On the breach: Identifying infringements of section 35 rights

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry Wilkins
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Substitution Effects ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Inclusive Approach ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has said, protects existing Aboriginal and treaty rights from unjustified infringement at the hands of federal and provincial legislatures and governments. To give meaningful effect to section 35’s protection, we need, therefore, to understand what counts as infringement of such rights and why. The Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence to date on this question, alas, disappoints; it does not withstand close critical scrutiny. This article calls attention to several shortcomings and inconsistencies in that jurisprudence and proposes for initial consideration a more inclusive approach to infringement identification, one that draws a sharper distinction between the infringement and justification inquiries. Adoption of such an approach, however, could have unwelcome substitution effects, prompting cautious courts to be more selective when asked to authenticate future claims of Aboriginal right, more penurious when construing the constitutionally protected scope of particular treaty or Aboriginal rights and/or more generous to governments during the justification inquiry. If the goal is to optimize the protection that Canadian constitutional law affords to treaty and Aboriginal rights, we shall need to be mindful of the interdependence among the authentication, infringement, and justification inquiries, and we shall need to understand much more clearly than we currently do just where the outer limits are beyond which mainstream Canadian law cannot, or will not, countenance Indigenous ways and why.

Recent Developments in Canadian Aboriginal Law: Overview of Case Law and of Certain Principles of Aboriginal Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-350
Author(s):  
Patricia Ochman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Aboriginal Law

AbstractThe author reviews the most recent judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and certain provincial courts, in order to provide an update in the sphere of Aboriginal law practice in Canada, destined mainly for foreign lawyers and academics. Throughout the review of those recent judgments, the author provides an overview of certain key principles and concepts of Canadian Aboriginal law. Besides providing an overview of recent judgments in the sphere of Aboriginal law, the author seeks to illustrate how meaningful the protection and recognition of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are in practice, through the overview of key concepts and principles of Canadian Aboriginal law and how they were recently interpreted by Canadian courts. The author briefly addresses Canada's vote against the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

scholarly journals Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test

1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
Leonard I. Rotman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Federal Legislation ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Straightforward Application ◽  
The Supreme Court

In the case of R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada created a justificatory scheme for federal legislation that had the potential to derogate from the rights of the Aboriginal peoples that are protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Since that time, the Sparrow test has been applied to both Aboriginal and treaty rights. The author suggests that the straightforward application of the Sparrow test to treaty rights is inappropriate because of the significant distinctions between Aboriginal and treaty rights. Where there is a need to balance treaty rights with competing rights, any justificatory standard to be applied ought to be consistent with the consensual basis of Crown- Native treaties.

scholarly journals A Choice among Values: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on the Defence of Necessity

1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Historical Perspectives ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
A Value ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.

scholarly journals Settling the Fisheries: Pre-Confederation Crown Policy in Upper Canada and the Supreme Court's decisions in R. v. NIKAL and LEWIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-172
Author(s):  
Peggy J. Blair
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Upper Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Although a casual reading of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Nikal and R. v. Lewis might suggest otherwise, this article will argue that Court's decisions in two recent British Columbia aboriginal fishing cases do not apply in Ontario. In doing so, it will be shown that the Supreme Court of Canada relied on evidence of historic Crown policies towards aboriginal fishing rights in Upper Canada in the absence of appropriate context as to when, how and why those policies evolved. As a result, the Court wrongly concluded that fisheries could not be the subject of exclusive aboriginal rights.

Historian and Courts:R. v. Marshall and Mi'kmaqTreaties on Trial

2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas C. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Hunting And Fishing ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Fisheries Act ◽  
Commercial Hunting

In September, 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its decision inR v. Marshall. Donald Marshall Jr., no stranger to Canadian law, had been convicted of catching eels out of season, without a licence, and selling them, contrary to the federalFisheries Act. He admitted the offences, but appealed his conviction to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and then to the SCC on the grounds that the 1760–61 treaties between the Mi'kmaq and the British recognized his right, as a Mi'kmaq, to catch and sell fish, and that this right was protected under the guarantee of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Canadian constitution. Justice Binnie, writing for the majority of the SCC, overturned the convictions. The Mi'kmaq, he held, did have treaty rights based on the 1760–61 treaties to catch and sell fish, including eels.The Mi'kmaq were delighted. After many years and many appearances before Canadian judges (R. v. Syliboy, R. v. Issac, andR. v. Simon), it appeared that the courts were finally prepared to recognize what the Mi'kmaq had long believed: that the eighteenth century treaties were the foundation of their relationship with Canada, that the treaties were still in force, and that they guaranteed commercial hunting and fishing rights in their traditional territories.

scholarly journals Dizzying Dialogue: Canadian Courts and the Continuing Justification of the Dispossession Of Aboriginal People

2011 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
D’Arcy Vermette
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal People ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Peuples Autochtones

