scholarly journals Modal Noneism: Transworld Identity, Identification, and Individuation

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Berto
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Nonexistent Objects ◽  
Double Move ◽  
Transworld Identity ◽  
Graham Priest

Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Routley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely discussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest's noneism is based upon the double move of (a) building a worlds semantics including impossible worlds, besides possible ones, and (b) admitting a new comprehension principle for objects, differerent from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons' and Zalta's. The new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can deliver objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach can be conveniently labeled as "modal noneism". In this paper, I put modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the theory (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; (2) faces a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld individuation, which is often taken (especially after Kripke's notorious 'stipulation' solution) as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem; and (3) may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I shall call 'extensionally indiscernible entities' - particular nonexistent objects modal noneism is committed to.

scholarly journals Tree Trimming: Four Non-Branching Rules for Priest’s Introduction to Non-Classical Logic

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilynn Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Variable Domain ◽  
Free Logic ◽  
Intuitionist Logic ◽  
Branching Rule ◽  
Branching Rules ◽  
Graham Priest

In An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is Graham Priest (2008) presents branching rules in Free Logic, Variable Domain Modal Logic, and Intuitionist Logic. I propose a simpler, non-branching rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instantiation in Free Logic, a second, slightly modified version of this rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instantiation in Variable Domain Modal Logic, and third and fourth rules, further modifying the second rule, to replace Priest’s branching universal and particular instantiation rules in Intuitionist Logic. In each of these logics the proposed rule leads to tableaux with fewer branches. In Intuitionist logic, the proposed rules allow for the resolution of a particular problem Priest grapples with throughout the chapter. In this paper, I demonstrate that the proposed rules can greatly simplify tableaux and argue that they should be used in place of the rules given by Priest.

World construction and meaning production in the “impossible worlds” of literature

2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Stefanescu
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Direct Consequence ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Meaning Production ◽  
Fictional Worlds

AbstractI examine the implications for literary semantics of the distinction introduced by possible-world literary theorists between world construction and meaning production. I argue that the interdisciplinary borrowings from modal logic have resulted in a tendency among the literary scholars in the field to give preference to the referential dimension of fictional texts over their meaning component. As a direct consequence, the “impossibility” of certain fictional worlds has been diagnosed and assessed in terms of a referential failure. However, although the option to focus on the referential impossibility of some fictional worlds is clearly available to the literary theorist, it may lead to a rather one-sided approach, unless it is counterbalanced by an interest in meaning production in the case of (for the specific purposes of this article) logically inconsistent and/or self-disclosing narratives.

scholarly journals Set-Theoretic Dependence

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wigglesworth
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Logical Framework ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
First Order ◽  
Dependence Relations ◽  
Asymmetric Dependence ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
First Order Modal Logic

In this paper, we explore the idea that sets depend on, or are grounded in, their members.  It is said that a set depends on each of its members, and not vice versa.  Members do not depend on the sets that they belong to.  We show that the intuitive modal truth conditions for dependence, given in terms of possible worlds, do not accurately capture asymmetric dependence relations between sets and their members.  We extend the modal truth conditions to include impossible worlds and give a more satisfactory account of  the dependence of a set on its members. Focusing on the case of singletons, we articulate a logical framework in which to evaluate set-theoretic dependence claims, using a normal first-order modal logic.  We show that on this framework the dependence of a singleton on its single members follows from logic alone. However, the converse does not hold.

Systems of modal logic for impossible worlds

Inquiry ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 280-289
Author(s):  
Charles G. Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Impossible Worlds

scholarly journals Modal Formulas True at Some Point in Every Model

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd Humberstone
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Analogue ◽  
Consequence Relation ◽  
Graham Priest

In a paper on the logical work of the Jains, Graham Priest considers a consequence relation, semantically characterized, which has a natural analogue in modal logic. Here we give a syntactic/axiomatic description of the modal formulas which are consequences of the empty set by this relation, which is to say: those formulas which are, for every model, true at some point in that model.

Modal Logic

1980 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Chellas
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic

Modality and folk psychology

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Ja. O. Petik
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Formal Systems ◽  
Modern Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Important Direction

The connection of the modern psychology and formal systems remains an important direction of research. This paper is centered on philosophical problems surrounding relations between mental and logic. Main attention is given to philosophy of logic but certain ideas are introduced that can be incorporated into the practical philosophical logic. The definition and properties of basic modal logic and descending ones which are used in study of mental activity are in view. The defining role of philosophical interpretation of modality for the particular formal system used for research in the field of psychological states of agents is postulated. Different semantics of modal logic are studied. The hypothesis about the connection of research in cognitive psychology (semantics of brain activity) and formal systems connected to research of psychological states is stated.

A new approach to the logic of discovery

2007 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-27
Author(s):  
Gerald Massey
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Logic Of Discovery ◽  
Good Fortune ◽  
High Incidence ◽  
History Of ◽  
Deep Sense

Contending that the quest for a logic of scientific discovery was prematurely abandoned, the author lays down eight phenomena that such a logic or theory must explain: the banality of scientific discovery; the trainability of scientists; the high incidence of simultaneous discoveries; the ubiquity of relative novices; the fact of scientific genius; the barrenness of isolated workers; the incommensurability of concepts of successive theories; and the quasi-incorporation of old concepts, objects, and methods in successor theories, The author then presents a new theory or logic of discovery according to which discoveries are the termini of "tweak paths" generated when scientists "tinker" with the laws, concepts, methods, and instruments of a given theory. Tinkering and tweaking are illustrated by examples from many-valued and modal logic and from Darwinian biology. Through the history of planetary discovery, the accidental role played by luck or good fortune in some discoveries is explored, but the author emphasizes that in a deep sense serendipity is an in eliminable feature of all scientific discovery because scientists never know m advance whether their tweaks will lead to dead ends or to positive developments. The author's new theory of scientific discovery is shown to account for all eight explananda, ft also reveals science to be a more egalitarian enterprise than the traditional view of scientific discovery as ultimately inexplicable depicts it.

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