kant’s project of grounding an entire system of duties in the supreme principle, namely, that the principle lacks enough content to serve as the basis for genuine derivations.

What are We to Treat As an End? Kant’s Answer and Its Contemporary Relevance

A common point in today’s debates in various areas is that the consequences of accelerating anthropogenic changes, which include climate change and pan­demics, are challenging humanity, and that the latter requires protection. But un­derstanding should precede actions, otherwise the desire for security in a si­tuation of fear and ignorance can lead to measures with opposite results. In the attempts to provide philosophical meaning to our present condition the Kantian position is among the most respectable. “So act that you use human­ity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” - this formula of Kant’s categoricalimperative has become commonplace, it is explicitly and implicitly used as a supreme principle in many ethical arguments, declarations, conventions, char­ters, and codes. At the same time, the understanding of what Kant meant by hu­manity, as well as its autonomy and dignity, widely differs across different philo­sophical camps and schools. The purpose of this paper is to try to make this crucial concept of humanity more clear, first, by analyzing the context of Kant’s thought, second, by studying the use of the concept in Kant’s texts. The claim of the paper is that Kant unites in the concept of humanity four heterogeneous yet equally necessary meanings that enter complex relations and provide valuable insights into today’s discussions

Maqāṣid Al-Sharī‘at: The Main Reference and Ethical-Spiritual Foundation for the Dynamization Process of Islamic Law

The two primary and significant roles of maqāṣid al-sharī‘at worth studying are directive and defensive systems. The directive system, for instance, puts the maqāṣid al-sharī‘at as the main reference for any reformation or changing processes and dynamization of the Islamic law, whereas the latter places it as the supreme principle of morality that provides the foundation and ethical-spiritual power for Muslim Societies when they interact with the law. With these two roles, the maqāṣid al-sharī‘at can serve as a driving force to create future changes towards a more constructive and humanistic society. This study is library research which examines the maqāṣid al-sharī‘at from the time of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him) to this very day. It aims at elaborating the position of maqāṣid al-sharī‘at as the primary reference and ethical-spiritual foundation for the dynamization process of Islamic law in dealing with contemporary issues. It also examines the concept of maqāṣid al-sharī‘at and analyzes the flexibility, adaptability, and dynamic of Islamic law. In addition, it is intended to open the mind of those who claim that Islamic law is so immutable, doctrinal, eternal, and final. This means that Islamic law is assumed to be inadaptable to various forms of social changes and modernization. AbstrakPeran paling utama dan penting maqāṣid al-sharī‘at yang patut dipelajari adalah sistem direktif dan pertahanan. Sistem direktif, misalnya, menempatkan maqāṣid al-sharī‘at sebagai rujukan utama untuk setiap reformasi atau proses perubahan dan dinamisasi hukum Islam, sedangkan yang terakhir menempatkannya sebagai prinsip moralitas tertinggi yang memberikan landasan dan kekuatan etis-spiritual untuk masyarakat Muslim ketika mereka berinteraksi dengan hukum. Dengan dua peran tersebut, maqāṣid al-sharī‘at dapat menjadi pendorong perubahan masa depan menuju masyarakat yang lebih konstruktif dan humanistik. Penelitian pustaka ini meneliti maqāṣid al-sharī‘at dari masa Nabi Muhammad Saw. hingga hari ini. Hal ini bertujuan untuk menguraikan posisi maqāṣid al-sharī‘at sebagai acuan utama dan landasan etis-spiritual bagi dinamisasi proses hukum Islam dalam menghadapi persoalan kontemporer. Ini juga mengkaji konsep maqāṣid al-sharī‘at dan menganalisis fleksibilitas, kemampuan beradaptasi, dan dinamika hukum Islam. Selain itu, dimaksudkan untuk membuka pikiran mereka yang menyatakan bahwa hukum Islam begitu lestari, doktrinal, abadi, dan final sehingga dianggap tidak dapat beradaptasi dengan berbagai bentuk perubahan sosial dan modernisasi yang membawa banyak isu kekinian.

The metaphysical “monistic” approach of the Platonic Timaeus by the Neo-Platonist Proclus

In this article, we focus on Proclus' commentary on Plato's Timaeus (30a3-6) about how the divine Demiurge intervenes in matter. It is an interesting extract due to the fact that Proclus manages to combine philosophical perspective with theological interpretation and scientific analysis. In the six chapters of the article, we present the theory on dualism established by the representatives of Middle Platonism, we approach the question of the production of the corporeal hypostases, we examine limit and unlimited as productive powers, we explain production in the sense of co-production as well as why matter without qualities is excluded from the entire procedure, and we discuss the principle of the supremacy of the supreme Principle. The most important conclusion drawn according to Proclus, who adopts moderate skepticism, is that, although in his early dialogues Plato tends to dualism, he does this for methodological purposes, for Plato's views are actually connected with ontological monism.

