scholarly journals Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh: Lifting the veil of parliamentary privilege and parliament's response

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'I'Onetoa Fonua
Keyword(s):  
Best Practice ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Individual Citizen ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh¹ to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended.  This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House.  In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  ¹ Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106, [2012] 2 NZLR 713, (Leigh).</p>

scholarly journals Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh: Lifting the veil of parliamentary privilege and parliament's response

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'I'Onetoa Fonua
Keyword(s):  
Best Practice ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Individual Citizen ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh¹ to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended.  This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House.  In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  ¹ Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106, [2012] 2 NZLR 713, (Leigh).</p>

scholarly journals Attorney_General and Gow v Leigh : lifting the veil of parliamentary privilege and Parliament's response

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'i'onetoa Fonua
Keyword(s):  
Best Practice ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Individual Citizen ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014. It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended. This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House. In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.</p>

scholarly journals Attorney_General and Gow v Leigh : lifting the veil of parliamentary privilege and Parliament's response

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'i'onetoa Fonua
Keyword(s):  
Best Practice ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Individual Citizen ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014. It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended. This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House. In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.</p>

Public Service Motivation in Buffy the Vampire Slayer

Public Voices ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon Mastracci
Keyword(s):  
Popular Culture ◽  
Public Service ◽  
Public Service Motivation ◽  
Public Servants ◽  
Buffy The Vampire Slayer ◽  
The Public ◽  
American Popular Culture ◽  
Public Servant ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

In this paper, the author examines public service as depicted in the television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer (BtVS). First, she shows how slaying meets the economist’s definition of a public good, using the BtVS episode “Flooded” (6.04). Second, she discusses public service motivation (PSM) to determine whether or not Buffy, a public servant, operates from a public service ethic. Relying on established measures and evidence from shooting scripts and episode transcripts, the author concludes Buffy is a public servant motivated by a public service ethic. In this way, BtVS informs scholarship on public service by broadening the concept of PSM beyond the public sector; prompting one to wonder whether it is located in a sector, an occupation, or in the individual. These conclusions allow the author to situate Buffy alongside other idealized public servants in American popular culture.

Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure

1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-506
Author(s):  
James Hart
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Final Report ◽  
The Public ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Public Hearings ◽  
Administrative Procedures ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Administrative Proceedings ◽  
Rule Making

What is undoubtedly the most thorough and comprehensive study ever made of Federal administrative procedure was completed with the submission to the Attorney General, in a letter dated January 22, 1941, of the final report of the Committee named. In its investigation and report, the Committee confined its attention to those Federal agencies that substantially affect private interests by their powers of rule-making and adjudication. To the study of their procedures, it assigned a staff of lawyer-investigators, which produced 27 mimeographed monographs, 13 of which have been printed as Sen. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. In its interim report of January 31, 1940, the Committee thus described the methods being employed in the preparation of these monographic studies: “They have involved extended interviews with officials and employees of the agencies involved, with members of the public affected, and with attorneys who have represented clients before these agencies. Members of the Committee's staff have attended numerous hearings and other administrative proceedings as observers, and have closely examined the files of the agencies to discover the methods utilized in disposing of matters arising under the various statutes and regulations. Upon the completion of these investigations, the staff has prepared for the study of the Committee a preliminary report upon each agency, discussing in detail its administrative procedures. The report has been given to the officers of the affected agency for their consideration and comment. Thereafter, the full Committee has met with the agency's officers to discuss with them the facts and problems disclosed by the report.” (Final Report, pp. 254–255). The Committee held public hearings in June and July, 1940. In Chapter IX of its final report, it presents recommendations concerning a number of the individual agencies studied; and in Appendices B through M, it summarizes data collected on significant topics.

Negotiating Virtue

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
Amyn B. Sajoo
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
End Of Life Decisions ◽  
Genital Mutilation ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Biomedical Technologies ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Female Genital

Principlist modes of reasoning in bioethics – with autonomy at the core – resonate strongly with a legalism that dominates Muslim ethics, including the understanding of the shari’a. From abortion and organ donation/transplant to end-of-life decisions, both secular and Muslim bioethics generally apply “cardinal” principles in ways felt to be relatively objective and certain, though they may produce different outcomes. This article builds on recent critiques, notably that of virtue ethics, in drawing attention to the cost in sensitivity to context and the individual. The Aristotelian basis of virtue ethics has a venerable place in Islamic traditions – as does maslaha, the public good, which has long played a critical role in tempering formalism in the shari’a. In conjunction with the agent- and context-centred reasoning of virtue ethics, maslaha can contribute vitally to negotiating competing bioethical claims. It is also more inclusive than principlist legalism, given the latter’s traditionalist and patriarchal moorings. The shift is urgent amid the growing interface of religious and secular approaches to problems raised by biomedical technologies, and to biosocial issues such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and honour killings.

