scholarly journals THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, DIVERSIFICATION, AND DISCLOSURE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Octavianus Digdo Hartomo ◽  
Santanando Hermanto Pranatio Hutomo

<p class="JurnalASSETSABSTRAK"><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p><p>Anti-corruption disclosures reflect the company's commitment to prevent and combat corruption. This study examines the impact of managerial ownership, block holder ownership, government ownership, diversification, board independence, the board of commissioners' size, and diversification on anti-corruption disclosures. The object of this research is IDX listed companies from 2013 to 2017. Data obtained from the company's annual report  Data analysis is multiple linear regression. The results showed that the managerial ownership, government ownership, board independence, and board size positively affected anti-corruption disclosures, block holders ownership had a negative effect, and diversification positively affected anti-corruption disclosures.</p><p class="JurnalASSETSABSTRAK"><strong><em>ABSTRAK</em></strong><em></em></p><p><em>Pengungkapan anti-korupsi menunjukkan komitmen perusahaan untuk mencegah dan memberantas korupsi. Penelitian ini menguji dampak kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan pemegang blok, kepemilikan pemerintah, diversifikasi, independensi dewan komisaris, dan ukuran dewan komisaris terhadap pengungkapan anti korupsi. Objek penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2013 -2017. Data diperoleh dari laporan tahunan perusahaan  Analisis data yang digunakan adalah regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa struktur kepemilikan manajerial, struktur kepemilikan pemerintah, independensi dewan komisaris dan ukuran dewan komisaris berpengaruh positif terhadap pengungkapan anti korupsi, sedangkan struktur kepemilikan blockholder berpengaruh negatif dan diversifikasi berpengaruh positif pada pengungkapan anti korupsi.</em></p>

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-46
Author(s):  
Hassan Ahmad ◽  
Nasreen Akhter ◽  
Tariq Siddiq ◽  
Zahid Iqbal

This study is undertaken with the purpose of investigating the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on the capital structure of Pakistani listed firms from 2011-2014, feasible general least square is used to investigate the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on capital structure of KSE 100 index firms. Explanatory variables include ownership concentration, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, board size, board independence and CEO duality along with the three control variables namely firm size, firm profitability and liquidity. There is insignificant positive relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure, managerial ownership has a significant negative impact on debt ratio. Foreign ownership has also a significant negative impact on firm capital structure and institutional ownership has significant positive impact on capital structure. Board size is positively related to capital structure, board independence also positively related to firm’s debt ratio but CEO duality negatively related to the dependent variable, all these variables have significant impact on capital structure of Pakistani firms. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-87
Author(s):  
Harjum Muharam ◽  
Galuh Kusuma Putri

This paper aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on leverage with credit rating as a moderating variable. The ownership structure used in this study is government ownership and managerial ownership. Leverage is measured using a debt to assets ratio (DAR). Credit rating uses ratings issued by PEFINDO.The sample used in this study was companies rated by PEFINDO and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2017. The number of samples used were 53 companies determined using a purposive sampling method. The analysis using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis indicated that government ownership does not affect leverage, and the credit rating does not moderate the relationship between government ownership and leverage. Managerial ownership has a negative effect on leverage, and the credit rating moderates the relationship between managerial ownership and leverage


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Matari ◽  
Ali Saleh Al_arussi

This study attempts to investigate the effect of the ownership structure characteristics (ownership concentration, managerial ownership and government ownership) on firm performance (ROA) among non-financial Omani companies during 2012-2014. For achieving the objective of this study, 81 firms were taken as a sample to test the above relations. The sampling was obtained from annual report of the companies for three years with a total sampling equal to 243 firms. Multiple regression analysis was employed to test the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable. In addition, this study tried to fill the gap in the existing literature concerning the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the developing countries such as Oman. This study found a positive and significant association between ownership concentration and government ownership to firm performance (ROA). The study provides some suggestions for future researchers before the conclusion.


