scholarly journals The Generalized Criterion of Relevance for Argument Evaluation

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktoriia Babiuk
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-307
Author(s):  
Marcello Di Bello ◽  
Bart Verheij
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-41
Author(s):  
Atefeh Keshavarzi Zafarghandi ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge ◽  
Bart Verheij

Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) have been introduced as a formalism for modeling argumentation allowing general logical satisfaction conditions and the relevant argument evaluation. Different criteria used to settle the acceptance of arguments are called semantics. Semantics of ADFs have so far mainly been defined based on the concept of admissibility. However, the notion of strongly admissible semantics studied for abstract argumentation frameworks has not yet been introduced for ADFs. In the current work we present the concept of strong admissibility of interpretations for ADFs. Further, we show that strongly admissible interpretations of ADFs form a lattice with the grounded interpretation as the maximal element. We also present algorithms to answer the following decision problems: (1) whether a given interpretation is a strongly admissible interpretation of a given ADF, and (2) whether a given argument is strongly acceptable/deniable in a given interpretation of a given ADF. In addition, we show that the strongly admissible semantics of ADFs forms a proper generalization of the strongly admissible semantics of AFs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (7) ◽  
pp. 581-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Srikanth Dandotkar ◽  
Joseph P. Magliano ◽  
M. Anne Britt
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-147
Author(s):  
Didier Maillat

Abstract This paper proposes to harness the linguistic theory that looks at the construction of meaning in context – i.e., pragmatics – to investigate the contextual effects bearing on the interpretation of arguments in manipulative seduction contexts. Adopting a cognitively grounded relevance-theoretic approach, I will show that deceptive seduction is used primarily to strengthen the hearer’s perception of the seducer, thereby strengthening the standpoints and arguments s/he puts forward. In that sense, it will be argued, seductive moves function like contextual constraints on the interpretative processes. Exploring further the cognitive grounding of human interpretative processes, I will claim that many seductive manipulations rely on the halo effect – the cognitive bias whereby a positive trait (e.g., attractiveness) tends to spill over other personality traits (e.g., competence) – to create a contextual environment that will boost argument evaluation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 781-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran O’Halloran

In the article, I model an alternative critical discourse analysis (CDA) pedagogy which is based on an ethical subjectivity instead of a political subjectivity. Aimed at undergraduates, it facilitates critical purchase on arguments which attack the standpoint of relatively powerless groups/organizations (who seek political change). Via corpus linguistic analysis of appropriate web-based data, I show how the analyst can rigorously find out at scale the recurrent key concerns of a relatively powerless Other with whom they were previously unfamiliar. They use this counter-discourse information as a lens on an argument which criticises the relatively powerless group, ascertaining whether or not the argument has distorted the group’s key concerns. Should this be the case, I highlight how the analyst can go on to explore whether any mischaracterisation has implications for the argument’s credibility because it loses coherence relative to the outlook of the Other. The approach is grounded in Jacques Derrida’s ‘ethics of hospitality to the Other’. It is in being hospitable to the outlook of a relatively powerless Other, and adopting it for purposes of argument evaluation, that the analyst effectively creates an ethical subjectivity. That said, the ethical and political are, in principle, relatable with this method as I indicate.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 781-813 ◽  

In the article I model an alternative critical discourse analysis (CDA) pedagogy which is based on an ethical subjectivity instead of a political subjectivity. Aimed at undergraduates, it facilitates critical purchase on arguments which attack the standpoint of relatively powerless groups/organizations (who seek political change). Via corpus linguistic analysis of appropriate web-based data, I show how the analyst can rigorously find out at scale the recurrent key concerns of a relatively powerless Other with whom they were previously unfamiliar. They use this counter-discourse information as a lens on an argument which criticises the relatively powerless group, ascertaining whether or not the argument has distorted the group’s key concerns. Should this be the case, I highlight how the analyst can go on to explore whether any mischaracterisation has implications for the argument’s credibility because it loses coherence relative to the outlook of the Other. The approach is grounded in Jacques Derrida’s ‘ethics of hospitality to the Other’. It is in being hospitable to the outlook of a relatively powerless Other, and adopting it for purposes of argument evaluation, that the analyst effectively creates an ethical subjectivity. That said, the ethical and political are, in principle, relatable with this method as I indicate. Keywords: absences; argumentation; change.org; corpus linguistics; counter-discourse; critical discourse analysis; ethical subjectivity; Jacques Derrida; online comments; text cohesion.


Argumentation ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-498
Author(s):  
Shiyang Yu ◽  
Frank Zenker

Abstract According to the argument scheme approach, to evaluate a given scheme-saturating instance completely does entail asking all critical questions (CQs) relevant to it. Although this is a central task for argumentation theorists, the field currently lacks a method for providing a complete argument evaluation. Approaching this task at the meta-level, we combine a logical with a substantive approach to the argument schemes by starting from Toulmin’s schema: ‘data, warrant, so claim’. For the yet more general schema: ‘premise(s); if premise(s), then conclusion; so conclusion’, we forward a meta-level CQ-list that is arguably both complete and applicable. This list should inform ongoing theoretical efforts at generating appropriate object-level CQs for specific argument schemes.


1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Walton

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility function that can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party's character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-220
Author(s):  
Simoni Iliadi ◽  
Kostas Theologou ◽  
Spyridon Stelios ◽  

Philosophy courses help students develop logical reasoning and argument skills or so it is widely assumed. To test if this is actually the case, we examined university students’ familiarity with the basic tools for argument. Our findings, based on a sample of 651 students enrolled in philosophy courses at six Greek universities, indicate that students who have prior experience with philosophy are more familiar with the basic tools for argument, and that students who have taken philosophy courses at the university have stronger argument-recognition and argument-evaluation skills compared to university students with no prior experience with philosophy. Moreover, our findings suggest that students get more familiar with the basic tools for argument as their level of engagement with philosophy increases, and that they get significantly better at evaluating arguments when they become graduate students in philosophy. However, our findings also suggest that the majority of students in philosophy classrooms haven’t developed fluency in (at least some) basic argument-related concepts and skills. To remedy this, we argue that philosophy instructors need to re-think (a) the place that the teaching of argument has in philosophy courses, and (b) the way that they teach students about argument.


2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 235-254
Author(s):  
G.C. Goddu

‘Grass is red’ is the only premise and is obviously false, so (X) should convince you that there are arguments with merely obviously false premises. On the face of it, there is nothing irrational about being so convinced by (X). But then (X) is a rationally persuasive argument with merely obviously false premises.A cheap trick you say? Not so, say I — a trick yes, but, I shall argue, far from cheap. In ‘ ‘P, Therefore, P’ Without Circularity,’ Roy Sorensen uses numerous examples like these to suggest, among other things, that there is a missing parameter to argument evaluation, viz. exemplification. I shall argue, however, that understanding these sorts of cases in the way that motivates Sorensen to recommend adding the extra parameter has extremely unpalatable consequences. I shall propose an alternative account that avoids these consequences.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document