The co-construction of campaign argumentation on U.S.A. late-night talk shows

This study shows that when presidential candidates visit, late-night talk show discourse is argumentative, and that this argumentation is co-constructed by the host and the candidate. Through their questions, hosts implicitly invoke arguments by casting doubt on the candidate’s presidential bid. By treating the host’s questions as critical questions expressing skepticism whether people should vote for the candidate, politicians prototypically use two types of argument schemes to defend their case. First, to argue that their policy proposals are needed, candidates use complex problem-solving argumentation. Second, to maintain that they have the skills and character to succeed as president, candidates use symptomatic argumentation. In their response, candidates also deal with other critical questions belonging to the argument scheme invoked through the host’s question. Which critical questions of that argument scheme the candidate addresses in addition to the one posed by the host depends on the type of question the host has asked.

Argumentation schemes as a way of arguments studies

The paper investigates argument (argumentation) schemes that are used in the theory of argumentation for analyzing everyday reasoning. Such schemes should be understood as structures representing the most general types of argument. Today they are studied not only from theoretical perspectives but also in relation to their application in education and information technologies. Argumentation schemes allow us to identify, produce and evaluate real arguments, as well as critically assess discussions. Despite their popularity, argumentation schemes face some problems. The current presentation introduces the concept of schemes, describes their possible classifications, analyzes strengths and limitations in various approaches. However, the main focus of the paper is on the direction in which the conception of an argument scheme is being developed. I argue that the new stage of its development can be correlated with the birth of a dynamic style of argument in­vestigation that is opposed to a static version. A similar dichotomy can be observed in logic that stands for two types of formality: as pertaining to forms and as pertaining to rules.

Schemes, Critical Questions, and Complete Argument Evaluation

According to the argument scheme approach, to evaluate a given scheme-saturating instance completely does entail asking all critical questions (CQs) relevant to it. Although this is a central task for argumentation theorists, the field currently lacks a method for providing a complete argument evaluation. Approaching this task at the meta-level, we combine a logical with a substantive approach to the argument schemes by starting from Toulmin’s schema: ‘data, warrant, so claim’. For the yet more general schema: ‘premise(s); if premise(s), then conclusion; so conclusion’, we forward a meta-level CQ-list that is arguably both complete and applicable. This list should inform ongoing theoretical efforts at generating appropriate object-level CQs for specific argument schemes.

The Inference to the Best Legal Explanation

Courts use inferences to the best explanation in many contexts and for a variety of purposes. Yet our understanding of lawyers’ uses of this inferential form is insufficient. In this article, after briefly introducing this inferential form, I set out to: (i) explain the structure of such arguments by reference to an argument scheme; (ii) clarify the types of claims courts support by deploying such inferences while attempting to justify acting in accordance with explanatory principles (inferences to the best explanation—principles, or IBE-Ps); (iii) offer an account of the ‘explanatory’ relationship on which IBE-P is predicated; (iv) explain what precisely can count as part of the explanandum in an IBE-P; and (v) discuss criteria that might be used to adjudicate which is the best among rival explanations.

A New Argument Scheme for Causal Explanations by Analogy? The Case of Galileo’s Explanation of the Tides

This paper is a case study. After formulating three norms for critical assessment of argumentation (section 1), I give a brief overview of Galileo’s argumentative strategy in his Dialogue and present his argument for the cause of the tides, which appears as an argument by analogy (section 2). I then discuss possible reconstructions of this argumentation, with one particular suggestion in detail. These arguments seem to fall short, given the aforementioned set of norms (section 3). This leads to my own proposal of Galileo’s argument. I defend this proposal and it’s general idea - that is, the argument’s pattern. It will be classified as ‘interventionist’ and useful regarding the goals of critical assessment (section 4). Finally, I suggest that the pattern of argument is applicable to other cases and useful for applied theory of science (section 5).

Context-dependency of argumentative patterns in discourse

This introductory article concludes the examination of prototypical argumentative patterns manifesting themselves in communicative activity types in the political, legal and medical domain reported in this special issue of the Journal of Argumentation in Context (JAIC) and an earlier special issue of the journal Argumentation (2016, 30(1)). First, the results pertaining to the use of pragmatic argumentation in the main argumentation of prototypical argumentative patterns in the various domains are described that were reported in the latter issue. Next, the results are described which are reported in this issue of JAIC; they pertain to prototypical argumentative patterns in the various domains that come into being as a result of the employment of an argument scheme in the main argumentation that is perfectly suited for being used in a certain communicative activity type in a specific domain. In the following section an overview is provided of the most conspicuous differences in the prototypical argumentative patterns between the various communicative domains caused by the institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering in the communicative activity types that were examined. Finally, some general conclusions are discussed.

The Role of Quasi-Logical Arguments in Critical Dialogue: A Pragma-Dialectical Redefinition

The article focuses on the New Rhetoric’s concept of quasi-logical arguments imitating logical or mathematical demonstrations, and examines it from point of view of pragma-dialectics as a device contributing towards resolving the difference of opinion. It is shown that the category of quasi-logical arguments cannot be considered as an argument scheme or a united type of strategic maneuvering. It is suggested to consider the category of quasi-logical arguments as a cluster of specific strategic maneuvers increasing the efficiency of arguments under certain circumstances. This approach is demonstrated in a case study of pragma-dialectical analysis of the quasi-logical scheme of probability.

How to Disagree About Argument Schemes

Argumentation theorists often disagree about which scheme best represents a given type of argument (e.g. argument by analogy, argument from authority, inference to the best explanation). Unfortunately, authors sometimes become involved in fruitless pseudo-agreement because they fail to perceive that their supposedly competing schemes are means for achieving different (but compatible) practical or theoretical goals. This paper explains some of the different purposes that an argument scheme may serve, and it indicates how the relevant type of pseudo-disagreement may be avoided.