Author(s):  
Emna Boumediene

This research aims to test the impact of the interaction between the external audit reputation and the characteristics of the board of directors on the firm performance. Hence, we have tried to test the hypothesis of Williamson (1983) in the Tunisian context.The results obtained in the empirical analyses show a significantly negative effect of the interaction between the external audit reputation and the board independence of the financial performance of the firm. This result reveals the substitution effect between these two mechanisms.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamsul Nahar Abdullah ◽  
Nor Raihan Mohamad ◽  
Mohd Zulkifli Mokhtar

The purpose of this study is to determine whether board independence and ownership have any influence on the decision on CSR disclosure. This study uses the proportion of pages in an annual report and a CSR disclosure checklist to measure the extent and quality of a firm’s CSR disclosure. Multiple regression and logistic regression analysis are employed to test the hypotheses. The paper finds that boards of family owned firms are negatively associated with the level and the quality of CSR disclosure. The fact that board independence is not significant on CSR disclosure could be due to the fact that CSR initiatives are strategic in nature. Finally, firm’s size, performance and leverage are found to have significant effects on CSR. This study was conducted among Malaysian top 100. The generalizability of the findings of this study is, thus, limited to Malaysian large firms. One of the major findings of this study is the ineffectiveness of the board of directors in ensuring firms discharge its social responsibility. Relevant authorities may need to come up with measures to ensure independent directors are effective. The study adds to the understanding of how ownership structure plays an influential role as oppose to independent board of directors on CSR disclosure in Malaysia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-308

The decision on the magnitude of dividend has been identified to be highly related to the decisions to pay or not to pay dividends in formulating dividend policy. However, literature seems to be homogeneous and focused on examining the effect of ownership structure on dividend level or probability of paying dividends. Therefore, the paper examines the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using Heckman’s two-stage technique. Utilizing 304 firm-year observations from industrial and consumer goods firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period within 2009-2019, the result shows that in the first stage, only foreign ownership has a negative significant effect on the probability of paying dividends. However, after accounting for a possible correlation between the probability of paying dividends and dividend pay-out, the result on the second stage exhibits a significant negative effect with block-holders and foreign ownerships on dividend policy while institutional ownership reveals a positive significant effect. The overall results show that the lower the foreign ownership the higher the possibility of paying dividends. Also, higher dividend pay-out is associated with the lower level of block-holders and foreign ownerships coupled with higher institutional ownership in listed industrial and consumer goods firms in Nigeria.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Tayachi ◽  
Ahmed Imran Hunjra ◽  
Kirsten Jones ◽  
Rashid Mehmood ◽  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan

Purpose Ownership structure deals with internal corporate governance mechanism, which plays important role in minimizing conflict of interests between shareholders and management Ownership structure is an important mechanism that influences the value of firm, financing and dividend decisions. This paper aims to examine the impact of the ownership structures, i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership on financing and dividend policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data of manufacturing firms from both developed and developing countries, and the generalized method of moments (GMM) is applied to analyze the results. The authors collect the data from DataStream for the period of 2010 to 2019. Findings The authors find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration have significant and positive effects on debt financing, but they have significant and negative effects on dividend policy. Institutional ownership shows a positive impact on financing decisions and dividend policy for sample firms. Originality/value This study fills the gap by proving the policy implications for both firms and investors, as managers prefer debt financing, but at the same time try to ignore dividend payment. Therefore, investors may not invest in firms with a higher proportion of managerial ownership and may choose to invest more in institutional ownership, which lowers the agency cost.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-75
Author(s):  
Mazlina Mustapha ◽  
Ayoib Che Ahmad

This paper tests the effect of managerial (inside) and block-holders (outside) ownership in relation to agency theory in Malaysian business environment. This study tests the agency relationship in different culture and social contact and provides evidence whether agency theory in non-western organizations have equal impact in Asian organizations. Consistent with agency theory and the convergence of interest hypothesis, managerial ownership (insiders) in Malaysia indicate a negative relationship with the demand for monitoring. This finding may be due to the fact that as the managers are also the owners, there is less conflict, less information asymmetry and less hierarchical organization structure in the companies, which lead to lower monitoring costs. However, another ownership structure, outside block-holders appear to demand more monitoring. This positive relationship may be explained by their effort to compensate their lack of involvement in the daily transactions and internal decisions of the company, especially in the concentrated business environment in the country.


2017 ◽  
pp. 5-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Abramov ◽  
A. Radygin ◽  
M. Chernova ◽  
R. Entov

The paper examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The authors have tried to discriminate the influence of direct and indirect state ownership. Using econometric analysis we conclude that the size of the block of shares owned by the state has negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on average perform worse than private companies. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of indirect productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs the similar correlation between return on equity and efficiency characteristics was not revealed. The study shows that the increase of the size of direct government ownership leads to lower productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect state ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.


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