scholarly journals Grants, Funding, Awards and Recognition in Healthcare Innovation

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 76-81
Author(s):  
Jagdish Chaturvedi ◽  
Gunda Srinivas
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
International Agencies ◽  
Angel Investor ◽  
Gates Foundation ◽  
Healthcare Innovation ◽  
Funding Opportunities ◽  
Public Offering

For an idea to be validated, prototyped and tested, adequate financial planning plays a major role in the long journey of the idea from the brains to the market. There are various ways of getting funds for the startup. The founders usually start with their own money from their savings or some borrowings from family and friends which is called bootstrapping and is very common and crucial, akin to doctors starting their own clinics and small nursing homes. As they start to grow, large funds are needed in the early stage to set the foot firm with the help of an angel investor/ seed investor which is like starting a full-fledged hospital. The Venture capitalist comes in at a stage when the idea is proven and started with operations, early-stage customers and has a major potential to expand, just like when more branches of hospitals are planned. Private equity companies and investment banks are those who are keen to invest in companies who have proved themselves beyond doubt with strong leadership in the market and are looking for a major return on investment by making the company bigger, which is like planning a pan India network of the hospital chain. These investments happen multiple times or rounds at various stages of the company usually termed series A to series D or E and ultimately leading to the Initial Public Offering when it goes public from private holding. This funding journey is a well-planned effort quite specific to the investment stage, investor type, and their preferences. The recognition of the startups and their ideas plays a major role in them reaching to market and access to funding opportunities. The funding and national recognition from various govt. and private agencies such as BIRAC, FICCI, NASSCOM, Wellcome trust, and Villgro and international agencies such as CAMTech, Bill and Melinda gates foundation, Grand Challenges Canada, Stanford, and Harvard gives the much needed attention from the potential investors and is a major advantage which should be utilized well. Social media recognition plays a major role in recent times which has the potential to make an innovation “viral” and reach millions of customers and make relevant investors and govt. agencies notice, which can be a huge breakthrough for the company if the innovation has a social impact. We would like to make this article more practical, experiential, and contextual for better connect with pediatrician colleagues.

Survival of Initial Public Offerings on Europe’s New Stock Markets

2018 ◽  
pp. 533-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao Jiao ◽  
Peter Roosenboom ◽  
Giancarlo Giudici
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Stock Markets ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Similar Survival ◽  
Public Offering

Nearly 20 competing new stock markets opened their doors in 12 Western European countries during 1995–2005. These stock markets copied the NASDAQ model, with low barriers to entry and tight disclosure rules, and had one common aim—to attract untested, early stage, innovative, and high-growth small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The main hypothesis of this chapter is that by setting the entry barriers too low, these new markets risked attracting too many low-quality firms, creating a “lemons problem” that negatively impacted the survival prospects of all firms listed on that market. The key finding is that the initial public offering (IPO) firm failure on six of these new stock markets is almost double the IPO firm failure on long-established official stock markets with more stringent listing requirements. The exception is the unregulated Alternative Investments Market, where firms have similar survival prospects compared to companies listing on London’s Official List.

scholarly journals The Deregulation of the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (12) ◽  
pp. 5463-5509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ewens ◽  
Joan Farre-Mensa
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Securities Markets ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Going Public ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Securities Laws

Abstract The deregulation of securities laws—in particular the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996—has increased the supply of private capital to late-stage private startups, which are now able to grow to a size that few private firms used to reach. NSMIA is one of a number of factors that have changed the going-public versus staying-private trade-off, helping bring about a new equilibrium where fewer startups go public, and those that do are older. This new equilibrium does not reflect an initial public offering (IPO) market failure. Rather, founders are using their increased bargaining power vis-à-vis investors to stay private longer.

Cross-Border LBOs, Human Capital, and Proximity: Value Addition through Monitoring in Private Equity Investments

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-41
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Chemmanur ◽  
Tyler J. Hull ◽  
Karthik Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
The United States ◽  
Efficient Allocation ◽  
Value Addition ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Public Offering

We show that cross-border leveraged buyout investments involving U.S. rather than non-U.S. private equity (PE) investors are more likely to have a successful exit (initial public offering or acquisition). Exogenous increases in effective proximity following the signing of “open sky agreements” between the United States and target firms’ home countries increases both the propensity of U.S. PE firms to invest in these firms and the value addition by these investors. We show that such increases in value addition by U.S. PE investors following proximity increases are at least partially due to better monitoring, facilitated by the more efficient allocation of experienced U.S. PE managers to cross-border deals.

INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND PRE-IPO SHAREHOLDERS: ANGELS VERSUS VENTURE CAPITALISTS

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1250022 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM C. JOHNSON ◽  
JEFFREY E. SOHL
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Corporate Investors ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Angel Investors

At the time of an initial public offering, shares in a firm are typically held by venture capitalists, insiders, corporate investors and angel investors. We examine the role of angel investors in the IPO process. We find that angel investors provide equity capital in industries venture capitalists are less likely to serve and that shareholders in angel backed IPO firms are more likely to sell their shares at the time of the offering. Where venture capital backed IPO firms have higher underpricing, angel backed IPO firms do not, implying that angels may be the preferred investors for early-stage firms.