Since Aboriginal rights have found protection within Canada’s Constitution, a new relationship has emerged between Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples and the Crown. This relationship is characterized by the need for “reconciliation.” In its growing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada applies reconciliation doctrine to several important Aboriginal claims. Each application, however, brings with it a restriction on Aboriginal rights. This paper argues that the Court’s conception of reconciliation is designed to facilitate the integration of Aboriginal peoples into larger society rather than to protect their collective interests. To demonstrate this argument, this paper examines the Supreme Court’s discussion of the doctrine of reconciliation from Sparrow (1990) to Little Salmon (2010).Depuis que les droits des autochtones sont protégés par la constitution canadienne, une nouvelle relation, ayant comme caractéristique le besoin de « réconciliation », a vu le jour entre les peuples autochtones du Canada et la Couronne. La Cour suprême du Canada a appliqué la doctrine de la réconciliation dans la série d’arrêts où elle s’est penchée sur plusieurs importantes revendications autochtones. Dans chaque cas, l’application de la doctrine de la réconciliation a cependant abouti à une restriction des droits des autochtones. Dans cet article, l’auteur soutient que, dans l’esprit de la Cour, la réconciliation vise à faciliter l’intégration des peuples autochtones dans la société en général plutôt qu’à protéger leurs intérêts collectifs. Pour étayer cette opinion, il examine l’analyse qu’a faite la Cour suprême de la doctrine de réconciliation de l’arrêt Sparrow (1990) à l’arrêt Little Salmon (2010).

scholarly journals Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties

1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contextual Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

This article explores the interpretive principle of sui generis treaties introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada since the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982. The article proceeds through an analysis of treaty rights as constitutional rights, contextual analysis of Indian Treaties, the intent of the treaty parties and the principles which govern the interpretation of treaty text. The author concludes that the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada are an attempt to affirm and enhance Aboriginal worldviews and cognitive diversity within the Constitution of Canada.

scholarly journals JUDICIALIZAÇÃO E ATIVISMO JUDICIAL EM PERSPECTIVA: UMA ANÁLISE A PARTIR DAS EXPERIÊNCIAS DAS SUPREMAS CORTES DO BRASIL E DO CANADÁ

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 425
Author(s):  
Edith Maria Barbosa RAMOS ◽  
Pedro Trovão do ROSÁRIO ◽  
Sara Barros Pereira de MIRANDA
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Scientific Journals ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Theoretical Construction

RESUMOA presente pesquisa por escopo analisar os fenômenos da judicialização e do ativismo judicial a partir das experiências da Suprema Corte do Canadá e do Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. Observou-se que, em ambos os países, tem havido, nas últimas décadas, uma contínua expansão da autoridade do Poder Judiciário e da sua atuação em temáticas de natureza política até então abordadas apenas pelos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo, o que pode ser evidenciado a partir da análise das decisões proferidas pelas Cortes Supremas dos dois países. Apesar das diferenças na arquitetura constitucional, ambas as Cortes atuam como condutoras do processo de expansão alcance do poder de suas estruturas judiciárias. O presente artigo foi desenvolvido a partir de levantamento bibliográfico em artigos obtidos em diferentes bancos de dados e indexadores, publicados na integra em português e inglês, acessados de forma gratuita. Foram selecionadas revistas científicas na área do Direito Constitucional Comparado com extratos elevados, qualis A e B. Utilizou-se, ainda, dados constantes em documentos oficiais e na legislação pertinente com recorte epistemológico e científico fundado na construção teórica contemporânea dos Direitos Fundamentais. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Judicialização; Ativismo Judicial; Suprema Corte do Canadá; Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. ABSTRACTThis research by scope analyzes the phenomena of judicialization and judicial activism from the experiences of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Brazilian Supreme Court. It has been observed that, in both countries, there has been, in the last decades, a continuous expansion of the authority of the Judiciary Power and its action in themes of a political nature hitherto addressed only by the Legislative and Executive Powers, which can be evidenced by from the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of both countries. Despite differences in constitutional architecture, both courts act as drivers of the process of expanding the power of their judicial structures. This article was developed from a bibliographic survey in articles obtained in different databases and indexers, published in full in Portuguese and English, accessed for free. Scientific journals were selected in the area of Constitutional Law Compared with high extracts, qualis A and B. It was also used data in official documents and relevant legislation with epistemological and scientific basis based on the contemporary theoretical construction of Fundamental Rights. KEYWORDS: Judicialization; Judicial activism; Supreme Court of Canada; Brazilian Supreme Court.

Part VI Constitutional Theory, D The Role of Constitutional Principles in Canadian Constitutional Law, Ch.47 Constitutional Principles in the Secession Reference

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leclair Jean
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Constitutional Changes ◽  
Political Compromises

In Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the unwritten constitutional principles of federalism and democracy dictated that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province gave rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to the federation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire. To understand this astonishing decision, the author first examines how, over time, in Canada and Quebec, issues of identity(ies), constitutional law, and democracy came to be formulated in absolutist terms, making political compromises next to impossible. Only then does he analyse the Supreme Court’s decision and attempts to explain why the latter chose to decide as it did.

Self-determination—Canada—Quebec—right to secede under constitutional law and public international law—role of international law in Canadian courts

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 519-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Stephen J. Toope
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Federal Authority ◽  
Unilateral Declaration ◽  
Legal Context ◽  
The Supreme Court

Re Reference by Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating to Secession of Quebec from Canada.Supreme Court of Canada, August 20, 1998.In an attempt to clarify the legal context in which continuing Canadian constitutional conundrums arise, the federal executive referred three questions to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the legality under both Canadian constitutional law and international law of a potential unilateral declaration of independence by the Province of Quebec. The Court declared that unilateral secession is not permitted under either Canadian constitutional law or international law. The “underlying principles that animate” the Canadian Constitution preclude secession, even though there is no specific text prohibiting the dismantling of the Canadian state. However, if Quebecers were to vote yes to secession by “a clear majority on a clear question,” democratic legitimacy would be conferred on the secessionist project and a constitutional obligation to negotiate would arise binding the other provinces and the federal authority.

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