The Derivation without the Gap: Rethinking Groundwork I

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 18-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berys Gaut ◽  
Samuel Kerstein
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Supreme Principle

At the core of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals lies his ‘derivation’ of the categorical imperative: his attempt to establish that, if there is a supreme principle of morality, then it is this imperative. Kant's argument for this claim is one of the most puzzling in his corpus. The received view, championed by Aune and Allison, is that there is a fundamental gap in the argument, which Kant elides by means of a simple but deadly confusion, thus robbing the argument of all validity. We will here contest the received view, as well as Korsgaard's alternative interpretation of the argument. In place of these positions we will offer a reconstruction of the derivation which reveals its coherence and force. We will show that it illuminates some interesting grounds for rejecting certain candidates, including a utilitarian principle, for status as the supreme principle of morality. While certainly not free of all defects, the argument will be shown to be far more powerful and interesting than it has commonly been held to be.

Three Accounts of Respect for Persons in Kant's Ethics

2004 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 38-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Klimchuk
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
The Core ◽  
Formula Of Humanity ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Kant's Ethics

The idea that respect for persons comprises the core of morality has long been associated with Kant and the ethics of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular, the second formulation of the categorical imperative (CI), the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-itself (FHE) – ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (G, 429) – is often glossed as enjoining us to respect persons as such. On what I think may fairly be called the received view, the injunction to respect persons as such is thus, for Kant, co-extensive with morality itself.

Kant’s Formula of the Universal Law of Nature Reconsidered

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faviola Rivera-Castro
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Clear Distinction ◽  
Logical Interpretation ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
The Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Universal Law

I criticize the widely accepted “practical” interpretation of the universality test contained in Kant’s first formula of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – the formula of the universal law of nature. I argue that this interpretation does not work for contradictions in conception because it wrongly takes contradictions in the will as the model for them and, as a consequence, cannot establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction. This interpretation also assumes an understanding of universality that departs from Kant’s own and, cannot, for this reason, capture the kind of contradiction that he explicitly claims to establish. I provide an alternative interpretation, which I call revised logical interpretation, that allows us to account for contradictions in conception, including those examples that the practical interpretation cannot handle, as well as to establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction.

scholarly journals Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Duty

2018 ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Karif Jal Basara
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

The categorical imperative is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Introduced in Kant's 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it may be defined as a way of evaluating motivations for action.

I Think, I Am Mad. Derrida, Gaslight and the Irony of the Cogito

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93
Author(s):  
Dirk Setton
Keyword(s):  
Active Form ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Central Point ◽  
Transcendental Function ◽  
Stanley Cavell ◽  
The Core ◽  
A Value ◽  
Female Protagonist ◽  
History Of ◽  
Supreme Principle

At the climax of George Cukor's Gaslight, a film melodrama from 1944, the female protagonist utters the phrase ‘I am mad’ which Stanley Cavell takes to reveal her Cogito. As such, the formula seems to be a perfect exemplification of Derrida's central point in Cogito and the History of Madness, namely that there is ‘a value and a meaning of the Cogito’, detectable in Descartes's Mediations, which welcomes madness as its genuine and necessary possibility. But how can we conceive of the ‘I think’—the supreme principle of transcendental philosophy constituting the objectivity of cognition and experience—as embracing unreason as its own condition? This article attempts to highlight a quasi-transcendental interpretation of Derrida's answer to this question: deconstruction reveals a certain irony at the core of the primary text of transcendental philosophy. I argue that the formula ‘I am mad’ contains the decisive key to the argument: the irony of the Cogito consists in the fact of its double transcendental functioning—a transcendental function in the ‘middle’ form and a transcendental function in the active form.

Do We Need a Metaphysics of Morals?

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Alessandro Pinzani ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Core ◽  
Enlightenment Project ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

This paper argues that Kant’s project of a metaphysics of morals represents a normative ideal grounded on the core ideas of Enlightenment. In the first section, it analyzes Kant’s concept of metaphysical principles of morals by establishing a connection between a metaphysics of morals and Kant’s concept of metaphysics in general and of metaphysics of nature in particular. It then discusses what is metaphysical in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In its last section, it tackles the question of whether a non-metaphysical reading of Kant’s doctrines of right and of virtue is desirable if we want to remain faithful to Kant’s Enlightenment project.