Founders, Private Equity Investors, and Underpricing in Entrepreneurial IPOs

2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 909-928 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garry D. Bruton ◽  
Salim Chahine ◽  
Igor Filatotchev
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Performance Outcomes ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Entrepreneurial Firm ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Retained Ownership

One of the most important events in the life of an entrepreneurial firm is when it undergoes an initial public offering (IPO). Combining signaling theory with research on the role of information asymmetry in pricing of IPOs this study examines the performance outcomes of two distinct types of agency conflicts at the time of the IPO: adverse selection and moral hazard. Empirical results show a curvilinear (U–shaped) relationship between founders‘ retained equity and underpricing. This suggests that founders‘ retained ownership in an entrepreneurial IPO limits adverse selection problems and the associated IPO underpricing; however, at some point entrepreneurs‘ investment and risk become so great that entrepreneurs may no longer act rationally and moral hazard increases. Empirical findings also indicate that the retained ownership of business angels has a stronger mitigating effect on adverse selection and moral hazard problems than do venture capitalist investors.

The Choice of Exit: Influence of Private Equity Investors and Buyout Entry

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. S1-S26
Author(s):  
Rohan Chinchwadkar ◽  
Rama Seth
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
The Real Estate ◽  
Developed Markets ◽  
Real Estate Sector ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
The Cost

The choice of exit method is an inevitable decision faced by entrepreneurs and private equity (PE) investors. The existing literature addresses four categories of factors which influence this choice of exit method between initial public offering (IPO) and acquisition: industry-related factors, market-timing variables, deal-specific factors and demand-for-funds factors. We extend the literature by introducing a new category of factors, ‘PE investor characteristics’, and test if this category has a significant effect on the choice of exit method. We also test if the type of entry has an influence on the exit method. We find that PE investor characteristics play an important role in the choice of exit method. The existence of a large syndicate of PE investors in the same firm increases the probability of an IPO exit, but the presence of a foreign PE investor reduces this probability. Moreover, unlike in developed markets, the cost of debt does not affect the choice of exit method in India. We further consider specific exit methods such as strategic sale, financial sale and buyback and find consistent results. We find that in buyout transactions, the probability of an IPO exit is less than that of a strategic sale. Finally, we present a unique finding that the probability of a buyback as opposed to an IPO is higher if a firm is in the real estate sector.

scholarly journals IPO as a VC-Funds Type of Exit

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-129
Author(s):  
Dorota Podedworna-Tarnowska
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Going Public ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
The Us ◽  
Portfolio Company ◽  
Venture Capital Firms ◽  
Public Offering

The key characteristic of private equity finance is that investors hold their investments only for a limited period of time. The key goal of VC funds is to grow the company to a point where it can be sold at a price that far exceeds the amount of capital invested. This process is called an exit or divestment. There are three basic types of exits: going public, being acquired by a larger corporation, a sale to a third-party investor.It is a widely believed and accepted proposition in private equity literature that the initial public offering of a private equity portfolio company is the most successful and profitable exit opportunity. However, according to the few sources of literature, public offerings are not the preferred divestment type for venture capital firms. Going public is one of the most critical decisions in the lifecycle of a firm. This is not easy, as the process is very comprehensive and complex. Hence, a lot of considerations should be taken into account. Because every investee firm is different, a development plan to achieve a successful exit takes into consideration a number of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. Moreover, several advantages and disadvantages of exit through an IPO could be indicated. The objective of this paper is to show the success and profitability of going public by VC funds. The VC’s exit type as a way of cashing out on its investment in a portfolio company is a consequence of the exit strategy, which means the plan for generating profits for owners and investors of a company. While an IPO is the most spectacular and visible form of exit, it is not the most common one, as historically in the US it was, but still in Europe it has not been yet. There will be both literature and statistical data coming from different studies and reports used in this research.

scholarly journals Start-Up Investor Governance Case

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
Robert M. LoBue
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Silicon Valley ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Financial Restructuring ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Business Financing

AbstractIn the current age of innovative business financing opportunities available from fintech apps, social media crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and RocketHub, et.al., and friends and family private equity investors, start-up firms can strategically source their venture capital funds from many globally disperse organizations and individuals. As the firm in this case learned, the benefit of alternative investing sources comes with a critical hidden risk for corporate governance. After a financial restructuring, a typical Silicon Valley software start-up found itself with close to 300 external individual shareholders, some of whom had not been documented as accredited investors. The regulatory agency could decide that the prior actions of the founders and the decisions of the board had been prejudicial to the interests of the minority investors. The management of this small private company faced an atypical investor relations dilemma, before its initial public offering (IPO).

Venture capital backing: financial policies and persistence over time

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 640-663
Author(s):  
Antonio Gledson de Carvalho ◽  
◽  
Pinheiro Roberto ◽  
Sampaio Joelson ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Financial Policies ◽  
Significant Evidence ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Over Time

<abstract> <p>The present article seeks to analyze the financial policies of companies backed by Private Equity and Venture Capital funds (PE/VC). Our sample consists of firms completing an initial public offering between January 1991 and December 2000. Our hypotheses relate to the difference between VC and non-VC-backed firms in terms of financial policies and their persistence. We use four measures to evaluate the firms' financial policies: i) Cash holdings; ii) Leverage; iii) dividends out of their earnings; and iv) interest coverage. To test the four hypotheses, we run Pooled OLS regressions. The results suggest that VC-backing firms keep a higher level of cash holdings than non-VC-backed firms. This effect lasts for at least 8 years after the IPO. We show that VC-backed firms are associated with a lower level of leverage over the first 8 years after the IPO. Differently, while interest coverage is lower in the first years after the IPO, results are not persistent, even reverting in later years. Finally, we do not find statistically significant evidence of a difference between VC- and non-VC-backed firms on dividend to earnings ratio. Our results are robust across statistical methods and different methodologies.</p> </abstract>

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