A Contemporary Analysis of Kant’s Concept of Goodwill and the Categorical Imperative

This paper makes a contemporary appraisal of the concepts of the ‘Goodwill’ and the ‘Categorical Imperative’ in Kant’s formalistic, deontological ethics. Kant posits that the rightness of an act does not depend at all on the value of its consequences. For him, in order to know whether an act is right or wrong, we need only see whether it is in accordance with a valid moral rule. The test for a valid moral rule, as he conceives it, is purely formalistic. For a moral rule to be valid, it must pass the test of the foundational, supreme principle or ultimate criterion of morality, which Kant calls the “Categorical Imperative”. On this score, the paper, seeks to address the problem of ethical formalism and foundationalism associated with Kant’s theory in view of the contemporary challenge of ethical pluralism and destructive postmodernism. The objective of the paper is to reconcile with Kantianism with the contemporary shift from moral foundationalism and universalism to anti-foundationalism and relativism.

The Transcendental Deduction Gets Underway

This chapter is in three parts. The first part considers the aim of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, as presented in the second edition of the Critique. It claims programmatically that the aim of §15 to §20 is to disclose the necessary conditions of thinking, while that of the remaining sections—culminating in §26—is to show that these conditions make thinking possible insofar as they lay the foundation of a cosmology of experience. The second part of the chapter opens a two-chapter long study of Kant’s account of thinking and its conditions in the B-Deduction. It examines §15 and §16 of the B-Deduction and attempts to clarify Kant’s statement of the supreme principle of all human knowledge: the manifold of given representations must be brought under the synthetic unity of pure apperception. The third part of the chapter focuses on §17 and Kant’s conception of the relation between knowledge and its object. It compares and contrasts this conception with its counterpart in the Duisburg Nachlaß. It argues that §17 of the B-Deduction tries to correct the dubious idealism implied by the counterpart conception of the Duisburg Nachlaß.

Utilitarianism and Its Critics

Later defences of utilitarianism, by Lewis and Hare, support Sidgwick’s claim that the utilitarian outlook is the outlook of practical reason. They argue that the appropriate extension of sympathy requires imaginative identification with the pleasures and pains of other people, in a way that leads to the utilitarian attitude. Ross, however, argues that utilitarianism gives us neither a correct account of moral concepts nor a correct account of moral properties. When we consider what makes right actions right, we have good reason to agree with Price in rejecting utility as the supreme principle of morality. Rawls defends this argument against utilitarianism. To decide what our considered moral judgments commit us to, we describe fair conditions in which we can choose between different principles of justice. In these fair conditions we accept principles that conflict with utilitarianism, but conform to Kant’s principle of respect for persons as ends.

Kant e a Vontade: um percurso pela “Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes”

Resumo: Para Kant, a moral encontra fundamento nas determinações da faculdade volitiva, que, por sua vez, possui profundas implicações com as ideias de dever e liberdade. Sob esta perspectiva, norteado pelo lineamento constante de sua Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, o presente escrito intenta acompanhar o desenvolvimento de suas reflexões sobre a vontade, com o propósito de oferecer um incipiente contributo para a compreensão dos fundamentos em que se assenta o princípio supremo da moralidade que Kant tenciona fixar. Palavras-chave: Kant. Moral. Vontade. Abstract: For Kant, the morality finds foundation in the determinations of the volitional faculty, which, in turn, has deep implications with the ideas of duty and freedom. In this perspective, guided by the constant line of its Grounding of the metaphysics of morals, the present paper tries to follow the development of its reflections on the will, with the purpose of offering an incipient contribution to the understanding of the foundations on which the supreme principle of morality that Kant intends to fix. Keywords: Kant. Morality. Will. REFERÊNCIASARISTÓTELES.Ética a Nicômacos. Tradução de Mário da Gama Kury. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1992, 3ª ed._______. Ética a Nicômaco (Livro VI). Tradução de Lucas Angioni [Dissertatio, UNICAMP/CNPq, 2011] Disponível em: http://unicamp.academia.edu/LucasAngioni>. Acesso em: 21 fev. 2016._______. Metafísica. Edição em grego-latim-espanhol, por Valentin Garcia Yebra. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1987.GADAMER, Hans-Georg. “Filosofia ou teoria da ciência?”. In:_____. A razão na época da ciência. Tradução de Ângela Dias. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Edições Tempo Brasileiro, 1983, p. 88-105.NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studenausgabe (KSA), vol. 6. Edição de Giorgio Colli e M. Montinari. Berlin/N. York, dtv/de Gruyter, 1988._______. Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studenausgabe (KSA), vol. 12. Edição de Giorgio Colli e M. Montinari. Berlin/N. York, dtv/de Gruyter, 2008.PLATÃO. A república. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000. 3ª ed._______. Protágoras. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000a. 3ª ed._______. Teeteto. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2001. 3ª ed.