Good Sex on Kantian Grounds, or A Reply to Alan Soble

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-317
Author(s):  
Joshua Schulz ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Sexual Desire ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral System ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Natural Inclination ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

Immanuel Kant offers definitions of “sexual desire” and “sexual use” in the Metaphysics of Morals that occasion an inconsistency within his moral system, for they entail that sexual desire, as a natural inclination that is conditionally good, is also categorically objectifying, and thus per se immoral according to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Following Alan Soble, various attempts to resolve the inconsistency are here criticized before more suitable, and suitably Kantian, definitions of these terms are offered. It is argued that these new definitions resolve the inconsistency.

The explanationist revolution in evidence law

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 60-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Revolutionary Change ◽  
The Core ◽  
Basic Distinction ◽  
Evidence Law ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Probabilistic Criteria

According to Allen and Pardo, the field of evidence law has experienced a revolution -in Kuhn's sense- from probabilism to explanationism, which they identify with the relative plausibility theory. The explanationist revolution, argue Allen and Pardo, has placed explanationist -rather than probabilistic criteria- at the core of the fact-finding process and, in contrast to probabilism, has advanced a comparative understanding of the theory of legal proof. This paper develops an alternative interpretation of the explanationist revolution in evidence law. First, it elaborates on the concept of legal revolution and argues that it involves a kind of shift that is best characterized as a Hacking -rather than a Kuhnean- type of revolution and, thus, as an ‘emplacement’ instead of a ‘replacement’ revolution. Second, it claims that the shift from probabilism to explanationism involves a deep -genuinely revolutionary- change in the conception of rationality that is taken to govern the processes of evidence and legal proof. Other differences between probabilistim and explanationism, such as those mentioned by Allen and Pardo, are not central to the revolutionary shift, but rather emanate from this basic distinction. Last, it argues that the explanationist paradigm embraces, but cannot be reduced to, the relative plausibility theory; the identification of explanationism with the relative plausibility theory occludes the richness and possibilities harboured by the new, explanationist, paradigm.

Overview of Psychiatric Ethics V: Utilitarianism and the Ethics of Duty

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 402-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Robertson ◽  
Kirsty Morris ◽  
Garry Walter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Codes Of Ethics ◽  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
The Core ◽  
Kant's Ethics

Objective: The aim of this paper is to describe the ethical theories of utilitarianism and the ethics of duty (Kant's ethics) and to evaluate their value as theoretical bases of psychiatric ethics. Conclusions: Utilitarianism is a well-established moral philosophy and has significant instrumental value in dealing with common ethical problems faced by psychiatrists. Despite its capacity to generate solutions to ethical problems, utilitarianism requires a process of what Rawls described as ‘reflective equilibrium’ to avoid morally repugnant choices, based on utility. The criticisms of utilitarianism, such as the problems of quantifying utility and the responsibility for consequences, are very relevant for psychiatry. Singer's model of utilitarian thinking is particularly problematic for our profession. Kant's ethics provides the pretext for duty bound codes of ethics for psychiatrists, but suffers from problems of flawed claims to the universalizability prescribed by Kant's ‘categorical imperative’. Kant's valorization of reason as the core of the autonomy of persons is a valuable insight in understanding psychiatrists’ ethical obligations to their patients.

Humanity, Obligation, and the Good Will: An Argument against Dean's Interpretation of Humanity

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Ethical Obligation ◽  
Good Will ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Important Notion

Humanity (die Menschheit) is an important notion within Kant's moral theory. The humanity formulation of the categorical imperative (FH) commands: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (G 4: 429). Kant's analysis of ethical obligation and his expositions of rights and duties in the Metaphysics of Morals refer frequently to humanity. How we understand this concept, then, has signifcant implications for how we understand Kant's ethics.

On a Presumed Omission in Kant's Derivation of the Categorical Imperative

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-459
Author(s):  
Robert Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Universal Law

AbstractA new book by Stephen Engstrom repeats a criticism of Bruce Aune's of Kant's derivation of the universalizability formula of the categorical imperative. The criticism is that Kant omitted at least one substantive premise in the derivation of the formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.’ The grounds for the formula that are given in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, however, are said to support only a weaker requirement, namely, that a maxim conform to a universal law. Hence, Kant omits at least one necessary substantive premise of the derivation. This paper attempts to show that nothing substantive is omitted from the argument. It only needs two principles of inference that it is assumed add nothing substantive to the premises.

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