scholarly journals ANALISIS HUKUM SISTEM PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA ATAS TANAH BERBASIS KEADILAN

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 219
Author(s):  
HERLINA RATNA SAMBAWA NINGRUM

Law enforcement bureaucracy in resolving land disputes through litigation and non-litigation often found that in resolving the dispute is considered unjust. Disputes over land and agrarian resources in general seems to be a latent conflict. Of the various cases, rise and sharpening of land disputes not happen instantly, but to grow and develop from seeds that so long it has been deposited. This research method combines doctrinal research and socio-legal research-research, the basis of doctrinal research is research library that includes the primary legal materials, secondary law and tertiary legal materials. The results obtained 1) that the causes of the frequent occurrence of land disputes, among others; System of land administration, land ownership distribution is uneven. The legality of land ownership based solely on the formal proof (certificate), without regard to soil productivity2) Strategy Dispute Settlement System of Land-Based Justice: Strategic Administrative State, Judiciary, Legislative Strategy, Need to establish a separate judiciary in resolving disputes over land

Author(s):  
Stefan Griller

The author argues that the mega-regionals are incorporating WTO standards on the removal of technical barriers to trade (TBT), but do not go much further. Consequently, domestic policies on consumer or environmental protection are inevitably affected. However, in this regard, the mega-regionals would not result in a substantive change. By contrast, the relationship between the removal of TBT and investment protection standards is qualified as poorly balanced, unclear, and creating fresh problems. This includes the possibility that damages might be awarded even in cases where the party to the agreement has correctly used its ‘right to regulate’. Moreover, a critical account of the investor-state dispute settlement system foreseen is offered. It is presented as unnecessarily complex, and creating unbalanced advantages for investors. The better alternative would be integrating national courts into the system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document