scholarly journals BOOK REVIEW CHARLES THOMAS AND TOYIN FALOLA, SECESSION AND SEPARATIST CONFLICTS IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA. CALGARY: UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY PRESS, 2020. PP. VIII, 344.

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-256
Author(s):  
Jacob Babajide ◽  

The book, Secession and Separatist Conflicts in Postcolonial Africa, is a timely intervention on this important dimension to conflicts in Africa, especially in the post-cold war order where intra-state conflicts have become the norm rather than exception. Armed with suitably relevant historical analysis and epistemological methodology, the authors cleverly approach the varieties of conflict cases associated with secessionist, separatist and irredentist moves and Movements across Africa. Such liberation efforts span through struggles towards decolonization and struggles for self-determination or autonomy. The arrangement of the book is methodical, encompassing the dynamics and structures of successful, failed, protracted and short-lived attempts at secession and separatism in Africa and implications for sub-Saharan African states.

1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-46
Author(s):  
Donald S. Rothchild

The Clinton administration and its predecessors have had a difficult time assessing the impact of ethnicity and nationalism on international conflict. They are inclined to focus on state power and individual rights considerations, downplaying the importance of the ties of communal identity and the emotive appeals of ethnic self-determination. Then, when ethnic groups do gain political significance, U.S. officials often give the communal concerns a prominence out of proportion with reality. The primary challenge for the Clinton administration is that U.S. liberalism classically has involved commitments that preclude flexibility on communally based demands for self-determination and group rights. Such perspectives can at times complicate the formulation of effective foreign policies for a region only partially integrated into the global capitalist economy, and therefore autonomous for some purposes from U.S. manipulation. What is needed is an involved but pragmatic liberalism that links U.S. conflict management objectives with what Thomas Friedman describes as a “coherent post–Cold War strategic framework.” Without that framework, he writes, “the Americans look like naive do-gooders trying to break up a street brawl.”


Author(s):  
Rebecca Tapscott

Although militias have received increasing scholarly attention, the concept itself remains contested by those who study it. Why? And how does this impact contemporary scholarship on political violence? To answer these questions, we can focus on the field of militia studies in post–Cold War sub-Saharan Africa, an area where militia studies have flourished in the past several decades. Virtually all scholars of militias in post–Cold War Africa describe militias as fluid and changing such that they defy easy definition. As a result, scholars offer complex descriptors that incorporate both descriptive and analytic elements, thereby offering nuanced explanations for the role of militias in violent conflict. Yet the ongoing tension between accurate description and analytic definition has also produced a body of literature that is diffuse and internally inconsistent, in which scholars employ conflicting definitions of militias, different data sources, and often incompatible methods of analysis. As a result, militia studies yield few externally valid comparative insights and have limited analytic power. The cumulative effect is a schizophrenic field in which one scholar’s militia is another’s rebel group, local police force, or common criminal. The resulting incoherence fragments scholarship on political violence and can have real-world policy implications. This is particularly true in high-stakes environments of armed conflict, where being labeled a “militia” can lead to financial support and backing in some circumstances or make one a target to be eliminated in others. To understand how militia studies has been sustained as a fragmented field, this article offers a new typology of definitional approaches. The typology shows that scholars use two main tools: offering a substantive claim as to what militias are or a negative claim based on what militias are not and piggy-backing on other concepts to either claim that militias are derivative of or distinct from them. These approaches illustrate how scholars combine descriptive and analytic approaches to produce definitions that sustain the field as fragmented and internally contradictory. Yet despite the contradictions that characterize the field, scholarship reveals a common commitment to using militias to understand the organization of (legitimate) violence. This article sketches a possible approach to organize the field of militia studies around the institutionalization of violence, such that militias would be understood as a product of the arrangement of violence. Such an approach would both allow studies of militias to place their ambiguity and fluidity at the center of analyses while offering a pathway forward for comparative studies.


1998 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Cavanagh Hodge

On December 23, 1991, the Federal Republic of Germany announced its intention to proceed with unilateral diplomatic recognition of the secessionist Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia, unquestionably one of the most precipitous acts in post-Cold War Europe. With it the Bonn government in effect renounced the legitimacy of the existing Yugoslav state and pressured other European governments to do the same. Within weeks the Yugoslav federation came apart at every seam, while its civil affairs degenerated into an anarchy of armed violence as convoluted in many respects as the Thirty Years' War.In Germany's defense, it should be conceded at the outset that an alternative approach to recognition would not necessarily have produced a fundamentally more peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia. In light of the deepening political and economic cleavages with which the multinational state had been wrestling since the 1970s, the reasonable question is not whether the serial wars of the Yugoslav succession could have been avoided altogether, but whether Germany's action offered Yugoslavia and its populace the best chance for a more peaceful course of change given the circumstances. Did Bonn apply the best of its diplomatic and political brains to the issues of sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights? Were its actions morally responsible with regard to Balkan, German, and European history?


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