Judges and Human Rights: The Kenyan Experience

1991 ◽  
Vol 35 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 142-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gibson Kamau Kuria ◽  
Algeisa M. Vazquez
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
Fundamental Rights And Freedoms ◽  
The Individual

On 4 July, 1989 in Maina Mbacha v. Attorney General the High Court of Kenya appeared to remove itself from its role of enforcing the Bill of Rights of Kenya. The court ruled “inoperative” section 84 of the Constitution of Kenya which grants original jurisdiction to the High Court to enforce Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, section 70–83 (inclusive) (Chapter V). The provision was deemed “inoperative” in Kamau Kuria v. Attorney General, and this was upheld shortly thereafter in Maina Mbacha when the High Court found that no rules of procedure had been enacted to enforce the Bill of Rights and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, in the latter case the court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction even though the case was before the court by virtue of the constitutional grant of “original unlimited jurisdiction”. As a matter of established law, the court can be approached by any available procedure when ruling to enforce established constitutional rights. Ordinary rights can be defeated for failure to follow procedure, but historically, procedural requirements often defer to constitutionally granted rights. Once the Bill of Rights was enacted in the Constitution, its enforcement became supreme to all other law, including procedural rules, for the supremacy clause of the Kenya Constitution states: “… if any other law became inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void”

scholarly journals IN RELATION TO CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 46-52
Author(s):  
D.A. Gadzhieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Group Rights ◽  
Collective Rights ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Legal Entities

This article is devoted to the analysis of some of the issues related to the definition of the content of the concept of collective human rights. The author examines the issues related to the definition of methods of exercising and the range of subjects of collective rights, some problems concerning their relations with individual rights, as well as whether the term “collective rights of the individual” is a proper one to be used in law science. The author analyzes the difference between the concepts of “collective” and group” rights, and also substantiates the reasons why these categories of human rights cannot be equated or why group rights cannot be singled out into an independent category of individual rights. In addition, the author substantiates the impossibility of possessing of collective rights by legal entities.

scholarly journals Tafsir Wewenang Seponering Jaksa Agung Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 29/PUU-XIV/2016

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilham Dwi Rafiqi
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
State Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Public ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Definition Of

The affirmation of the attorney general's authority in the Elucidation of Article 35 letter C of the Indonesian Prosecutor's Law after the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 29/PUU-XIV/2016 still leaves problems and has the potential to cause new legal problems. This research will look at and analyze how the authority of the Attorney General after the decision is as well as how the concept of an ideal arrangement that ensures legal certainty. This research uses normative juridical research with a statutory approach and case studies which in this case are court decisions. The results showed that after Constitutional Court decision, there was a change in the meaning of the Elucidation of Article 35 letter c of the Republic of Indonesia Prosecutor's Law. Based on the results of these interpretations and decisions, the legal implications that followed were related to the conditions for setting aside cases in the public interest, namely in setting aside cases in the public interest, the Attorney General was required to 'require' first to pay attention to suggestions and opinions from state power agencies that have relationship with the problem. The concept of an ideal arrangement that can guarantee legal certainty as an indicator to measure and assess the implementation of the Attorney General's obligations can be done by clarifying the definition of "state power agencies" for which advice and opinions are requested and making criteria for the term "public interest".

scholarly journals The Cheshire explainer. Musings about the training of explainers

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (04) ◽  
pp. C06
Author(s):  
Antonio Gomes da Costa
Keyword(s):  
Science Communication ◽  
Clear Definition ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Scientific Training ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Main Factors ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Definition Of

The profession of explainer is still pretty much undefined and underrated and the training of explainers is many times deemed to be a luxury. In the following pages we make the argument that three main factors contribute to this state of affairs and, at the same time, we try to show why the training of explainers should really be at the core of any science communication institution. These factors are: an erroneous perception of what a proper scientific training means for explainers; a lack of clear definition of the aptitudes and role of explainers required by institutions that are evolving and diversifying their missions; and an organizational model based on top-down practices of management and activity development which underappreciates the potential of the personnel working directly with the public.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document